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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates how political instability is related to the probability of civil war. 
According to the literature in comparative politics, regime breakdown is caused by critical events 
such as economic decline, defeat in interstate war, death of a leader in office, or changes is the 
international balance of power. Drawing on Powell (2004, 2006), I conceptualize such critical 
events as shifts in the domestic distribution of power that can lead to a bargaining breakdown 
and, in consequence, military conflict. Following a shock to government capabilities, current 
leaders and the opposition are bargaining for a share of authority. The government has incentives 
to grant concessions to other groups within the state, yet such promises are not credible given 
that the leadership may regain its strength. Similarly, opposition groups lack the ability to make 
credible commitments as they expect to be more powerful in the future. Both the government and 
opposition groups could benefit from striking bargains, but cannot credibly commit because of 
incentives to renege on agreements in the future. Unable to commit, both actors may use force to 
achieve their preferred outcome. The dissertation then shifts the focus to solutions to such 
commitment problems. I expect that (1) the institutional structure of government and opposition 
groups and (2) the distance between groups have important consequences on the range of 
feasible agreements during this bargaining process. The arguments are tested in a statistical study 
of all countries for the 1960-2004 time period and in a small-sample analysis of democratization 
processes in Algeria and Chile. Findings show that critical events increase the probability of civil 
war as hypothesized and empirical evidence also provides strong support for the proposed 
solutions to the commitment problem.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the course of his 28-year stay in power, Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe has 
led his country to the verge of economic collapse. Zimbabwe’s economy has shrunk by one-third 
since 1999, and disastrous economic policies have resulted in inflation rates exceeding 100,000 
percent in early 2008.1 Mugabe’s continued rejection of international pressure for reform turned 
the country into a pariah in international relations. Amid these destabilizing conditions, 
presidential elections were held in March 2008. The contest pitted long-serving autocrat Mugabe 
against the leader of the main opposition party, Morgan Tsvangirai. Following the election, local 
democracy advocates projected an election victory for the opposition candidate. The country’s 
electoral commission, however, failed to publish official results for more than three weeks after 
the election. Mugabe’s party then offered that he would participate in a runoff election with the 
opposition leader if neither candidate received an absolute majority in the elections.2 This 
proposal was swiftly rejected by opposition leaders, who argued that Mugabe’s past history of 
election rigging made such promises incredible, as the offer was simply a tool to buy more time 
to distort election results. Over the next few days, reports of violence against opposition 
supporters spread in Zimbabwe, seemingly confirming the opposition’s fears.3 Lacking 
credibility to negotiate with opposition groups for future influence, the government used force to 
secure its continued power.  
In late 2007, Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide bombing 
at an election rally. Her death occurred only two weeks before Pakistan’s first democratic 
elections since President Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999. With her party leading in the 
polls, her assassination unleashed street violence and riots with over 50 deaths. Throughout his 
                                                 
1 Angus Shaw, “Zimbabwe Inflation Passes 100,000 Percent,” The Guardian, February 22, 2008.  
2 Celia W. Dugger, “Leaders of Ruling Party Say Mugabe Will Fight On,” New York Times, April 5, 2008.  
3 Celia W. Dugger, “Accounts of Violence Spread in Zimbabwe,” New York Times, April 9, 2008.  
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leadership, Musharraf had repeatedly promised to hold elections and return power to a civilian 
government, but never put reforms into practice. In November 2007, he proclaimed emergency 
rule, dismissed all Supreme Court justices, and replaced them with followers when the court 
challenged his quest for a third term as president. Intended as an attempt to strengthen his 
waning power, the declaration of emergency rule triggered intense domestic and especially 
international pressure by Pakistan’s allies, and Musharraf eventually agreed to hold elections in 
January of 2008. His regime’s credibility, however, was severely tainted, and many doubted his 
true commitment to reform.4 Immediately following Bhutto’s assassination, supporters of 
opposition parties instantly blamed members of the military regime for her death. While 
responsibility for the attack has not been determined, Bhutto and other observers have criticized 
her security protection by the government as insufficient in the past.5  
The above discussion of recent events in Pakistan and Zimbabwe shows how political 
instability contributes to the eruption of violence. In both countries, the regimes’ past actions and 
subsequent credibility problems seemingly contributed to the occurrence of violence at election 
time. It is the goal of this dissertation to demonstrate that the current events in Zimbabwe and 
Pakistan are examples of a more general class of events. To develop a general explanation of the 
consequences of political instability on the occurrence of violence within states, the dissertation 
asks two key questions.  
First, why does political instability increase the probability of civil war? The argument 
developed here expects that critical events weaken the government’s capabilities and result in 
bargaining over the future distribution of power. When a shock or critical event weakens the 
                                                 
4 Ironically, Musharraf’s campaign used the slogan “confidence and credibility.” 
5 Randall Mikkelsen, “Musharraf: Bhutto Bears Responsibility for Her Death,” Reuters, January 5, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL1624120080105 (accessed April 26, 2008). In an interview for the 
CBS show “60 Minutes” broadcast on January 6, President Musharraf also suggested that the opposition leader 
exposed herself to danger and bears responsibility for the attack.    
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government’s capabilities, neither the current regime nor the opposition can credibly commit to a 
regime with shared powers. Once domestic authority is challenged through a shock to its strength 
(such as a change in the international balance of power, economic crisis, war defeat, or the death 
of a leader), uncertainty over the future distribution of power dominates, and relevant groups in 
society will compete for a piece of the domestic pie. Although a regime challenged by a shock 
has incentives to provide concessions to other groups in society, such promises lack credibility, 
as the regime has incentives to renege since it may regain its strength in the future. Equally, an 
opposition group can expect to be more powerful in a future government, thus also having 
incentives to renege on agreements in the future. Commitment problems experienced by 
government and opposition groups thus increase the risk for bargaining failure and, in 
consequence, civil war.  
Second, how can actors solve the commitment problem caused by political instability? To 
develop solutions to the commitment problem, variations in the type of government and 
opposition group are analyzed. In particular, it is expected that (1) the institutional structure of 
the government, (2) the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and (3) the distance between actors 
influences their ability to make credible commitments. First, leaders in authoritarian regimes that 
rely on a small group of supporters and are therefore more likely to be punished when challenged 
will face greater difficulty in making a commitment to peaceful settlements than other 
authoritarian leaders. Leaders in single-party regimes or democracies, on the other hand, will be 
more successful at securing a role in future governments at least for the short term, as can be 
seen in the case of Communist parties in the recent transitions in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. Second, opposition movements with cohesive organizational structures and links 
to existing social organizations are more likely to make credible commitments to sharing power. 
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Cohesive, hierarchical organizations are better at in-group policing and can therefore coerce 
more radical opposition members and enforce compromises (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 715-35). 
In addition, linkages with existing social institutions such as the church or unions make it easier 
for opposition movements to keep extremists at bay (Kalyvas, 2000). Finally, groups with 
divergent preferences will have greater difficulty at making credible commitments. Ethnic 
divisions, for example, can result in competing preferences over possible agreements and will 
therefore reduce the possibility of credible and peaceful negotiation.  
The dissertation develops important insights for international organizations and 
policymakers engaged in the areas of democracy promotion, state failure, and conflict resolution. 
Civil wars are the most common form of military conflict today, cause tremendous suffering, and 
have the potential to undermine regional stability (Sambanis, 2002). In addition, democratization 
and regime transitions more generally have attracted increasing interest in the international 
community. The dissertation’s focus on the conflict-exacerbating effects of political instability, 
therefore, is of great importance for the international community. By demonstrating what types 
of actors or mechanisms are susceptible to the risk of violence change, this research will help in 
identifying the set of cases in which political instability will be most dangerous, and 
precautionary measures by international actors can be taken. 
The arguments developed in the dissertation fit into the broader literature on the 
relationship between political instability and civil war. Three different arguments can be 
distinguished in the existing literature. First, political grievances and changes in states’ political 
opportunity structures are expected to influence the probability of civil war (Hegre et al., 2001; 
Gurr, 2000). States that are neither strongly authoritarian nor true democracies are expected to 
experience more grievances and therefore greater conflict propensities. In addition, regime 
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change represents a change in states’ opportunity structure and thus provides incentives for 
violent mobilization. A second explanation argues that diversionary tactics prompt leaders’ use 
of domestic violence (Snyder, 2000; Figuerdo and Weingast, 1999). Threatened leaders incite 
nationalist violence in order to deflect challenges to their power. Third, the security dilemma has 
been applied to the domestic sphere (Posen, 1993; Walter, 1999). When domestic authority 
breaks down, uncertainty and fear trigger militarization and the occurrence of conflict.  
The dissertation makes two important improvements to the literature on the political 
causes of civil war. First, current arguments suffer from endogeneity problems. Regime change, 
democratization, or the collapse of government authority may already entail the use of force. For 
example, violence is common in coup d’états, which clearly represent instances of regime 
change. The critical events (such as economic crisis or leader death) emphasized in the 
theoretical argument and operationalized in the empirical section avoid endogeneity problems. 
While critical events function as triggers of the bargaining process between government and 
opposition, they do not include the use of force between domestic groups. Second, existing 
arguments fail to explain why actors choose violence – a costly and risky strategy – over the 
peaceful negotiation of agreements (Fearon, 1995). The bargaining argument developed here 
lays out how rapid power shifts can result in bargaining inefficiencies and conflict, thus 
demonstrating how instability can lead to violence among rational actors (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 
2004). 
More generally, the dissertation makes three key contributions to our understanding of 
civil war. First, by focusing on the effects of shocks on civil war, the argument takes the dynamic 
nature of civil war seriously. Many theories of civil war look at concepts that change little or not 
at all over time, such as relative poverty, ethnicity, or natural resources. While such arguments 
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are valuable in the sense that they can tell us which states are expected to have a higher baseline 
probability of civil war, they do not explain why countries move from peace to war. An analysis 
of critical shocks (such as economic crisis, the death of a leader, or defeat in interstate war) 
identifies events that help understand a shift from a stable equilibrium to war.  
Second, the argument shows that shocks to government capabilities represent a shift in 
the domestic distribution of power and thus provide a valuable empirical referent for the 
commitment problems described in Powell (2004, 2006). Economic decline, the death of a 
leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of power are identified as events 
leading to regime weakness, and, in consequence, civil war. Identifying critical events as rapid 
power shifts helps specify the micro-foundations for the inefficient use of force and avoids 
“black-boxing” these changes (Powell, 2004: 237).  
Third, while work on commitment issues provides a compelling explanation of interstate 
or intrastate war occurrence, it does not lay out the conditions under which actors can avoid such 
inefficiency. As outlined above, the dissertation expects that variations in the type of government 
and opposition group influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments. Identifying 
solutions to the commitment problem has important consequences for international organizations 
and policymakers alike.  
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter two provides an overview 
of existing explanations of civil war onset. To place the central questions of this dissertation 
within previous research, economic, ethnic, political, and bargaining theories on the occurrence 
of civil war are reviewed in this chapter. Since the dissertation puts forward a political 
explanation of civil war onset, such theoretical accounts are reviewed in more detail. Three 
distinct arguments can be distinguished. First, grievance and opportunity structures have been 
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argued to explain the relationship between regime change and conflict. Secondly, research has 
analyzed situations of government collapse as an intrastate security dilemma. Finally, 
diversionary-conflict arguments claim that leaders divert from their temporary weakness by 
engaging in violence at the domestic level. After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach, I develop an argument based on a commitment problem between the incumbent 
regime and opposition groups. To place the argument into the larger literature on commitment 
problems, I assess recent work in this area. 
Chapter three presents a detailed account of the two-sided commitment problem that 
arises following shocks to domestic authority. When a critical event such as economic decline, 
defeat in interstate war, the death of a leader, or a change in the international balance of power 
threatens the domestic equilibrium, the incumbent regime and opposition groups will bargain for 
a share of authority. However, neither the current leadership nor opposition groups can credibly 
commit to peaceful agreements following such events. The incumbent regime, while having 
incentives to buy off the opposition, cannot credibly grant concessions since it expects to regain 
its strength in the future. Opposition groups, on the other hand, may expect to become more 
powerful in the future, and thus have incentives to renege on agreements. Lacking the ability to 
credibly commit to negotiated agreements, both actors have the option of using force to achieve 
their most favorable outcome.  
I then analyze solutions to the commitment problem. What types of actors or strategies 
will be most successful in making credible commitments? Since not all shocks lead to the onset 
of violence, better knowledge of the types of actors that enable such nonviolent outcomes is 
crucial for researchers and policymakers alike. I expect that the organizational features of 
government and opposition and the distance between actors affect their ability to make credible 
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commitments. Specifically, I argue that military and personal regimes have smaller winning 
coalitions than single-party or democratic regimes and are therefore less credible when 
threatened in their power. Military and personalist dictators cannot easily extend their circle of 
supporters and therefore have little to offer when their power is challenged. Unable to credibly 
grant concessions, leaders of such regimes are therefore more likely to use force. For the 
opposition, groups possessing strong, hierarchical organizational structures will better be able to 
police demands by radicals, thus enhancing their credibility and reducing the potential for 
violence. Finally, greater distance between groups in society (arising because of ethnic, religious, 
or ideological differences) reduces the range of acceptable agreements and thus makes peaceful 
agreements less likely.  
Chapter four provides a statistical test of the commitment problem outlined in the 
previous chapter. The empirical implications of the hypotheses are tested in a cross-sectional 
dataset including all leaders for the 1960-2004 period. The dataset includes information on all 
types of critical events during the time period analyzed, as well as information on the 
institutional structure of actors and the distance between them. Results show that critical events 
increase the risk of civil war as hypothesized, and this result is consistent across different model 
specifications. Economic decline, war defeat, and changes in the international balance of power 
lead to an increased probability of civil war onset.  
Analyzing only countries that experienced such critical events, I then assess whether 
military and personalist regimes are more likely to experience civil war. Empirical results 
confirm the hypothesis, showing that both types of regimes have greater conflict propensities 
than single-party and democratic regimes. In addition, it is shown that cohesive opposition 
groups are less likely to use force following critical events. As hypothesized, countries with 
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established opposition parties have a reduced risk of civil war onset. Finally, countries with 
greater ethnic diversity have increased probabilities of civil war, confirming the hypothesis on 
the distance between actors.  
Chapter five provides a more detailed historical account of the theoretical expectations by 
examining transition processes in Algeria and Chile. The case studies focus on variation in the 
organizational structure of opposition groups for two reasons. First, little research on opposition 
groups in authoritarian regimes exists, despite the fact that such groups operate in many 
noncompetitive regimes. Second, the cohesion of opposition groups is a concept that is difficult 
to measure in a large-N quantitative analysis. While the statistical results support the theoretical 
argument, detailed process-tracing of historical cases allows for a more accurate 
operationalization of the concept. Therefore, I chose cases that exhibit variation in the 
organizational structure of opposition groups, but are similar in the other independent variables 
emphasized in the theoretical section.  
In the 1980s, critical events altered the domestic balance of power in Algeria and Chile 
and triggered moves toward liberalization by the military leadership. In Algeria, economic 
recession and youth protests forced the military regime to negotiate with opposition groups 
(Quandt, 1998). The authoritarian regime decided to liberalize and called for elections, only to 
later cancel the election results and use force against the Islamist opposition. In contrast, 
Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 plebiscite was followed by a peaceful transfer of power and 
successful democratization in Chile. I argue that institutional structure of opposition groups 
explains these divergent outcomes. The Islamist Salvation Front (FIS), the primary opposition 
party in the Algerian elections, suffered from competition between radical and moderate forces. 
Marred by internal divisions, organizational deficiencies, and the lack of a clear program, the FIS 
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was unable to define itself as a unified and credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. 
Fearful that the opposition movement would renege on its commitment to a democratic regime 
and establish an Islamist state, the military canceled election results and took up arms against the 
Islamists. In addition, the FIS failed to establish coalitions with other opposition parties (Roberts, 
1994a; Martinez, 2000). Conversely, opposition groups in Chile were able to overcome divisions 
and polarization that had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the early 1970s. 
Socialist groups, long beset by internal tensions, united behind a moderate message after a failed 
coup attempt on Pinochet’s life. This development opened up the door for negotiations with 
Christian Democrats. Parties in the center and on the left eventually formed a united, cohesive 
coalition against the military regime. Moreover, party ties to the Catholic Church and unions also 
facilitated the emergence of a unified opposition. The Church, while traditionally closer to the 
Christian Democrats, attracted Socialists because of its engagement in human rights issues. 
Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy in the late 1980s thus can be credited to the unified 
appearance of opposition elites, which signaled credibility to the incumbent military leadership.  
Chapter six offers concluding remarks on the relationship between political instability 
and civil war. In addition to summarizing key findings, the chapter also advances suggestions for 
policymakers and addresses recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Do shocks to the government increase the probability of violent internal conflict? If so, 
how can actors avoid the onset of violence following a weakening of the government? To place 
the central questions of this dissertation within previous research, existing theoretical 
explanations on the occurrence of civil war are reviewed in this chapter. The chapter proceeds in 
six sections. The first section analyzes the intersection of international relations and comparative 
politics with respect to the study of civil war. The second section addresses theoretical and 
methodological challenges in the civil war literature. The subsequent three sections summarize 
economic, ethnic, and political explanations of civil war.6 Multiple theoretical explanations and a 
large body of empirical research exist on the causes of civil wars (Sambanis, 2002). Since this 
dissertation puts forward a political explanation of civil war onset, such theoretical accounts are 
reviewed in more detail. Bargaining theories and their applicability to the study of internal 
conflict are the subject of the sixth section of this chapter. A final section summarizes the main 
theoretical approaches and addresses linkages to the theoretical argument developed in the 
subsequent chapter.  
 
The Intersection of International Relations and Comparative Politics in the Study of Civil War 
Academic interest in civil wars has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold 
War. While scholars in comparative politics have long studied insurgency and political violence 
at the domestic level - such as revolutions, social movements, riots, and other forms of protest - 
the last two decades have witnessed increasing contributions by international relations scholars. 
Traditionally focused on military conflict between states, international relations researchers have 
                                                 
6 Consistent with the focus of this analysis, the review of the civil literature centers on explanations of civil war 
onset, not duration or termination.  
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extended their research to explanations of violence within states, thereby challenging the 
traditional distinction between comparative politics and international relations.  
Traditionally, the study of international politics has concentrated on relations between 
sovereign states and their interactions, while comparative politics engages in the comparison of 
states’ domestic structures. Recent developments within both research areas, however, 
increasingly question the validity of this demarcation line. First, international relations scholars 
today explicitly consider the influence of domestic factors on the relations between states. This 
shift is evident in research on the democratic peace or economic interdependence, which stresses 
the influence of domestic political institutions and economic structures on the relations between 
states (Oneal and Russett, 2001). Similarly, comparative scholars now acknowledge the impact 
of international factors on the domestic structure in areas as diverse as democratization, 
globalization, and the emergence of the state system (Gourevitch, 1978). Second, the anarchy 
assumption, often argued to be the main primary boundary line separating domestic and 
international politics, has been questioned by critics such as Milner (1991). Neorealist theory 
argues that anarchy at the international level results in decentralized competition among 
sovereign equals, where the absence of centralized control results in a self-help system with 
states relying on the use of force for survival (Waltz, 1979). Yet this argument neglects the fact 
that groups - at times violently - compete for power in the domestic sphere. The occurrence of 
civil wars, for example, demonstrates that anarchy does occur at the domestic level.  
 While the theoretical distinctions between international relations and comparative 
politics with respect to domestic violence seem blurry at best, some important differences 
remain. First, unlike military competition between states, where states (or leaders) are the main 
parties to a conflict, civil wars lack a stable set of actors. Therefore, research on civil wars needs 
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to address the question of how and why rebel groups emerge and survive (Gates, 2002). Second, 
anarchy is not a constant condition at the domestic level. This limits the applicability of 
international relations theories such as neorealism, which assumes a permanently unregulated 
environment in the international system (Waltz, 1979). As such, research on civil wars, unlike 
that on international relations, needs to consider the conditions leading to the breakdown of 
order.  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Issues in the Study of Civil War 
Before proceeding to an evaluation of theories of civil war onset, I present a brief outline 
of challenging theoretical and methodological issues in the civil war literature. Among 
theoretical approaches, one can distinguish between macro- and micro-level explanations, with 
the main emphasis until recently on macro-level arguments.7 Examples of such macro-level 
theories of internal conflict are approaches stressing the importance of political or economic 
grievances or ethnic divisions (Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 1985). Yet such approaches leave 
questions on individuals’ motives and actions largely unaddressed – why, for example, do 
individuals take the risk of joining rebellion, and how is violence sustained over time?   
Recent research by Kalyvas (2006) and Gates (2002) has started to fill in these gaps. 
Kalyvas (2006) explores the logic of violence in civil wars at the individual level. In his 
argument, actors use selective violence because it functions as a powerful deterrent, as it creates 
the perception that actors can monitor and sanction behavior. Using selective violence, however, 
is costly since it requires verifying of collaborators’ information. Random violence, while less 
                                                 
7 A similar divide exists in the literature on revolutions. Macro-level approaches, such as relative deprivation 
arguments or structural analyses rooted in Marxism dominated revolutionary analysis until the 1980s, but came 
under increasing criticism for failing to explain and predict the “surprise” revolutions in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (Kuran, 1991; Goldstone, 2001).  Subsequent research stressed the importance of agency and 
analyzed the motives of revolutionaries (Kuran, 1991; Weede and Muller, 1998; Wood, 2003). 
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difficult and costly to use, cannot induce compliance. It is therefore used only when selective 
violence is infeasible. A combination of quantitative and qualitative data on the Greek civil war 
is used to test his arguments, and results show that the type and level of violence used varies as a 
result of change in actors’ control over territory. Gates (2002) examines (1) why individuals 
make the costly decision of joining a rebel group and (2) why they remain members of the group 
despite having to engage in violence and endure personal hardship. Gates concludes that 
geographical proximity, shared ethnicity, and a common ideology are mechanisms facilitating 
compliance and enforcement in rebel organizations.  
In addition, bargaining theories of war provide theoretical accounts that help understand 
individuals’ actions. By emphasizing the strategic nature of civil war, they explicitly focus on the 
motivations of actors and the interactions between them. Informational approaches, for example, 
outline how actors in civil war have incentives to misrepresent their own capabilities and resolve 
to gain a military advantage (Fearon, 1995, 2004). Economic models of civil war have stressed 
the opportunity costs of rebellion, where the availability of rents (such as natural resources, 
foreign aid, or donations from diasporas) and the capacity of the state influence individuals’ 
decisions to rebel (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Skaperdas, 2002).  
Yet while bargaining and economic models of civil war provide increasingly detailed 
accounts for individual and group behavior, a gap persists between theoretical explanations and 
the empirical tests. The vast majority of empirical evidence is based on the state, or macro-level 
of analysis. Both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose micro-level 
theories, but use macro-level data to test their expectations. To date, two possible solutions to 
this problem exist. First, as Sambanis (2004a) suggests, researchers can use case studies to 
develop and test micro-level theories. Collier and Sambanis (2004), for example, present a two-
 15 
 
 
volume collection of case studies that provides a systematic application of the Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) model of civil war onset. A focus on individual cases allows for an 
understanding of the dynamic and strategic nature of civil war and does not constrain its focus to 
variables that change little or not at all over time. However, a drawback of this approach is the 
limited generalizability of case studies.  
A second solution would be to use data more appropriate for micro-level arguments. 
Cunningham et al. (2007), for example, take the strategic nature of civil war seriously when 
modeling it as a dyadic phenomenon between a state and a rebel actor. The authors investigate 
the effect of rebel strength, group location, and alternative means of participation on civil war 
duration. Yet a shortcoming of this approach is that it does not allow studying civil war onset – 
how can one know ex ante which group will rebel against the state? Also, since the onset and 
duration of conflict may not be independent events, such analyses may suffer from selection bias 
(Lemke and Reed, 2001). Data collected by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project provide 
another possible alternative, as they allow one to model empirically interactions between the 
state and minority groups. Since not all internal conflict is ethnically motivated, however, this 
approach might leave out a large number of potentially relevant cases. 
 
Economic Theories of Civil War 
Among economic theories of civil war, two competing explanations can be distinguished.  
I will first discuss economic approaches based on rational choice theories that understand civil 
war as a result of utility calculations. A second part will analyze approaches emphasizing 
economic grievances in society and their effect on the probability of civil war. 
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Studies by Grossman (1995) and Hirschleifer (1995) mark the beginning of the use of rational 
choice theories in the study of civil war. Both see civil war as a result of economic tradeoffs by 
actors, where the expected utility gained from conflict influences the decision to rebel. 
Hirschleifer (1995) argues that parties calculate potential net benefits from a conflict and engage 
in it when a successful outcome is likely. Grossman (1995) models rebellion as an industry that 
generates profits from looting and that is motivated by greed. When the opportunity of rebellion 
seems profitable, it will not be passed up. 
Both Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the expected 
gains from rebellion influence actors’ decisions regarding violence. In Collier and Hoeffler’s 
(2004) model, the opportunity costs of rebellion determine the demand and supply of civil war. 
Countries with low levels of per capita income have a higher probability of civil war since the 
opportunity costs for rebellion are small. In addition to income and development levels, the 
opportunity cost of rebellion is also influenced by the availability of natural resource extortion, 
donations from diasporas, and subventions to rebel movements from hostile foreign 
governments. Testing these expectations against country-level data, the authors find support for 
their greed-based explanation. Fearon (2004) and Ross (2004), however, are critical of the 
authors’ measure of natural resources, which is operationalized as the ratio of primary 
commodity exports to GDP. As Fearon (2004) points out, oil is the major component of primary 
commodities. He argues that oil increases the risk of civil war because oil producing states 
exhibit lower state capacity, and not because it is used to finance rebellion.8     
                                                 
8 While theories of civil war have become increasingly elaborate and fine-grained, empirical tests often use the same 
variables for different underlying theoretical concepts (Sambanis, 2002). Per capita income, for example, is used as 
a measure of the opportunity for rebellion in Collier and Hoeffler (2004), whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue it 
to be a proxy variable for state strength.  
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Fearon and Laitin (2003) expect that the size and likelihood of insurgency is influenced 
by the opportunity for insurgency and the government’s response to insurgents.  Opportunities 
for rebellion are greater when rebels are able to hide from the government (such as in rough 
terrain or mountainous areas), when they receive support from foreign actors, or when the local 
population supports the rebels. The government’s ability to contain insurgencies is a function of 
its strength, which Fearon and Laitin (2003) see influenced by income levels, the degree of 
political stability, and whether or not states are oil exporters. Empirical tests show that per capita 
income strongly increases the probability of civil war. In addition, newly independent states and 
states experiencing political instability are at greater risk of civil war. Finally, Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) also show that states in which oil revenue produces more than one-third of all export 
revenue are more likely to be involved in civil conflict.   
Skaperdas (2002) develops an economic model of warlord competition in which warlords 
compete over rents (such as diamonds, gold, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment). This 
competition over rents results in the crowding out of other production, reduces the overall 
welfare of the state, and increases the probability of civil war. Addison and Murshed (2002) and 
Buhaug and Gates (2002) find support for this expectation, showing that the presence of natural 
resources increases the overall probability of civil war and also prolongs its duration. De Soysa 
(2002) demonstrates that a shortage of renewable resources (such as water or timber) relative to 
an abundance of non-renewable resources (such as diamonds or oil) increases the risk of civil 
war.  Evidence by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) on the availability of natural resources and their 
effects on the opportunity of rebellion also seemingly supports Skaperdas’ (2002) model, but the 
authors make a different theoretical argument.  
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Apart from economic approaches based on rational-choice theories, scholars have 
emphasized the importance of economic grievances and their effect on rebellion. Gurr (1970, 
2000) sees relative deprivation as a primary cause of violence, and feelings of deprivation are 
influenced, among other factors, by economic inequality. In this model, relative deprivation 
results from a discrepancy between perceived rewards and actual rewards. Violence is 
subsequently triggered by changes in the perceived level of income compared to people’s actual 
income level. Empirical evidence for the expected relationship between inequality and civil war 
is inconsistent at best. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Sambanis (2004b) find no support for the 
conflict-exacerbating effect of inequality on civil war. More recently, research has suggested that 
this non-finding may be the result of an indirect relationship between economic inequality and 
internal conflict (Cramer, 2003; Sambanis, 2004b; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Sambanis argues 
that inequality may result in greater political instability, which has been shown to influence civil 
war likelihood and thus indirectly influences the risk of violence. Similarly, Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) argue that inequality can lead to violence through political effects. In unequal 
democracies people push for greater redistribution, which consequently discourages investment, 
hampers growth, and thereby increases the chances of domestic violence. The evidence 
supporting this conjecture remains inconclusive. These expectations, however, have not been 
subject to thorough empirical testing. 
 
Ethnicity and Civil War 
Theoretical arguments on ethnicity and civil war generally stress the role of ethnic 
identity as a negotiation and enforcement mechanism within groups.  Horowitz (1985) argues 
that ascriptive differences (such as language, appearance, or religion) shared by a group result in 
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the development of trust, and facilitate coordination and enforcement of agreements within the 
group. A similar argument is developed by Gates (2002), who expects that shared ethnicity 
contributes to rebel groups’ ability to motivate and sustain participation. While Gates (2002) also 
considers geographic proximity and shared ideology, he thinks of ethnicity as the strongest 
mechanism. Ethnic identity cannot be changed easily and thus carries a lower risk of defection. 
Ethnicity, therefore, facilitates intra-ethnic cooperation, but makes the negotiation of conflicts 
between different ethnic groups – lacking trust and coordination and enforcement mechanisms - 
more difficult.   
Caselli and Coleman II (2006) provide an explanation of ethnicity and conflict that 
conceptualizes society as group competition over the control of wealth-creating assets. Groups 
that succeed in controlling the country’s riches will suffer from infiltration by joiners who 
attempt to free-ride on the group’s efforts. Absent easy detection of such free-riders, the group 
faces the dilution of benefits provided to its members. However, in societies with ethnic 
heterogeneity, groups and coalitions can be formed along ethnic lines. Ethnicity then functions as 
a marker for identifying infiltrators and lowers the cost of enforcement. Group competition over 
resources will therefore be more intense in ethnically diverse societies, resulting in a greater 
probability of civil war in such countries.  
Empirical results for the consequences of ethnic heterogeneity on the probability of civil 
war, however, are mixed. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for example, 
do not find that ethnic heterogeneity increases the probability of conflict. Some authors argue 
that this may be due to a parabolic relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war 
(Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Blimes, 2006). According to this 
research, ethnic dominance, rather than heterogeneity itself, raises the potential for violence. 
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Data on ethnic polarization (measuring the size of groups and the nominal distance between 
them) presented in Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that 
such societies indeed are at a greater risk of civil war. Their research argues that the greatest risk 
of conflict occurs at a critical threshold of ethnic polarization, when societies are dominated by 
two large ethnic groups. Highly fractionalized societies incur a lower risk of civil war as 
coordination costs for rebellion are higher.  
Blimes (2006) presents a different explanation for the inconclusive findings on ethnicity 
and civil war. He argues that ethnic diversity does not present a constant cause for conflict and 
affects conflict only indirectly. Ethnicity becomes salient only when other causes of civil war are 
present, such as a weakening of the state or low economic development. Using a heteroskedastic 
probit model, Blimes (2006) shows that ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance increase 
the probability of civil war when other variables known to increase the likelihood of civil wars 
are present. Finally, some authors have argued that non-findings on ethnicity may be a function 
of a more fundamental difference between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars (Sambanis, 2001, 
2004a). According to this view, ethnic wars arise over issues related to ethnicity. Ethnic diversity 
lends itself to manipulation and can be used to generate collective action. For this reason, ethnic 
diversity increases the probability of ethnic wars, but does not affect the likelihood of civil wars 
lacking an ethnic component. 
 
Political Explanations of Civil War  
This dissertation puts forward a political explanation of civil war, and existing 
explanations of this kind will therefore be evaluated in more detail. I will first review three 
arguments on the relationship between political instability and civil war in the international 
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relations literature. Authors have emphasized the role of political grievances and opportunity 
structures, elite persuasion tactics, and the security dilemma. In addition to research in 
international relations, an extensive literature on regime change, revolutions, and other forms of 
protest exists in the field of comparative politics. While most authors do not explicitly address 
the issue of violence during these processes, I will review research to the extent that it informs 
the research questions posed here.  
The first group of arguments in the international relations literature highlights political 
grievances and opportunity structures as determinants of civil war. Focusing on opportunity 
structures and grievances, Lichbach (1987) expects that dissident groups will substitute violent 
protest for nonviolent protest depending on the state responses of repression. Groups will pursue 
the most effective strategy as a function of the state’s response. If the state represses in response 
to nonviolent behavior, groups will choose violence. If the state, however, represses violent 
behavior, movements will switch to nonviolent forms of protest. Gupta et al. (1993) add a 
regime-type dimension to Lichbach’s (1987) model. They expect that repression is more likely in 
authoritarian regimes, and dissidents are therefore more likely to engage in violent internal 
conflict. Dissidents in democracies, however, can select from nonviolent forms of expression, 
and this freedom reduces the potential for violence. Moore (1998) empirically tests both 
Lichbach’s (1987) and Gupta et al.’s (1993) models. He finds support only for Lichbach’s 
argument, which does not differentiate among different types of regimes. Moore’s (1998) test, 
however, uses only two cases and selects Peru as a democracy for the 1955-1991 period, 
although it is debatable whether Peru should be considered a stable democracy for this time 
frame. The selection of this case is especially problematic since Gupta et al. expect variation in 
group behavior across different types of regimes.  
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Building on work by Lichbach (1987) and Gupta et al. (1993), Hegre et al. (2001) argue 
that the probability of violence will depend on the existing level of grievances within a society. 
Democratic regimes prevent grievances since the expression of needs and demands is guaranteed 
in the political process. Regimes in the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum, however, 
do not have similar mechanisms and will therefore have greater chances of civil war occurrence. 
Authoritarian regimes are able to suppress grievances through repression. Combining these 
expectations, the authors expect a U-shaped relationship between level of democracy and the 
probability of civil war. In addition to their argument on the level of democracy, Hegre et al. 
expect that domestic regime change provides an opportunity for dissatisfied groups to struggle 
against the regime in power. Finally, while authoritarian regimes can curb grievances through 
repression, they are also less stable than democratic regimes and therefore more susceptible to 
violent regime transitions. Hegre et al.’s (2001) expectation on the role of regime change is 
similar to that of Fearon and Laitin (2003: 81), who argue that conditions for insurgency are 
favorable in situations of “political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization 
and weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion.” Gurr (2000) 
develops a related argument, in which civil war is understood as a function of the salience of 
ethno-political identity, the level of grievances in society, the capacity for mobilization, and 
opportunities for action. The level of grievances is approximated by the level of democracy, 
since groups in democratic societies are provided with nonviolent means of conflict resolution.  
Empirical findings in Hegre et al. confirm a U-shaped relationship between democracy 
level and civil war and show that regime change increases the risk of civil war. Combining these 
findings with evidence of lower survival rates for non-democratic regimes, Hegre et al. (2001: 
44) expect that all states will eventually reach a “democratic civil peace.” Their findings 
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regarding the effect of level of democracy and instability on conflict receive mixed support in 
other research. Subsequent research has largely confirmed Hegre et al.’s results on the conflict-
exacerbating effects of political instability. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Strand (2006), and Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006) all demonstrate that political instability increases the probability of civil 
war, thus demonstrating consistency across different model specifications. Results regarding the 
conflict proneness of semi-authoritarian regimes, however, are not as consistent. Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2002) find that the level of democracy influences the risk of civil war, and Reynal-
Querol (2002) shows that greater political rights, especially regarding representation, reduce the 
probability of civil war. Yet Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not 
find a significant relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood of civil war. 
More recently, Buhaug (2006) has shown that the U-shaped relationship between democracy and 
civil war holds only for insurgencies that target the state. He argues that group capability relative 
to the state influences whether rebels will target the state or attempt secession. States that are 
transitional and politically inconsistent will more often face challenges to the government.  
Approaches focusing on grievance and opportunity suffer from two weaknesses. First, the 
institutional logic of semi-authoritarian regimes may help us understand why grievances are 
likely to result in group mobilization, but need not imply the occurrence of a civil war. A regime 
facing domestic opposition could, for example, decide to accommodate group demands and thus 
attempt to avoid the eruption of violence. It is not clear under what circumstances groups would 
choose violence – admittedly a dangerous and costly strategy - over peaceful opposition. In 
addition, what level of grievance is sufficient to trigger violent mobilization? Considering the 
large number of semi-authoritarian regimes, we certainly do not observe continuing violent 
struggle in all such states. Second, while regime change certainly creates a window of 
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opportunity for opposition groups, it is not clear why actors would engage in costly civil war, 
rather than negotiating with the ruling elite (Fearon, 1995).  
A second line of arguments in international relations is the diversionary-conflict 
argument developed in Snyder (2000) and Figuerdo and Weingast (1999).9 Snyder’s “elite-
persuasion” argument maintains that threatened elites in democratizing states use nationalist 
violence as a tool to generate public support and secure their power. According to this view, 
ethnic nationalism is usually not developed before a political opening occurs. Democratization 
creates the opportunity for the promotion of exclusionary nationalism and, in turn, civil or 
interstate war. Snyder argues that nationalism allows for generating effective collective action on 
a national scale, yet can be achieved only through the exclusion and repression of some groups in 
society. Conflict is thus not caused by inherent tensions or ancient hatreds between groups, but is 
“constructed” by weakened political elites. De Figuerdo and Weingast (2000) argue that people 
may act irrationally and support civil war when elites manipulate their latent fears. Threatened 
leaders will exaggerate citizens’ uncertainty about the probability of victimization by another 
group, and thus motivate the preemptive use of violence.  
Such arguments, however, seem based on the irrationality of the masses and a positive 
level of victimization (Sambanis, 2002). Why should individuals pay the high price of 
mobilization for politicians’ selfish objectives absent any preexisting tensions between groups? 
Elite persuasion arguments, probably for this reason, are often combined with arguments on 
ethnicity. It seems that such approaches, in order to be compatible with rational behavior, assume 
that there is preexisting fear and distrust among groups, which can then be utilized by political 
                                                 
9 A related research program focuses on the linkage between regime change and interstate conflict. The argument 
claims that threatened elites initiate conflicts abroad in order to divert attention from domestic problems (Mansfield 
and Snyder, 2005).  Colaresi (2004) also finds evidence that elites pay a domestic-political price for acting dovishly 
in relations with rivals. Thus, inter-state conflict is exacerbated by weak elites that opt for hawkish policies to 
remain in power.  
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elites.10 In addition, the use of violence is only one of several options leaders may choose to 
maintain power, and it is not clear why leaders would engage in a risky gamble rather than using 
repression or offering concessions (Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000). Finally, while elites’ 
diversionary motives cannot be empirically observed, the argument nevertheless suggests that 
such strategies are successful in lengthening an embattled leader’s tenure. This expectation, 
however, is not borne out in recent research on diversionary war (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003; 
Chiozza et al., 2006). Snyder (2000) finds empirical support for his argument in several case 
studies, yet this finding suffers from selection on the dependent variable, since only countries in 
which conflict occurred are analyzed.  
A third political explanation of civil war is developed in research on the domestic 
security dilemma. Influenced by research on the interstate security dilemma, Posen (1993) 
compares the collapse of multiethnic states to the problem of anarchy in the international realm. 
Absent domestic authority, he argues, groups provide for their own security, but greater security 
is perceived as a threat by nearby groups. Actors strive for territorial integrity and political 
autonomy, yet because of domestic anarchy, they are not granted sovereign status. Similarly, 
Walter (1999) argues that the breakdown of domestic authority leads to the absence of 
enforcement and arbitration mechanisms within the state. Absent a central enforcement 
authority, groups are uncertain about the future distribution of power. The parties involved may 
fear that their status will be challenged, or that others may take advantage of the power vacuum, 
resulting in an intra-state security dilemma. Even if actors prefer to settle conflicts peacefully, 
they may feel threatened and militarize to protect themselves (Walter, 1999: 262). Approaches 
emphasizing this security dilemma, however, have not been subjected to thorough empirical 
                                                 
10 At the interstate level, Mitchell and Prins (2004) show that rival states use military force abroad to divert from 
domestic problems. Rivalry, as it is characterized by mutual fear and distrust, presents an environment with ample 
opportunity for the use of diversionary force.  
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testing (Sambanis, 2002: 233). In addition, the analogy to the international system suffers from 
the problem that anarchy is not a constant in the domestic realm and therefore cannot explain 
why regimes fail in the first place.  
I now turn to a discussion of arguments developed in the field of comparative politics, in 
which I evaluate the literature on regime change and democratization as it relates to the question 
of violence. A subsequent section discusses research on revolutions and social movements. A 
final part assesses the small but informative literature on elections and violence.   
While most research on democratization does not focus on the question of violence, 
authors such as Przeworski (1991) and Colomer (2000) include civil war as one possible 
outcome in their game-theoretic models of democratization. Przeworski’s (1991) model of 
democratization processes discusses three potential scenarios that affect the outcome of 
bargaining in transitional democracies.11 First, the distribution of forces (among actors) can be 
known and unbalanced. In these cases, institutional choice is usually biased toward the interest of 
a particular person, party or alliance, and they will consequently fail to maintain long-term 
stability (Przeworski, 1991: 82). Second, the distribution of forces can be known and balanced. 
Przeworksi (1991) considers this scenario the most unlikely for democratic consolidation. In this 
setting, civil war is an option available to the parties. Yet, actors may foresee the instability and 
danger of such situations and therefore negotiate temporal agreements involving suboptimal 
outcomes. The final scenario concerns cases in which the relation of forces is not known. 
Przeworski considers these cases the most promising for democratic stability, since uncertainty 
                                                 
11 Przeworksi (1991: 67) distinguishes between two aspects of democratization: Transitions from the authoritarian 
regime (extrication) and a second phase that deals with the establishment democratic rule (constitution). He admits 
that these two phases can coincide temporally, and may be difficult to distinguish empirically.  
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on actors’ strength will induce all actors to support institutions with checks and balances, 
institutions that provide guarantees against political adversity.12     
Colomer (2000), also using a game-theoretic model, sees two possible outcomes to 
political liberalization. First, groups may compete for mutual elimination, leading to civil war 
and an eventual victory of one side. Second, actors may foresee the risk of losing the conflict, as 
well as the level of destruction involved in civil war, and negotiate intermediate agreements 
between democracy and dictatorship (Colomer, 2000:1). These intermediate agreements, or 
“semi-democracies,” are Colomer’s (2000) main focus. He argues that such negotiated 
transitions fall short of consolidated democracy, yet can be beneficial immediately after 
authoritarian breakups as they avoid the eruption of violent conflict. The absence of 
“maximalist” actors (such as radical opposition or radical hardliners) is crucial for the possibility 
of peaceful agreements. Colomer (2000) identifies three factors that influence the presence of 
such extremist factions: Relative deprivation, utopian expectations, and restrictive institutions.13   
In addition to the models presented in Przeworski (1991) and Colomer (2000), research on the 
conditions for successful democratization and consolidation can be informative for the research 
questions analyzed here. Regimes that successfully transition to a stable democratic regime have 
presumably avoided the risk of violence. Burton et al. (1992) emphasize the importance of elite 
settlements for democratization success. The authors contend that such settlements enable 
peaceful competition among elites and allow for the eventual emergence of stable democracy 
(Burton et al., 1992: 14). This emphasis on elite settlements is similar to other work focusing on 
the importance of power-sharing and elite pacts (Lijphart, 1999; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; 
                                                 
12 Uncertainty, however, may well have the opposite effect. If the distribution of power and bargaining strength of 
actors are not known, parties may miscalculate each other’s strength and pursue institutions that will favor their own 
estimated position. In addition, uncertainty makes it impossible for actors to credibly commit to a certain outcome, 
and actors cannot anticipate that institutional choices will be abided by on the part of all actors.  
13 Yet these factors are quite ambiguous and not clearly defined in the text.   
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O’Donnell, 1992; Przeworski, 1992). Lijphart (1999) argues that consociational democracy is the 
best way to successful consolidation. His work also stresses the need for elite negotiation, but it 
is narrower in its applicability because of its detailed outline for the necessary institutional 
arrangements. Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy requires the adaptation of certain 
institutional mechanisms (such as grand coalitions, minority representation), which limits its 
scope compared to other research focusing on elite agreements.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that elite pacts are important for democratic 
consolidation as they lay out “rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual 
guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of the actors entering it” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 37). 
The authors support this with evidence on Latin American democracies, where countries with 
pacted transitions were able to withstand authoritarian reversals. In later work, however, 
O’Donnell (1992) seems more skeptical of pacts as a means to stable democracy. He sees 
extensive “accordism” as a threat to democratic competition and successful consolidation and 
argues that such pacted transitions often lead to the slow death of democracy. Yet he also points 
out that intense elite competition (following democratic ruptures) bears the danger of immediate 
reversals to authoritarian rule. Striking the right balance between agreement and competition 
seems to be the difficult task to manage. Przeworski (1992) sees political pacts as a (short-term) 
solution to the instability and uncertainty arising in democratic transitions. He acknowledges that 
pacts can offer short-term stability and the protection of embryonic democratic institutions, yet 
cautions that the long-term consequences of such pacts contradict democratic values.  
Existing research on democratization, therefore, sees pacted transitions as a way to avoid 
coups or authoritarian reversals. It seems that negotiated transitions, even though falling short of 
democracy, can offer the stability necessary to avoid periods of prolonged violence. Yet largely 
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unanswered remains the question under what circumstances actors can find such negotiated 
solutions. Przeworski (1991) points to uncertainty as a factor, and Colomer (2000) stresses the 
absence of extremist factions, yet these scenarios remain underdeveloped.  
The extensive literature on revolutions and social movements speaks to the question of 
violence as a response to political change. Structural theories of revolutions dominated the field 
up until the 1980s. These arguments, often rooted in Marxist theory, emphasize the role of class 
struggles, state conflicts with elites, and external military competition (Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 
1979). This research defines revolutions as major transformations of socio-economic and 
political institutions that are accompanied by class upheavals from below, thus focusing on a 
small set of “great revolutions” in Europe and Asia (Skocpol, 1979). In addition, the occurrence 
of violence is an important facet of revolution in structural analyses. Skocpol’s (1979) theory of 
social revolutions, the seminal work in this research tradition, stresses the importance of 
international factors in combination with social transformation and its consequences for 
mobilization.14 Investigating revolutions in China, France, and Russia, Skocpol (1979) sees 
revolutions as the result of intense competition for military and economic power with other 
states, forcing them to undertake costly domestic reforms to increase their competitiveness. In 
cases where the dominant class had an independent economic base, it opposed reforms, leading 
to splits in the regime. The landed elite in China and France had no interest in supporting costly 
armies and extensive bureaucracies, and subsequently overthrew the state. In Russia, conflicts 
with more powerful adversaries simply crushed the infrastructure of the monarchy, creating a 
                                                 
14 Skocpol’s work has since been criticized on a variety of grounds. First, scholars have questioned the overly 
deterministic nature of her model, where structural conditions all but preclude choice (Laitin and Warner, 1992). 
Second, authors have applied her model to other cases with limited success. The Mexican Revolution, for example, 
occurred despite the absence of a threatening international environment (Knight, 2001). Finally, Geddes (1990) 
critiques Skocpol’s case selection. While Skocpol discusses contrasting cases at two points in her chain of 
arguments, she fails to do so for the claim that external military competition has contributed to all revolutionary 
outbreaks (Geddes, 1990: 143).  As Geddes points out, many countries have encountered threatening external 
conditions throughout history, yet revolutions remain rare.  
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massive disgruntled peasant class that eventually mobilized against the regime. While the 
Russian upper class lacked an independent economic base, the existence of autonomous peasant 
villages explains the occurrence of revolution in this case. 
Yet structural theories came under increasing criticism following a number of revolutions 
from the 1970s through the 1990s. Revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, as well as anticolonial struggles in the Third World, challenged structural 
analyses in two ways. First, the class-based understanding of revolutions in structural theories 
was incapable of explaining multi-class coalitions toppling regimes in a variety of these cases 
(Goodwin, 1989). As a consequence, researchers studying the more recent revolutions 
emphasized the role of individuals for revolutionary mobilization and objectives, thus shifting 
the focus from structural elements to conscious agency. Wood (2003), for example, provides a 
micro-level analysis of the peasant insurgency during El Salvador’s civil war. She suggests that 
two path-dependent processes – patterns of past state violence and the proximity of insurgent 
forces – created the necessary conditions for peasant mobilization in rural El Salvador. However, 
campesinos only mobilized when they also developed emotional and moral commitments to the 
cause. Wood (2003) finds that participants in the insurgency differed from nonparticipants in 
their view of participation as a moral commitment to social justice and as a demonstration of 
their outrage at government authority.  
Second, revolutionary struggles in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seemed 
to provide a new model of revolution, where the breakdown of the regime was coupled with 
mostly nonviolent transitions to more democratic regimes (Diamond and Platter, 1993). As a 
response to this changing nature of revolutions, a new research area covering a variety of events 
such as democratization, revolutions, rebellion, protests, riots, and civil wars emerged under the 
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label “contentious politics” (McAdam et al., 2001).  In this research, scholars of revolutions and 
social movements are combining insights from both research areas, realizing that many of the 
processes underlying them are similar (Goldstone, 2001).  
More generally, the social movements literature focuses on the causes of movement 
mobilization, but – as in research on contentious politics - does not usually distinguish between 
violent and nonviolent movements. Theoretical arguments on movement formation are similar to 
approaches emphasizing grievances and opportunity structures (Gurr, 1970, 2000). Early 
approaches on grievances were later appended by arguments emphasizing the need for 
opportunities to rebel. The resource mobilization theory argues that movement formation is a 
result of changes in the opportunity structure (Jenkins, 1983). Liberalization of an authoritarian 
regime could function as one such change and result in movement formation as a response to the 
possibility of renegotiation of authority.  
Finally, a small literature in comparative politics addresses the subject of violence during 
elections in newly established democracies. Chaturvedi (2005) expects that the potential for 
violence at election time is lower as the number of undecided voters increases, an argument 
similar to that of Przeworski (1991). However, this model has not been tested empirically. 
Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) and Wantchekon (1999) expect variation in the probability of 
violence depending on which party controls the threat to violence. When the stronger party has 
the means to use force, and the threat of using force is serious, voters will overwhelmingly 
choose the strong party (presumably to reduce the risk of violence after elections). Preliminary 
evidence from post-conflict elections in Liberia and El Salvador supports their argument, but no 
systematic tests are conducted. Allison (2006) finds that the performance of armed opposition 
groups in post-conflict elections is a function of the groups’ success during the armed struggle. 
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Based on a sample of Central American countries, groups successful in the military competition 
are found to be more likely to do well in post-conflict elections. This evidence seems compatible 
with Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) and Wantchekon (1999), as voters may support these 
groups out of a fear of continued violence. 
 
Bargaining Theories of War 
While political explanations of civil war in the international relations literature have 
emphasized opportunity structures, the security dilemma, and elites’ diversionary motives, the 
argument advanced here analyzes regime change as a bargaining process. Bargaining theories of 
war have generally analyzed inefficient outcomes (such as war) as the result of informational 
and/or commitment problems (Fearon, 1995).15 After a brief discussion of arguments 
emphasizing informational effects, I will evaluate approaches to the commitment problem in 
more detail.  
In a seminal article, Fearon (1995) analyzes three rationalist explanations for war, one of 
which highlights informational problems. Bargaining inefficiencies arise when actors have 
private information on their payoffs to prevailing in a conflict and have incentives to hide this 
information (since it can provide a military advantage during confrontation). These incentives to 
misrepresent can make bargaining difficult and undermine nonviolent signaling. The use of 
force, while inefficient, can function as a credible means of revealing private information on 
capabilities, thereby facilitating a war-ending agreement. Work on informational problems has 
flourished over the past decade. Yet, as Fearon (2004) and Powell (2004) point out, 
informational problems provide a poor account of prolonged conflict. One potential explanation 
                                                 
15 Fearon (1995) also suggests issue indivisibilities may lead to violent conflict, although he remains skeptical of this 
rationalist explanation.  
 33 
 
 
for this can be found in Goemans (2000) analysis of war duration and termination. Goemans 
(2000) argues that battle victories increase leaders’ demands and elites’ expectations therefore 
fail to converge. 
Commitment problems are the second cause for inefficient outcomes in the bargaining 
literature. Recent research by Powell (2004, 2006) shows that issues as diverse as war, 
secessionist conflicts, civil war resolution, public debt, inefficient democratic decision-making, 
and administrative ineffectiveness can be understood in terms of a commitment problem. In all 
instances, actors fail to locate more efficient solutions to the bargaining problem at hand and are 
therefore left with a suboptimal provision of the good, or “pie,” in pursuit. This inefficiency is 
explained by the inability of involved actors to credibly commit to an agreement, since they may 
have incentives to renege and thus gain from defection.  
In an article focused primarily on conflict between states, Fearon (1995) identifies three 
types of commitment problems arising in (1) preventive wars, (2) preemptive attacks resulting 
from first-strike attacks, and (3) wars involving issues that impact future bargaining power.16 In 
an application to interstate war, Powell (2006: 169) extends this research by indicating a 
common mechanism in all three scenarios. Large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power 
create a commitment problem and therefore increase the risk of war. Following a power shift, a 
weakened state must offer concessions large enough to deter its strengthened opponent, yet such 
offers are not credible given that the state may regain its strength in the future. Fearon (1996) 
shows that commitment problems arise when objects in dispute are determinants of future 
                                                 
16 Fearon points out that while anarchy plays an important role for these problems, it differs from the role of anarchy 
in security dilemma models. Anarchy becomes relevant only when “opportunities for action imply that one or both 
sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains, which, if they were enforceable, would be 
mutually preferred to war” (1995: 401).  
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bargaining power. States may prefer fighting in the present if committing to a settlement could 
decrease their bargaining leverage in the future.  
Also focusing on interstate relations, Prins and Daxecker (2008) argue that commitment 
problems hinder rival states from terminating costly and competitive relationships. Rivalry is 
characterized by fear and mistrust, and rival states fail to reach mutually beneficial agreements 
out of fear of reneging. The authors argue that the adoption of liberal institutions such as 
democracy or membership in international organizations should help overcome fears of future 
exploitation and solve the commitment problem. Results show that the combined effect of 
democracy and development, change to democracy, and membership in international 
organizations that include dispute-settlement mechanisms increase the probability rivalry 
termination as hypothesized. Research by Bapat (2006) analyzes bargaining between states and 
terrorist organizations as a commitment problem. He expects that states’ ability to monitor 
agreements and impose moderate costs on terrorist groups increases the chances for negotiated 
settlements. In an analysis of terrorist events from 1968 to 1991, he shows that host governments 
that impose costs that are neither too low nor too high are more likely to form credible 
commitments.  
Other authors apply the commitment problem to incidents of internal violence (Fearon 
2004; Walter, 2002). In Fearon’s analysis of peripheral insurgencies and coup attempts, a short-
term shock to government capabilities “gives coup plotters or rebels a window of opportunity” 
(Fearon, 2004: 290). While the ruling elite may want to grant concessions in order to buy off a 
rebellion, such a commitment is incredible since the government expects to regain its strength in 
the future, and civil war can occur.  
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Analyzing civil war termination, Walter (2002) argues that civil war settlements fail 
frequently because of an inability of participants to commit to the terms of the agreement. This is 
because the demobilization of military forces as well as the future distribution of power within 
the state is not yet consolidated when settlements are signed. Combatants, therefore, have 
incentives to renege on the terms of a settlement, since they may fear the use of military force or 
attempts to gain hegemonic control by the opponent. Solutions to the commitment problem, in 
consequence, will depend on the adoption of power-sharing agreements as well as the presence 
of third-party actors. Guarantees of power-sharing and third-party support will reduce actors’ 
fears of exploitation and therefore increase the likelihood of a peaceful civil war settlement. 
Walter’s (2002) arguments are supported in a quantitative analysis of the post-WWII era and an 
in-depth study of two cases. Using data on 72 civil wars for the 1940-1992 period, she shows 
that third-party guarantees and power-sharing pacts were crucial for the peaceful implementation 
of settlements to the war. An analysis of the negotiating process during Zimbabwe’s and 
Rwanda’s civil wars shows that post-treaty security questions played an important role for 
successful settlements. The UN’s failure to extend third-party support as promised, then, 
explains the tragic breakdown of the peace process in Rwanda.  
Finally, regime change itself has been analyzed as a commitment problem (Nalepa, 2005; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Acemoglu and Robinson’s work on political transitions 
identifies conditions under which regimes fluctuate between democratic and authoritarian 
regimes because of actors’ inability to commit. They expect that unequal societies are particular 
prone to such fluctuations. In highly unequal societies, fiscal policy can vary greatly between 
different regimes, thus creating incentives for groups to mount a coup, or start a revolution. In 
the model, two groups, the rich and the poor, compete for political control and the setting of the 
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tax policy. When economic conditions are bad and the poor are in power, they want to offer the 
rich enough to avoid a coup, but cannot do so since they are unable to commit to future tax rates. 
The same scenario unfolds when the rich are in power and economic conditions worsen, 
resulting in iterations of highly unstable regimes.  
A similar picture arises in transitions to democracy and the use of transitional justice 
against the outgoing authoritarian regime. Nalepa (2005) argues that promises by democrats not 
to prosecute the old regime are incredible following a transition to democracy, thus resulting in a 
commitment problem. Once autocrats give up power, they have no guarantee that the new regime 
will abide by its promises, and such uncertainty should keep them from stepping down in the 
first place. The above situation can be observed empirically, such as in Hungary’s or Poland’s 
transition to democracy. Possible sources of credibility, according to the Nalepa (2005), arise 
from the extent of divisions between Anticommunists and Liberals, collaboration of Liberals 
with the ancient regime, the likelihood of regime implosion, and public support for transitional 
justice (Nalepa 2005: 42). 
 
Towards a Dynamic Theory of Civil War 
In this chapter, I have reviewed key theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in the 
literature on civil wars. This final section provides a brief synopsis of the main arguments and 
summarizes them in a table. I conclude with a preview of the theoretical argument developed in 
the next chapter. The study of civil wars, as pointed out earlier, straddles international relations 
and comparative politics, thus challenging the traditional demarcation line between the two 
research areas. Traditionally, international relations researchers have focused on conflict between 
states, but interest in civil war has increased greatly since the end of the Cold War (Sambanis, 
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2002). While comparative scholars have long studied rebellion, revolutions, or other instances of 
violence at the domestic level, recent theoretical and empirical contributions by international 
relations scholars have spurred tremendous development and growth of the field. 
Nevertheless, several theoretical and methodological challenges persist. First, unlike wars 
between states, civil wars lack a stable set of actors. Therefore, researchers need to consider the 
question of how and why violent opposition emerges, an effort that has begun only recently 
(Gates, 2002). Second, since the absence of authority is not a permanent condition at the 
domestic level, the applicability of international relation theories such as neorealism is limited. 
Finally, a disconnect between theoretical arguments and empirical testing exists. While 
economic theories of civil war provide increasingly detailed accounts of individual, i.e. micro-
level behavior, much theoretical testing uses states, i.e. macro-units, as the primary units of 
analysis. 
This chapter identifies three distinct explanations of civil war onset. First, economic 
theories stress the importance of economic cost-benefit calculations or inequality for the onset of 
civil war. One set of explanations, based on rational-choice approaches, expects that civil war is 
the result of utility calculations, where actors weigh the opportunity cost of rebellion (Grossman, 
1995; Hirschleifer, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Skaperdas, 2002). 
Empirical evidence confirms that countries with low economic development, weak state 
capacity, and abundant natural resources have increased probabilities of civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Addison and Murshed, 2002; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; 
De Soysa, 2002). A second explanation argues that grievances caused by economic inequality 
result in feelings of deprivation and, in turn, violent mobilization (Gurr, 1970, 2000). Little 
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empirical support, however, has been generated for this argument (Sambanis, 2004b; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004).  
Second, ethnic theories argue that while ethnicity functions as a bargaining and 
enforcement mechanism facilitating cooperation within groups, the absence of such a mechanism 
between different ethnic groups increases the probability of conflict (Horowitz, 1985; Gates, 
2002; Caselli and Coleman II, 2006). Empirical evidence for a linear relationship between ethnic 
heterogeneity and civil war, however, is mixed (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). Researchers have developed three explanations to account for this inconsistency. First, 
Reynal-Querol argues that ethnic polarization rather than diversity in itself increases the 
probability of conflict. Secondly, authors have hypothesized a conditional relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict, where ethnic diversity becomes salient only when other factors increasing 
conflict propensities are present (Blimes, 2006). Finally, Sambanis (2001, 2004a) expects that a 
linear relationship between ethnicity and conflict holds only for identity wars, which are believed 
to be fundamentally different from non-identity civil wars.  
Political explanations can be separated into three distinct categories. One argument 
emphasizes grievances and opportunity structures (Hegre et al., 2001; Gurr, 2000). States in the 
middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum are expected to experience more grievances, and 
therefore, a greater likelihood of civil wars. In addition, regime change opens up a window of 
opportunity for rebellion and for this reason also increases the probability of fighting. Empirical 
studies have found support for the expected relationship between instability and civil war, yet are 
inconsistent on the effect of level of democracy (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004; Buhaug, 2006). A second explanation views civil war as a result of leaders’ diversionary 
tactics (Snyder, 2000; Figuerdo and Weingast, 1999). In this argument, weakened leaders 
 39 
 
 
manipulate people’s fears by appealing to nationalism which in turn leads to violent conflict. 
While the motives of leaders cannot be subjected to empirical scrutiny, implications of this 
argument have found little empirical support (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003; Chiozza et al, 2006). 
Lastly, the security dilemma, prominent in international relations, has been applied to the 
domestic sphere (Posen, 1993; Walter, 1999). When domestic authority breaks down, uncertainty 
among actors triggers militarization and the occurrence of conflict. Such arguments, however, 
border on tautology as the collapse of the domestic equilibrium is a defining feature of any civil 
war. One would need to know more on the types of events that cause the breakdown of authority 
for this approach to be useful.  
 
Table 1: Main Theoretical Arguments on Civil War Onset 
Theory Argument Authors Empirical 
Evidence 
Economic 1. Civil war is the result of utility 
calculations – when the opportunity cost 
for rebellion is low, the probability of civil 
war increases.  
 
Grossman (1995)  
Hirschleifer (1995)  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Skaperdas (2002) 
strong 
 2. Grievances such as economic inequality 
cause feelings of relative deprivation and 
increase the likelihood of civil war. 
 
Gurr (1970, 2000) weak 
Ethnicity Ethnicity functions as an enforcement 
mechanism within ethnic groups - the 
absence of such mechanisms between 
different groups leads to a higher 
probability of conflict. 
 
Horowitz (1985) 
Gates (2002) 
Caselli and Coleman II (2006) 
mixed 
Political 1. Political grievances and changes in the 
political opportunity structure result in a 
greater probability of civil war.  
 
Gurr (1970, 2000) 
Gupta et al. (1993) 
Hegre et al. (2001) 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
mixed 
 2. Threatened leaders appeal to 
nationalism and encourage violence to 
divert from their weakness and stay in 
power. 
 
Snyder (2000) 
Figuerdo and Weingast (1999) 
weak 
 3. Absent a central enforcement authority, 
groups are uncertain over their status and 
militarize to protect themselves. 
 
Posen (1993) 
Walter (1999) 
not tested 
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In addition, a brief review assessed contributions in the comparative literature on social 
movements, revolutions, democratization, and elections and violence. With the partial exception 
of the study of revolutions, most research does not explicitly address the occurrence of 
violence.17 Colomer’s (2000) and Prezeworski’s (1991) studies of democratization mention 
violence as one possible outcome of the transition process, but do not elaborate on the conditions 
for its occurrence. Research on elections and violence focuses primarily on post-conflict 
elections and is thus seemingly applicable to only a small set of cases (Wantchekon, 1999; 
Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000; Allison, 2006). In theories of revolution such as Skocpol’s 
(1979), only cases experiencing widespread violence are included in the analysis. However, the 
in-depth nature of her argument combined with the narrow definition of revolution make it 
difficult to be extended to a large set of cases. 
Economic theories of civil war and arguments stressing ethnicity are similar in the fact 
that they emphasize variables that change little or not at all over time. Variables such as resource 
wealth, the ethnic makeup of a state, relative poverty, or economic inequality exhibit little to no 
variation over time. While these factors may help us understand why some countries have a 
higher baseline probability of civil war as compared to others, they don’t explain much about 
why a country moves from a stable political and economic system to war.18 Civil wars, however, 
are dynamic events, and an explanation of civil war should take into account the occurrences 
triggering the use of force.  
                                                 
17 As mentioned earlier, the question of whether violence is a defining characteristic of revolution has arisen since 
the peaceful “revolutions” in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union challenged the conventional wisdom 
(Goldstone, 2001).    
18 Butler (2005) stresses this point in their social network analysis of the Nicaraguan civil war, but argue that the 
country-year nature of the datasets used is the root of the problem. Yet it seems possible to identify dynamic events 
and integrate them into a country-year format.   
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Political theories of civil war do a better job at identifying changes that result in a shift 
from peace to war.19 Arguments on political opportunity structures specifically address the 
importance of change, arguing that changes in these structures (such as a regime change) 
represent discrete events that can trigger the use of force (Hegre et al., 2001). In a similar 
argument, Fearon and Laitin (2003) expect that political instability provides an opportunity for 
rebellion. Instability and regime change are emphasized repeatedly as the cause of domestic 
conflict, and empirical studies have shown strong and consistent support for these propositions 
(Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). While these arguments better explain war as the outcome of a 
dynamic, strategic process, two problems remain.  
First, the processes of regime change and civil war may be endogenous. The occurrence 
of a regime change may already entail the use of force, rather than precede the actual outbreak of 
violence. Particularly problematic is the fact that most studies use the Polity project’s data to 
identify instances of regime change or political instability (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Fearon 
and Laitin (2003), for example, use changes in Polity’s composite democracy scores to indicate 
whether a regime change occurred. Included in these changes, however, are periods of 
“transition” and “interregnum”, indicating a collapse of domestic authority. As Marshall and 
Jaggers (2005: 17) describe, “interregnum” is “most likely to occur during periods of internal 
war” and thus can hardly be seen as an exogenous cause of conflict. Second, Hegre et al. (2001) 
claim that regime change provides an opportunity for conflict, yet it seems that actual regime 
change indicates the endpoint of such opportunity, rather than the beginning.20 The opportunity 
                                                 
19 Arguments on the level of grievances usually emphasize the high level of grievances present in semi-authoritarian 
regimes (Hegre et al., 2001). While a country’s level of democracy shows greater variation than many of the 
variables emphasized in economic or ethnic explanations of civil war, many semi-authoritarian regimes have 
exhibited great stability in the past.  
20 Part of the problem may stem from confusion over what the term “regime change” in fact means. The empirical 
test used in Hegre et al. does not measure actual leadership change; rather, it measures fluctuation in democracy 
scores.  
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to challenge the regime should be greatest when the first signs of a loss in power for the 
incumbent regime appear, thus before the regime actually changes.    
The argument developed in detail in the following chapter, though stressing the dynamic 
and strategic element of civil war as do other political theories, avoids both problems elaborated 
above. The explanation put forward here views civil war as the result of a commitment problem. 
Following Powell (2004), I expect that rapid shifts in the domestic distribution of power create a 
commitment problem and thus an increased probability of civil war. The comparative politics 
literature on regime change provides examples for such power shifts. Economic decline, the 
death of a leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of power have been 
identified as instances triggering regime change (Geddes, 1999a; Colomer, 2000; Przeworski et 
al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003). By focusing on the effect of these shocks 
on civil war, I develop an argument that takes the dynamic and strategic nature of civil war 
seriously, but avoids the problems elaborated above. First, a focus on shocks, rather than regime 
change, steers clear of potential endogeneity problems. Coups and assassinations, for example, 
often entail violence, and thus cannot be seen as independent causes of civil war. Secondly, 
shocks to the incumbent government’s power seem to be a more natural starting point for 
bargaining between government and opposition than actual regime change itself. I expect that 
opportunities for violence are greatest prior to the renegotiation of political power, not once 
authority has been handed over to a new government. 
Placed squarely in the larger literature on commitment problems, this dissertation makes 
two contributions to existing research. First, it models leadership weakness as a commitment 
problem that can result in civil war in the domestic arena. Shocks to government capabilities 
represent a shift in the domestic distribution of power and thus can provide a valuable empirical 
 43 
 
 
referent for the commitment problems described in Powell (2004, 2006). This research identifies 
economic decline, the death of a leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of 
power as events triggering regime weakness, and, in consequence, civil war. Second, while work 
on commitment issues provides a compelling explanation of interstate or intrastate war 
occurrence, it does not lay out the conditions under which actors can avoid such inefficiency 
even when external conditions suggest otherwise. Although shocks to the government represent 
large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power, nevertheless examples for peaceful transfers of 
power exist. The subsequent theoretical chapter outlines the commitment problem during 
leadership weakness and presents possible solutions.  
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Chapter 3: Critical Events and the Commitment Problem 
In this chapter, I further develop how shocks to the domestic distribution of power can 
lead to commitment problems and, subsequently, civil war. The chapter proceeds as follows. A 
first section explores which cases are most pertinent for this analysis. The literature on regime 
transitions in comparative politics identifies critical events such as economic decline, 
international war defeat, the death of a dictator, and changes in the international balance of 
power as causes of regime breakdown. A second section elaborates when and how these critical 
events shift the domestic balance of power and trigger competition for power among relevant 
actors in society. While the weakened regime and opposition groups could gain from negotiating 
a settlement, they lack the ability to make credible commitments. This is because both actors 
have incentives to renege on agreements in the future, and these incentives hinder cooperation in 
the present. A third section investigates possible solutions to the commitment problem, expecting 
that (1) the organizational structure of regime and opposition and (2) the distance between actors 
influences actors’ ability to credibly commit.  
 
Identifying Critical Events  
Following a shock or critical event that leads to a dramatic shift in the distribution of 
power, bargaining between actors can result in commitment problems (Fearon, 2004; Powell, 
2006). More specifically, a shift in capabilities leads to bargaining between actors, and 
credibility problems obstruct the negotiation of peaceful agreements. The argument developed 
here expects that precisely these conditions arise when a critical event shifts the domestic 
balance of power. A shock to government capabilities weakens the current leadership and leads 
to bargaining over authority within the state. However, to translate this argument into a testable 
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proposition, it is necessary to know more about the types of events constituting such shocks. 
What events represent such sudden changes in the domestic balance of power? 
The breakdown of authoritarian and democratic regimes is triggered by critical events, or 
shocks. Colomer (2000), for example, points out that regime change is provoked by a significant 
crisis of the regime, thus modifying actors bargaining power and inducing them to develop new 
strategies of behavior. The literature identifies economic decline, international war defeat, the 
death of a dictator, and changes in the international balance of power serve as these shocks and 
can trigger regime change (O’Donnell, 1973; Geddes, 1999a; Colomer, 2000; Przeworski et al., 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003). For example, all transition specialists argue 
that economic decline increases the likelihood of authoritarian and democratic breakdown, and 
this expectation has been supported in quantitative analyses (Prezworski et al., 2000). Similarly, 
the death of a leader or defeat in an international conflict opens up space for a renegotiation of 
authority within the state, resulting in bargaining over the domestic distribution of power. 
Finally, changes in the international balance of power, such as a crisis in a foreign imperial 
power, will have comparable repercussions. During the period of 1985-1991, reforms in the 
Soviet Union promoted major changes in Eastern European satellite states and resulted in the 
eventual collapse of the USSR itself (Colomer, 2000).  
While the extant research on regime collapse is not per se interested in the consequences 
these shocks have on bargaining inefficiency between political groups within society, it can help 
in locating the cases most relevant for the analysis here. The period following such shocks, 
preceding a potential handover of authority, bears the greatest potential for violence. This 
emphasis on the weakening of government authority is different from existing explanations of 
the relationship between political instability and conflict. Previous research has not paid clear 
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attention to timing issues, usually identifying actual regime change as the catalyst for conflict. 
Hegre et al. (2001), for example, argue that regime change increases the opportunity for conflict. 
In contrast, this research expects that opportunities for violence are greatest when a shock 
weakens government authority, thus prior to a renegotiation of political power.21 The period 
preceding a transition to democracy or a reversal to authoritarianism is dominated by strategic 
interaction and bargaining and should be distinguished from later phases in the process. The 
relation of forces among actors will be much clearer once the initial transition period is over, and 
institutions will constrain possible interactions among actors.  
The above review of the transition literature demonstrates clear parallels between the 
scenarios addressed by Powell (2006) and Fearon (2004) and the focus of this research. Similar 
to Powell’s (2006) explanation of commitment problems arising between states due to power 
shifts, critical events change the distribution of power within states and open up space for 
bargaining. The following theoretical section elaborates in detail on the bargaining inefficiencies 
occurring in such situations.  
 
The Two-Sided Commitment Problem 
When a critical event weakens the position of the incumbent government, challengers can 
compete for a redistribution of domestic authority. Actors will contend for a share of power, yet 
uncertainty over the prospective distribution of forces prevails, and opposition groups will 
                                                 
21 While the empirical test used in Hegre et al. (2001) can be reconciled to an extent with the focus on shocks in this 
paper, a disconnect between their theoretical argument and the empirical analysis persists. Hegre et al. claim that 
regime change presents an opportunity for violent mobilization. It is likely, however, that the opportunity for 
mobilization would be greatest when the regime’s weakness first becomes apparent, not once a new regime has 
taken power. To operationalize the concept of regime change, the authors create a variable that measures 
fluctuations in polity scores. While such fluctuations may correspond to a concept such as political instability more 
broadly, it is doubtful that it measures actual regime change.  
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attempt to secure future influence. Immediately following a shock to government capabilities, at 
least two groups compete for a piece of the domestic pie.22  
However, the competing parties cannot anticipate the outcome of the bargaining process, 
and the relevant actors do not know ex ante whether agreements on sharing power can be 
negotiated. The incumbent regime would like to protect its vital interests and future access to 
power, but has to offer some benefits to challengers in order to buy off a potential rebellion. The 
government thus has incentives to make concessions following a weakening in its power, yet 
such commitments seem incredible given its earlier behavior.23 If the destabilized regime was 
unwilling to transfer power in the past, how can the opposition know whether it is serious about 
transferring authority, or is simply attempting to provide temporary buyoffs? Opponents of the 
regime may worry that the regime’s offers are merely an attempt to appease opposition groups, 
which will then be followed by the re-establishment of hegemonic control once the regime 
recovers from its weakness. The incumbent government faces a credibility problem, being unable 
to commit to outcomes it has tried to avert in the past.  
                                                 
22 It is assumed here that at least one group within society will challenge the current leadership in situations of 
regime weakness. While there may be cases in which no challengers are present, one should expect that individuals 
within the elite would take advantage of the leadership’s weakness. The empirical literature on the relationship 
between regime change and the probability of violence confirms this suggestion, indicating a positive and significant 
relationship between instability and rebellion using different operationalizations of the concepts (Tarrow, 1998; 
Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Zanger, 2000). Finally, the common definition of politics as the struggle 
of groups for authority also seems to lend some credibility to the assumed existence of a challenger to state 
authority.  
23 Why would leaders - at least in authoritarian regimes - not use repression rather than offer concessions? First, 
repression is likely a constant in authoritarian regimes.  When faced with a major challenge to their leadership, 
dictators cannot simply pursue the same strategy, and need to offer some benefits or perks to opposition groups. 
Second, research suggests that the strategies of concession and repression are not mutually exclusive, and are often 
used simultaneously. Franklin (2006) points out that theorists use the same explanatory variables to explain both 
phenomena. Rasler’s (1996) analysis of the Iranian revolution shows how the Shah and his government used both 
concessions and repression as a response to popular mobilization. Importantly, the combined use of repression and 
concession likely exacerbates the credibility problems emphasized in this research. How could the opposition trust 
that the government’s offers are sincere when it also arrests and jails its followers? Finally, while leaders may be 
tempted to apply particularly harsh repression when faced with a challenge to their power, empirical evidence shows 
that this strategy usually backfires. Schatzman (2005) demonstrates that the use of repression increases the 
probability of violent rebellion. Similarly, Francisco’s (2005) analysis of government massacres indicates that harsh 
repression results in backlash mobilization, and thus contributes to the eventual demise of dictators.  
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A brief discussion of events during Marcos’ dictatorship in the Philippines illustrates this 
scenario.  Following the 1972 imposition of martial law, Marcos came under increasing pressure 
to grant authority to the Muslim independence movement that had emerged in the region of 
Mindanao. Faced with an open rebellion by the armed wing of the insurgent movement, the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Marcos administration attempted to negotiate an 
autonomy agreement with the MNLF (May, 2002). While the initial agreement was signed by 
both parties, the MNLF pulled out of talks when negotiations stalled over the implementation of 
concessions by the Marcos regime. The insurgents were wary of the government’s true 
willingness to implement the terms of the agreement, essentially being “forced to rely on Marcos 
to agree to and help implement an arrangement that was contradictory to the essence of his 
government.” MNLF leaders “had to trust him (Marcos) to give them governing powers,” yet his 
government lacked the ability to establish such credibility, as Marcos had incentives to renege on 
the terms of the agreement (Noble, 1981: 1104). When Marcos subsequently announced his 
decision to hold a plebiscite over autonomy in the proposed region, the MNLF boycotted the 
referendum and resumed its armed insurrection (May, 2002). While admittedly anecdotal, this 
example serves to illustrate the fundamental problem encountered by weakened regimes and 
their opponents. Strained by increasingly open opposition to his regime, Marcos attempted to 
buy off a rebellion through concessions, yet these attempts were ultimately rejected as incredible 
by the insurgent movement. 
In addition to the commitment problems encountered by the government, a similar 
situation arises for the opposition. Based on its expectation to be more powerful in the future, the 
opposition has an incentive to renege on agreements in order to itself gain hegemonic control of 
the state. Emboldened by the current weakness in regime capabilities, opposition movements will 
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attempt to secure power to enact favorable policies and programs. While opposition groups 
would like to accept concessions offered by the government, they can use this increased 
bargaining power by reneging on a settlement in later interactions with the government. The 
weakened regime will anticipate this behavior, and thus be increasingly anxious to maintain its 
influence. Governments, in consequence, may be reluctant to transfer power, fearing that such 
transfers may empower their opponents to make even greater demands in the future (Fearon, 
2004: 298 fn.43).  
Georgia’s experience following its independence from the Soviet Union can serve as an 
example for this situation. Included as part of the new Georgian republic were the three regions 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Abjaria, and all three regions were able to preserve autonomy 
rights in Georgia’s first elected government (Cornell, 2002). When Georgia’s first elected 
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a coup d’état in 1992, however, activists in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia saw an opportunity to push for even greater self-determination. In 
the summer of 1992, Abkhaz militants took over the region’s capital and declared its formal 
independence from Georgia. This was followed by military action of Georgian forces, and a 
yearlong civil war between government and separatists ensued (Jones, 1997). This brief 
discussion of Georgia’s post-independence history shows that during times of government 
weakness, challengers can feel strengthened and place ever-increasing demands on a destabilized 
leadership. In the Georgian case, the granting of autonomy rights did not satisfy the requests of 
an emerging separatist movement. The Abkhaz’ declaration of independence led to the 
government’s use of force as an attempt to hold on to its power and defuse future challenges to 
its power. In other words, Georgia’s leadership was concerned that any additional concessions 
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would lead to further demands by the separatist movements, ultimately threatening the territorial 
integrity of the newly independent state.   
 The commitment problem encountered during leadership weakness, therefore, is a two-
sided one. Both government and opposition groups suffer from credibility problems, which 
hinder their capacity to negotiate agreements. Lacking the ability to fashion credible 
commitments, both the incumbent regime and the opposition have the option to achieve their 
preferred outcome through the use of force (Powell, 2004). The government may use military 
force in an attempt to hold on to power and to avoid increasing demands by the opposition in the 
future. The opposition, on the other hand, could choose violence because offers by the weakened 
regime are not considered sincere. The use of force, however, is inefficient because it is costly, 
uses resources, and destroys some of the flow of benefits available (Fearon, 1995, 2004; Powell, 
2004, 2006).  To avoid such inefficiency, actors need to make credible guarantees to share power 
in the future. They are unable to do so since they have incentives to renege on agreements once 
they recover from temporary weakness (for the government) or achieve greater strength (for the 
opposition). It is therefore expected that the commitment problems caused by shocks to 
government capabilities increase the probability of civil conflict.  
H1: A shock to government authority increases the probability of civil war. 
 
Making Credible Commitments  
Under what circumstances can actors overcome the credibility problems elaborated in the 
preceding section? The main emphasis will be put on the importance of actors’ institutional 
structure and the distance between them in the bargaining process.  
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Although commitment problems hamper actors’ ability to fashion mutually enforceable 
agreements during leadership weakness, the empirical record presents instances of bargaining 
after shocks in which actors avoided resorting to arms and succeeded in establishing regimes 
with mechanisms for power sharing.24 In the recent transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Gorbachev’s shift to a policy of non-intervention into the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact 
allies triggered intense bargaining between the old elite and opposition forces in the satellite 
states. The peaceful outcome of this process shows that actors can devise strategies that allow 
them to cooperate and transition without the use of force. Communist elites discussed the terms 
of the power transfer with members of the opposition at so-called “round tables” (Welsh, 1994). 
These negotiations led to the establishment of compromises acceptable to both sides, and the 
redistribution of power was settled peacefully. Similarly, economic decline and increasing 
international pressure forced the South African apartheid regime to enter negotiations with 
opposition groups in the late 1980s. Despite the occurrence of a shock that could trigger the use 
of force, the country subsequently went through a largely peaceful transition with built-in 
mechanisms of power sharing, resulting in its first democratic elections in 1994. This outcome 
was even more surprising given that the country was long thought to be home to intractable 
political conflicts (Jung et al., 2005).  
Yet little is known on how political leaders can enhance their credibility and reduce the 
potential for violence following a shock to their authority. I develop an argument that specifies 
how (1) the institutional structure of government and opposition groups and (2) the distance 
between them affect their ability to commit credibly to peaceful agreements.25  
                                                 
24 The occurrence of a shock does not necessarily lead to regime change, but theoretical expectations and empirical 
evidence suggest a strong relationship between both concepts (Przeworski et al., 2000).  
25 A possible objection is that neither the incumbent regime nor opposition groups may have a true interest in 
sharing power. While it is certainly true that bargaining may result in the establishment of an authoritarian regime, 
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Bargaining for Authority   
Following the weakening of domestic authority at the center, government and opposition 
groups compete for a favorable distribution of power. While cooperation and power-sharing may 
be mutually advantageous and avoid costly conflict, the use of military force remains on the 
bargaining table since both actors suffer from credibility problems. Government leaders may 
expect to regain their strength in the future and hence have incentives to renege on temporary 
concessions to the opposition. Equally, the opposition may hope to be more powerful, making 
the government fearful of attempts to achieve control of the state.  
What factors are expected to explain variation in actors’ commitment abilities in the 
bargaining process? First, it is argued that the institutional structure of incumbent regimes 
impacts elites’ ability to negotiate peaceful settlements. Leaders of regimes with low 
expectations of political survival in future governments are hypothesized to suffer from greater 
credibility problems. Second, the credibility of opposition movements will be evaluated 
according to the cohesiveness of their organization. Groups that lack clear, cohesive 
organizations will have difficulty to maintain control over radical elements, and should therefore 
be less able to guarantee compliance. Finally, the distance between government and opposition 
actors will also influence actors’ commitment abilities. Actors that are far apart from each other 
(because of ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences) will have greater difficulty 
overcoming commitment problems than groups that lack such contentious variation. Solutions to 
the commitment problem must therefore focus on the organizational structure of government and 
the opposition and on the distance between relevant actors.  
                                                                                                                                                             
one cannot assume an outcome of one or another type of regime ex ante. In addition, a shock implies that there is at 
least temporary uncertainty over the future distribution of power, where neither actor can immediately prevail. A 
weakened regime can attempt to buy off opponents with benefits or perks and establish a broadened dictatorship, but 
cannot simply seize power without bargaining (Przeworski, 1991).   
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Leadership Type 
The institutional structure of the regime in power will influence whether a weakened 
government can negotiate a peaceful outcome in the bargaining process. The institutional 
differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes are well established in the 
literature. Yet, in addition to the distinction between these two basic institutional types, 
important variations can be found within authoritarian regimes, and these variations will be 
evaluated here in regard to actors’ ability to make credible commitments. Non-democratic 
regimes differ significantly in decision making procedures, access to political office, leadership 
choice and succession mechanisms, as well as in their degree of institutionalization. More 
refined typologies of authoritarian regimes are now available, and different incentives inherent in 
these different types have been identified (Geddes, 1999a, b; Slater, 2003; Ulfelder, 2005; Lai 
and Slater, 2006; Weeks, 2008). 
The elite’s expectation of political survival in future regimes is expected to be the crucial 
factor influencing its commitment abilities. Elites that cannot anticipate continued political 
influence will suffer from greater credibility problems as they have more to lose in a handover of 
power. Regimes in which the fate of the ruling elite is closely tied to the fate of the leader will 
feel threatened by a potential transition and can be ousted only with the use of force.  
Military and personal regimes depend on a relatively small group of supporters that 
receive particularistic benefits in exchange for enforcement (Geddes, 1999a). Regimes relying on 
narrow segments of the population will, on average, face greater difficulty in making credible 
commitments to power-sharing. This is because elites maintain control through repressive tactics 
rather than co-optation and therefore cannot expect to receive political support from significant 
parts of society once opposition groups demand a share of power. They feel threatened by 
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challenges to power, as they cannot expect to survive politically in a new regime and are 
therefore more likely to block a takeover with force. Military and personalist regimes have little 
to offer when attempting to negotiate concessions with opposition groups, since their hold on 
power is based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the population.  
These two types of authoritarian regimes, therefore, feature winning coalitions that are 
much smaller than single-party or democratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, elites feel highly threatened when a crisis weakens their grip on power, and fear 
punishment in the case of a regime transition. Haggard and Kaufmann (1995), for example, 
argue that military regimes in crisis situations have greater difficulty negotiating favorable exit 
terms than single-party regimes. Similarly, since personalist dictatorships “exclude all but a tiny 
proportion of elites from sharing the fruits of power” they are unable to offer credible 
concessions when faced with domestic pressure (Goldstone, 2001: 149). Bratton and Van De 
Walle (1997: 84) point out that personal dictators “are unlikely to initiate political liberalization 
or relinquish power without a struggle, they have to be forced out”. Their inability to credibly 
share power, thus, increases the probability of armed conflict.    
Military and personalist regimes further tend to be less institutionalized than single-party 
and democratic regimes, not having developed mechanisms to penetrate large parts of society 
(Lai and Slater, 2006). This limitation reduces their chances for participation in future 
governments, since their organizations cannot easily be transformed into political parties. When 
an international event, economic crisis, or war defeat forces personalist or military regimes to 
negotiate with the opposition, they will have little prospect of maintaining even partial control in 
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the future and will attempt to thwart the transition process with violence. Concessions promised 
by personalist and military leaders will therefore not be credible. 26   
Single-party regimes differ from military and personalist regimes in that they incorporate 
significant segments of society into the regime through the party organization. In addition, the 
party ventures into many areas of social life, allowing for the inclusion of large parts of the 
population. Through the party organization, leadership successfully co-opts and controls social 
groups. The single-party regime in Kenya, for example, uses “the lure of state jobs to buy off 
opposition politicians” (Mwenda, 2003).  In the case of an economic or political crisis, dominant 
party regimes can adapt by broadening the base of their regimes without giving up control.27 
Elites in such regimes can make use of the party organization to adjust to changing external 
circumstances. The long-ruling Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as Haggard and 
Kaufman (1995: 267) describe, could draw on “the organizational resources available through 
the PRI to initiate wide-ranging economic adjustments”.  
When single-party regimes are unable to withstand the pressure to liberalize, officials can 
negotiate a transition to a regime with shared powers, rather than risking a costly military 
contest. As Geddes (1999a: 141) points out, elites in single-party regimes will be inclined to 
negotiate when facing pressure as they can “expect life as they know it to continue after 
liberalization or even regime change”. Leaders in dominant party regimes realize that they are 
                                                 
26 Findings in the literature on authoritarian regimes support this argument. Research shows that personal and 
military regimes face greater insecurity in their leadership tenure, having a median duration of 17.3 years (personal) 
and 11.6 years (military), compared to 32.6 years for single-party regimes (Ulfelder 2005: 320). Furthermore, 
leaders of military and personal regimes are much more likely to experience punishments (such as exile, 
prosecution, or death) following their tenure than other leaders, which is supported empirically in the analyses 
below. These findings conform to the expectation posited here.    
27 This is not to say that military and personalist dictators will not attempt to buy off opponents. However, the 
institutional logic of their regimes greatly reduces their ability to do so.  First, personalist leaders must defend 
themselves from potential rivals, and extending their circle of supporters thus threatens their hold on power. Geddes 
(1999a: 132) points out that personalist dictators must constantly eliminate the most able and ambitious potential 
successors. Second, the military as a group is much less permeable than a dominant party, and thus could only offer 
credible concessions to challengers who are already members of the military.   
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better off to negotiate and secure favorable exit terms rather than risking punishment. 
Furthermore, single-party regimes possess the political organization necessary for contestation 
and can therefore expect to secure a political future under a regime with shared powers at least 
for the short term. Post-Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, 
participated quite successfully in democratic elections. The former Communist Party of the 
German Republic (PDS), for example, garnered 19% of the vote in the Eastern part of Germany 
in the 1994 elections (Buchstein, 1995).  
Finally, it is necessary to consider the commitment abilities of democratic leaders in the 
case of an economic or political shock. Democracies have constitutional or informal mechanisms 
to respond to national crises that bypass normal legislative procedures. In addition, executives in 
democratic regimes can choose from routine forms of legislative authority to react to critical 
events. In presidential systems, the executive can issue vetoes, introduce legislation, and 
pronounce decrees subject to congressional approval. Legislatures can use impeachment to 
remove the executive. Prime ministers in parliamentary systems can dismiss parliaments and call 
for new elections, and parliaments are able to issue votes of no confidence. Leaders in 
consolidated democracies, therefore, can choose from a variety of tools when faced with 
challenges to their regime. In addition, reforms undertaken by democratic leaders are credible as 
the commitment problem is resolved through repeated elections. Incumbents turn over power to 
their challengers after losing elections, and stable expectations over such power transfers exist.28 
One may argue that newly democratic states are more susceptible to breakdown when faced with 
a shock to its capabilities (Linz, 1978). Yet, given that democratic leaders in new democracies 
have already committed to sharing powers with political opponents, they should suffer from 
                                                 
28 Supporting this intuition, Gates et al. (2006) find that democracies are significantly more stable than both 
authoritarian and inconsistent regimes.   
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fewer credibility problems than other types of regimes. Consistent with this notion, Linz (1978; 
56-57) points out that violence rarely plays a role in the breakdown of democratic regimes.29 
Democratic leaders’ behavior should therefore be similar to the expectation developed for single-
party regimes.  
To conclude, I expect that personalist and military leaders suffer from greater credibility 
problems than single-party or democratic rulers, problems which in turn increase the probability 
of civil war.   
H2: Following a shock to government authority, states with personalist and military 
regimes are more likely to experience civil war than single-party or democratic regimes.    
 
The Cohesiveness of Opposition Actors 
Opposition groups also encounter credibility problems in situations of leadership 
weakness. Even when a threatened regime is willing to negotiate, it may fear that granting 
concessions could result in greater opposition demands in the future or even hegemonic control 
by the opposition. As pointed out in the initial discussion of Georgia’s experience since 
independence, fear of ever-increasing demands by opposition groups can result in the use of 
military force by the threatened regime. The opposition, therefore, must find ways to signal 
credibly its willingness to negotiate, and to deflect the government’s fears over future demands 
or a takeover of control.  
Little systematic research on opposition groups in authoritarian regimes and emergent 
democracies exists (Lawson, 1993). Much of the existing literature on opposition movements 
and parties focuses on consolidated democracies. This literature, however, neglects the fact that 
                                                 
29 Hitler, for example, came to power through legitimate elections. While violence was central to Hitler’s 
maintenance of political authority, the Nazi Party secured 33 percent of the vote in 1932, and President Hindenburg 
legally selected Hitler as Chancellor in 1933 (Linz, 1978: 56).  
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such groups exist and operate in noncompetitive regimes. While in some regimes these groups 
function clandestinely and are excluded from the political process, other authoritarian regimes 
allow for the presence of legal opposition parties. Critical for this analysis is the credibility of 
opposition groups during government weakness. Which types of movements will be able to 
credibly signal their commitment to cooperation with the incumbent regime?   
It is argued here that the organizational structure of opposition groups will affect their 
ability to cooperate when the government is weakened. Groups with cohesive, developed 
organizational structures are expected to signal more credibly their commitment to a regime with 
shared powers.30 This is because opposition groups are often divided into moderate and radical 
challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals’ 
demands (Kalyvas, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Lacking the institutional strength to punish 
defectors, weakly organized groups cannot deflect the regime’s fear of greater demands in the 
future. Groups without clear leadership or a cohesive organization cannot signal resolve to a 
negotiated settlement, thus hindering the prospect for cooperation (Kalyvas, 2000). In a 
comparison of Belgium’s and Algeria’s democratization, Kalyvas (2000) finds that the presence 
of a hierarchical, centralized challenger party in Belgium deflected fears of a radical takeover of 
the old regime. Conversely, Islam’s decentralized, vertical organizational structure led to 
competition between radical and moderate forces within the opposition during Algeria’s short 
experiment with democracy in the early 1990s. Quandt (1998) points to leadership struggles 
within the Islamist movement, where the rhetoric of Islamist leader Ben Hadj “seemed 
considerably more extreme than Madani’s” (Quandt, 1998: 58). Fearful that the opposition 
                                                 
30 The focus on the cohesiveness and organizational strength of opposition creates obvious measurement problems, 
especially for quantitative analysis. Unorganized groups lacking a strong party organization are expected to be less 
credible, but the presence of such groups will be difficult to measure in large-N analysis. These measurement 
problems will be discussed in more detail below.  
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movement would renege on its commitment to a democratic regime and establish an Islamist 
state, the military canceled election results and took up arms against the Islamists.  
This intuition is consistent with insights from the study of ethnic conflict, where only 
strong, hierarchical organizations that can effectively police extremists succeed in inducing 
compromise for cooperation (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Pointing to the relative prevalence of 
interethnic cooperation, Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that the organizational structure of 
groups plays a crucial role for the outbreak of conflict. Groups with dense social networks and 
interactions allow for in-group policing, and radicals threatening interethnic cooperation can be 
identified and sanctioned (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 719). Yet when institutional arrangements 
allowing for in-group policing are absent, defection can lead to the breakdown of cooperation in 
the form of spiraling violence.   
In addition to the organizational structures emphasized above, links to existing social 
institutions can further enhance the credibility of opposition movements. Ties to established 
institutions such as churches or unions make compromise more likely as they provide additional 
credibility and legitimacy to a movement.31 Such linkages can signal to the government that 
moderates are in control, as existing institutions tend to ally with forces that will maximize their 
political impact (Kalyvas, 2000: 391).  
The Polish Solidarity movement, for example, had a strategic partnership with the 
Catholic Church, which lent legitimacy to the movement (Meardi, 2005). Collaboration with the 
Catholic Church, a hierarchical, conservative, and risk-averse institution, signaled that moderate 
                                                 
31 A possible objection is that the effect of such linkages will depend upon the nature of the respective institution. 
North’s work on institutional stability, however, suggests that institutions are generally status-quo oriented. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that preexisting social organizations would establish linkages with extremist groups. In 
addition, the appeal of radical groups stems at least in part from marketing themselves as “anti-establishment” 
alternatives to existing, more moderate groups and organizations. For example, research by Adams et al. (2006) 
shows that extremist parties that moderated their positions are punished at the polls. Therefore, it is likely that links 
to established institutions function as a signal of moderation.   
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forces were in control, and thus helped to reduce Communists’ fears of radical demands. 
Conversely, opposition groups lacking ties to other institutions, such as the Islamist movement in 
Algeria’s regime transition, cannot convincingly commit to power-sharing and democracy 
(Kalyvas, 2000). Islam’s structure is “loose and decentralized with no clergy, and religious 
discourses and idioms compete on several levels” (Kalyvas, 2000: 389). The movement failed to 
establish linkages to preexisting social institutions and could not convince the regime that 
moderates were in control. Fearing an Islamist takeover of the state, the military canceled 
election results and the country descended into a long civil war. An analysis of social movements 
in Israel, South Africa, and Northern Ireland by Meyer (2004) comes to a similar conclusion. The 
author finds that groups considering contact with existing institutions as “neither feasible nor 
desirable” were more likely to engage in violent protest activity (Meyer, 2004: 177).  
Cohesive opposition groups with ties to existing organizations, therefore, are expected to 
be able to make credible commitments, and these characteristics consequently reduce the 
probability of civil war.   
H3: Following a shock to government authority, states with cohesive, organized 
opposition groups are less likely to experience civil war. 
 
While the above discussion concentrated on the independent influence of government and 
opposition structures on the incidence of civil war, different institutional configurations will 
likely result in different conflict propensities. If a regime that is unable to commit (such as a 
personal dictatorship) encounters a cohesive and unified opposition, its promises to grant 
concessions will not be deemed credible, and the probability of peaceful resolution decreases. A 
similar scenario ensues when a weakened regime that could make credible commitments faces an 
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opposition group lacking clear authority structures. While the leadership could credibly devolve 
authority, it will not do so out of fear of reneging by the opposition, and either actor may choose 
violence to compel an opponent to its preferred outcome.  
Furthermore, it is easily conceivable that variation in the institutional structure of 
government and opposition groups can result in a number of outcomes apart from the war and 
peace dichotomy emphasized here. Civil wars, in the end, are rare events, and the absence of war 
does not convey a uniformity of outcomes. Democracies, for example, will likely respond with 
policy change and reform when experiencing economic crises or other shock events, whereas 
single-party leaders may choose repression. Since the focus on civil wars does not allow for such 
distinctions, more fine-grained distinctions should be developed in future research. Highlighting 
civil wars, however, restricts the focus to the most violent, costly, and destructive of possible 
outcomes and therefore seems worthwhile in its own right.  
 
The Distance between Government and Opposition  
The discussion of the government’s and the opposition’s institutional structure 
emphasizes actor-specific elements that affect their ability to commit credibly. It thus neglects 
the fact that divergence in actors’ preferences may also impact the bargaining process. When 
government and opposition groups have widely different preferences over what types of 
agreements are acceptable, bargaining can break down because the range of possible negotiated 
outcomes is too small.32 In the domestic arena, divergent preferences may arise from ethnic, 
religious, ideological, or economic differences between the relevant actors. 
                                                 
32 One may argue that divergent preferences can preclude bargaining if no area of overlap between actors’ win-sets 
exists. In the past, Fearon (1995) has suggested that conflict over indivisible goods can lead to such a scenario. 
Powell (2006: 171), however, argues that the costliness of fighting ensures that a bargaining range exists even if the 
dispute concerns an indivisible issue. In addition, Schelling (1960, 1966) points out that much bargaining is implicit. 
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Putnam’s (1988) work on win-sets makes a similar point in the area of international 
political economy. He expects that the size of negotiators’ win-sets (the range of possible 
negotiating outcomes) and the areas of overlap between these win-sets influence the likelihood 
of an agreement. When there is no overlap between negotiators’ win-sets, bargaining breaks 
down as no acceptable agreements can be found.  Applying this argument to the domestic arena, 
societies with greater differences are less likely to have overlapping win-sets. If government and 
opposition exhibit greater distance due to ethnic or other differences, acceptable agreements may 
not exist.33 
The role of competing preferences in the occurrence of violence is stressed in research in 
the area of regime change and civil war. Examining different actor constellations during a 
transition to democracy, Przeworski (1991: 83-87) argues that conflicting preferences over the 
organization of political life can result in bargaining breakdown, and that may mean civil war. If 
actors are diametrically opposed on what type of institutional system should be adopted, no win-
set exists, and cooperation becomes impossible. Similarly, Hirschleifer (1995) notes that parties’ 
divergent preferences can develop into opportunities for civil war. In this scenario, contrary 
preferences reduce the bargaining range, and actors choose conflict when it is expected to be 
more lucrative than peace (Hirschleifer, 1995, Sambanis, 2002).  Yet largely unanswered 
remains the question of what types of actors suffer from such opposed preferences.  
Ethnicity is suggested as a possible cause of civil war in much of the literature.34 While 
shared ethnic identity provides a mechanism for trust and enables cooperation for members of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tacit bargaining, therefore, may have occurred in cases of negotiation failure that are claimed to stem from 
indivisible issues.  
33 When win-sets do overlap, smaller areas of overlap do not necessarily indicate that agreements are more difficult 
to achieve. If win-sets, for example, intersect in a single point, negotiators should immediately settle on the single 
possible agreement. If the area of overlap is small, a negotiator with a small win-set may in fact experience a 
bargaining advantage, as the actor with the larger win-set can be “pushed around” to accept an agreement favoring 
his opponent (Putnam, 1988: 440).   
34 See Sambanis (2002) for an overview.  
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ethnic group, the presence of ethnic divisions can complicate collaboration across different 
ethnic groups (Sambanis, 2002). Scholars disagree on whether ethnic fragmentation, 
polarization, or dominance is the appropriate operationalization of the concept. Some authors 
argue that ethnic fractionalization should be positively related to conflict, claiming that the 
presence of multiple small groups increases the probability of secessionist movements 
(Horowitz, 1985; Buhaug, 2006). Others speculate that countries with ethnically dominant or 
polarized groups are at the greatest risk of violent domestic conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Societies dominated by two large groups rather than many 
diverse ones are more prone to violent rebellion, since the coordination costs of rebellion are 
smaller. Empirical results on the relationship between ethnicity and civil war are inconsistent, 
with results varying across different operationalizations of the key concepts (Hegre and 
Sambanis, 2006).  
The effect of ethnic differences on commitment ability is of concern here. When 
domestic authority is weakened in countries with large numbers of ethnic groups, compromise 
may be more difficult to achieve since government and opposition groups will likely split across 
ethnic lines. Ethnicity works as one possible source for diverging preferences among actors, 
which in consequence limits the bargaining range. If members of one group see themselves as far 
apart or polarized from others, a commitment to negotiation becomes less likely, increasing the 
probability of conflict. Political instability also helps explain why ethnic diversity has divergent 
effects on conflict propensities. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) point out, many ethnic groups 
coexist peacefully for extended periods, yet at times conflict breaks out and quickly spirals out of 
control. As long as the institutional equilibrium is stable, ethnic differences should not result in 
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the use of force, yet when the renegotiation of authority becomes feasible, such differences can 
exacerbate the commitment problem present during leadership weakness.35 
Apart from ethnic differences, ideological and economic differences also may generate 
preference divergence, and subsequently civil war. Yet, as Gates (2002: 122) points out, ethnic 
differences should be expected to present a more salient cleavage, as ethnicity is difficult to 
change and therefore unlikely to result in significant group defections. Furthermore, empirical 
studies to this date have not confirmed a significant effect of ideological distance or inequality 
on the probability of civil war (Sambanis, 2004b).36 For the theoretical and empirical reasons laid 
out above, I therefore focus on ethnic distance as one possible source of preference divergence. 
Ethnic differences, I hypothesize, will increase commitment problems between the relevant 
actors during regime change and, in consequence, the risk of civil war. 
H4: Following a shock to government authority, states with high ethnic fractionalization 
are more likely to experience civil war. 
                                                 
35 As a corollary, high ethnic fractionalization may also impact the cohesiveness of opposition actors. During regime 
weakness, groups in such societies will find it more difficult to make credible commitments as the presence of many 
small groups makes it difficult to form a cohesive opposition with clear leadership.  
36 Sambanis (2004b) points out that one reason for the non-finding regarding economic inequality may be that it is 
related to the probability of political instability, which has been shown to increase the risk of civil war.   
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Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses  
Concept Associated 
Hypothesis 
Expectation Expected 
Direction 
Leadership Weakness Hypothesis 1 A shock to government authority increases 
the probability of civil war. 
 
+ 
Leadership Type Hypothesis 2 Following a shock to government authority, 
states with personalist and military regimes 
are more likely to experience civil war than 
single-party or democratic regimes.    
+ 
Opposition Cohesion Hypothesis 3 Following a shock to government authority, 
states with cohesive, organized opposition 
groups are less likely to experience civil war. 
 
- 
Ethnic Distance Hypothesis 4 Following a shock to government authority, 
states with high ethnic fractionalization are 
more likely to experience civil war. 
 
+ 
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 Chapter 4: Empirical Test I: Critical Events and the Threat of Civil conflict 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that shocks to government capabilities create a 
commitment problem for relevant actors within the state. I then focused on potential solutions to 
such credibility problems by emphasizing the organizational structure of actors and the distance 
between them. This chapter tests the theoretical arguments against data on civil conflicts and 
civil conflicts for the 1960-2004 time period. The analysis aims to answer two questions: First, 
do critical events such as economic crisis, the death of a leader, or defeat in war increase the 
probability of civil conflict, as outlined in the theoretical section? Second, do the factors put 
forward to alleviate the commitment problem influence the likelihood of civil conflict as 
hypothesized?  
This chapter proceeds in five parts. The first part outlines the structure of the dataset used 
to test the empirical expectations. In the second part, I briefly summarize the empirical findings 
to be presented in the subsequent section. The next two parts present empirical results for the 
different statistical models. Each of these parts includes a discussion of the statistical 
methodology, the operationalization of variables, and empirical results. The first part analyzes 
whether shocks in fact increase the probability of civil conflict. In the subsequent part, a 
selection model is constructed to investigate the effect of leadership type, opposition cohesion, 
and the distance between actors on actors’ commitment abilities. A final section summarizes 
results and gives a short preview of the next chapter.  
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Data  
 Goemans et al.’s (2006) data base on political leaders is used to create a dataset for 
testing the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter.37 In these data, leaders, rather than 
countries, are the primary unit of analysis. This choice was made for two reasons. First, a 
growing body of research emphasizes how leaders, not states, are the primary actors in 
international politics (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003, 2004a, b; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000, 
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Decisions in international relations are made by 
government leaders, not states, and rates of leadership survival differ across regimes. Second, 
using states rather than leaders would significantly reduce the number of cases available for the 
analysis, since countries can have multiple leaders who hold office during the same year. This 
would lead to the exclusion of cases in which leaders experienced political instability or 
challenges to their authority, which are the most important observations for the substantive focus 
of this analysis. The unit of analysis in this dataset is the leader-year, including one observation 
for each leader and year for the 1960-2004 period. The first hypothesis, investigating the basic 
relationship between shocks to the government and civil conflict, is tested using a dataset for all 
leader-years. The final three hypotheses, analyzing solutions to the commitment problem for 
weakened leadership and opposition, are tested on data including only cases that experienced 
political instability.  
 
Summary of Findings 
The empirical findings confirm the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical section. First, 
shocks increase the probability of civil conflict, lending support to the expectation that actors 
suffer from commitment problems when faced with a weakening of government authority. 
                                                 
37 Data are available online at http://mail.rochester.edu/%7Ehgoemans/data.htm. Version 2.5 is used here.  
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Critical events such as economic decline, defeat in interstate war, and the end of the Cold War 
represent sudden shifts in power, resulting in commitment problems for government and 
opposition. All three types of events significantly increase the probability of civil conflict, 
confirming the first hypothesis. Second, solutions to the commitment problem outlined in the 
previous chapter are corroborated. Hypotheses 2 and 3 stated that the organizational structure of 
leadership and opposition will influence actors’ commitment abilities. As laid out in hypothesis 
2, personalist and military regimes are more likely to experience civil conflict after a weakening 
of government authority. The expected effect of the cohesiveness of opposition groups is also 
confirmed in the statistical analysis. I show that states with cohesive and organized opposition 
groups have a lower probability of experiencing violence following critical events. The fourth 
hypothesis argued that greater distance between actors reduces the bargaining range, and in 
consequence increases the probability of civil conflict. Findings show that greater ethnic 
heterogeneity does in fact result in a greater risk of violence. Finally, a Heckman selection model 
is used to account for potential selection effects between factors influencing the probability of a 
shock and the probability of civil conflict respectively. Results indicate a correlation of the 
disturbance terms, thus confirming the selection model as an appropriate modeling choice.  
 
A Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil Conflict 
Methodology 
The first hypothesis argues that leadership weakness increases the probability of civil 
conflict as a result of the commitment problem. To test this hypothesis, data on all leader-years 
for the 1960-2004 time period are included in the analysis, resulting in more than 7,700 
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observations.38 Probit analysis is used to investigate the relationship between leadership 
weakness and civil conflict. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, civil conflict 
onset, probit analysis is an appropriate estimation method.   
Dependent Variable 
The onset of civil conflict is the dependent variable in the probit model. Entry dates for 
leaders are available in Goemans et al.’s (2006) data base on political leaders. Data on civil 
conflict onset come from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Project and are described in Gleditsch et 
al. (2002).39 Armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility which concerns 
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002: 619). The Uppsala dataset on armed internal conflict uses a lower 
threshold, 25 battle-deaths per year, than the Correlates of War (COW) project, which specifies 
that a civil conflict must involve 1,000 battle deaths in a single year (Sarkees, 2000: 129).  While 
the data also provide information on interstate conflicts, I only include internal armed conflicts 
and internationalized internal armed conflicts in this variable. The civil conflict onset variable is 
dichotomous and coded 1 for years with an onset of internal armed conflict, 0 otherwise.  
I believe that a lower threshold on battle-deaths is useful for several reasons. First, a low 
threshold reduces endogeneity problems. A large body of research highlights the effect of 
economic conditions on the probability of civil conflict. Civil conflict, however, has also been 
shown to negatively impact economic growth. Using a high battle-death threshold, therefore, 
runs the risk of demonstrating the negative effects of civil conflict on economic development, 
since fighting may have started long before a conflict reaches 1,000 battle-deaths. The argument 
                                                 
38 The number of cases in the probit model is smaller because of missing data in some of the independent variables.  
39 Data are available at http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-Armed-
Conflicts-Dataset.   
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developed here expects that critical events such as economic decline increase the potential for 
civil conflict. It is important to avoid the possibility that these shocks are the result of civil 
conflicts, and a lower battle-death threshold is therefore more appropriate. Second, a lower 
battle-death threshold is attractive because it does not exclude conflicts that may be major for 
countries with small populations. Finally, as war is a relatively rare event, the inclusion of a 
larger number of conflicts also solves statistical problems associated with the analysis of rare 
events data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).  
However, to ensure that results are not driven by the definition of civil conflict employed 
here, I also use data on civil conflicts using the 1,000 battle-death threshold to define civil 
conflict onset. The data are described in Gleditsch (2004) and use the same coding criteria for 
intrastate wars as the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees, 2000: 129). Cases are then 
updated based on Gleditsch and Ward’s (1999) list of independent states and Uppsala data on 
armed conflict for the post-1997 period.40 
Independent Variables 
The first hypothesis investigates whether the occurrence of critical events increases the 
probability of civil conflict occurrence. I argued that shocks such as economic decline, war 
defeat, the death of a leader, or changes in the international balance of power constitute power 
shifts that weaken incumbent governments. While such shocks create incentives for government 
and opposition groups to bargain, credibility problems keep them from committing to negotiable 
agreements. I construct four separate variables to operationalize the concept of a “critical event,” 
or “shock.”  
First, I include a measure that indicates whether a country experienced a period of 
recession, or economic decline. Researchers in comparative politics argue that economic decline 
                                                 
40 Data are available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/expwar.html.  
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increases the likelihood of authoritarian and democratic breakdown, and this expectation has 
been supported in quantitative analyses (Prezworski et al., 2000). I use data on economic growth 
from the World Bank Development Indicators to operationalize this concept. The standard 
definition of recession is a decline in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for two or more 
consecutive quarters.41 Since quarterly data on GDP growth rates are not available for a large set 
of countries, states with negative growth rates during a given year are defined as being in 
recession. I create a dummy variable coded 1 if a country experienced a decline in GDP growth 
during a given leader-year, 0 otherwise.  
 Defeat in interstate war is the second indication of leadership weakness operationalized 
in this paper. Data on interstate wars provided in the Correlates of War (COW) project include 
information on war outcomes.42 Specifically, the data include a variable indicating whether a 
country was on the winning or losing side of a conflict. I constructed a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if a leader was on the losing side of an interstate war during a given leader-year, 0 
otherwise. For the period of 1960-2004, 28 leaders experienced defeat in international wars.  
Third, I have argued that the death of a leader while in office constitutes a shift in the 
regime’s power and will trigger a bargaining process between followers of the incumbent regime 
and opposition. Data for leader deaths are available in the Goemans et al. (2006) data.43 I include 
a measure of death in office, coded 1 for leaders that died of natural causes while in office, 0 
otherwise. In the time period analyzed here, 99 leaders died in office. 
                                                 
41 While this is the standard newspaper definition, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) uses a more 
complex procedure to define recession in their data on the U.S. business cycle. The NBER definition considers the 
depth and duration of economic decline, includes a broader set of indicators than GDP, and uses monthly indicators. 
Data for the United States are available at http://www.nber.org/.   
42 Data are available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.  
43 The variable available in Goemans et al. (2006) codes whether a leader left office because of regular loss, natural 
death, irregular loss, or deposition. I construct a dummy variable coded 1 for leaders that died of natural causes 
while in office, 0 otherwise. While irregular leadership exit (due to assassinations or coups) or depositions also 
indicate bargaining over power, they often imply the occurrence of domestic violence, and are therefore endogenous 
to a model of leadership weakness and civil conflict.  
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Fourth, changes in the international balance of power can weaken the domestic 
distribution of power and open up space for bargaining. While “change in the international 
balance of power” is difficult to operationalize in a large-N setting, the upheaval triggered by the 
end of the Cold War presents an instance of such changes. Reforms in the Soviet Union in the 
late 1980s led to crises of legitimacy and subsequent regime changes in the Central and Eastern 
European satellite states, followed by the eventual collapse of the USSR (Colomer, 2000). To 
account for this change in the balance of power, I include a dichotomous variable coded 1 for the 
years 1990-1995, 0 otherwise.  
Finally, I created a variable combining all four of these event types. This measure is 
labeled “shock” and is a dummy variable created from the four previously described indicators. 
It is a dichotomous measure coded 1 for countries experiencing recession, war defeat, leader 
death, and/or changes in the international balance of power, 0 otherwise.  
The operationalization of political instability used here differs from earlier research. 
Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, operationalize instability by 
measuring fluctuations in polity scores.44 While this measure gauges variation in states’ level of 
democracy, it fails to identify the precise conditions triggering a bargaining process between 
actors for a share of authority.  Hegre et al. and Fearon and Laitin argue that political instability 
opens a window of opportunity for potential rebellion, but the variable used to measure this 
concept is rather abstract. This research operationalizes the shocks identified as causes of regime 
change in the comparative literature, and can thereby more accurately identify opportunities for 
rebellion.  
In order to control for alternative explanations of civil conflict, several variables are 
added to the model testing the first hypothesis. To allow for comparability with earlier research, I 
                                                 
44 The composite polity score is a 21-point scale ranging from most autocratic to most democratic. 
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will use covariates similar to those of Hegre et al. (2001). First, the polity score, a measure 
accounting for the level of democracy, is added to the model.45 The squared term of this variable 
is also included in order to allow for the curvilinear relationship proposed by Hegre et al. (2001).  
Second, the level of economic development is expected to influence the risk of civil conflict 
occurrence. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) show that the probability of civil conflict is reduced by 
increases in GDP per capita, as the economic opportunity costs for rebels from fighting become 
greater.46 To control for economic development, I include a variable measuring GDP per capita 
per leader-year.47 Because of high skewness, this variable is log-transformed. Conforming to 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) finding, increases in GDP per capita are expected to lower the risk 
of internal war.  
To account for temporal dependence in the model, I follow Beck et al.’s (1998) advice 
and include cubic spline variables in the probit models presented below.48 To ensure that results 
are not influenced by the particular set of control variables employed, I also present models 
without the control variables. Finally, I discuss results on the relationship between leadership 
weakness and civil conflict using a battle-death threshold of 1,000.49 Table 3 provides summary 
statistics for the independent variables used in the probit model. 
                                                 
45 The composite score ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Data come from the Polity IV 
project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. The variable used here is called Polity 2, designed to 
facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. This variable revises the combined annual  
polity score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority codes” (i.e., -
66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 
46 Hegre et al. (2001) also include a squared GDP per capita variable based on earlier research by Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998). Since Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do not hypothesize such a relationship, I did not include a 
squared term.  
47 GDP data come from the the World Development Indicators 2004.   
48 Coefficients for the spline variables are not reported to conserve space.  
49 Results are presented in table 6 in the appendix.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Probit Model 
Variable Name Mean SD Min Max Description 
Civil conflict (25 battle deaths) 0.03 0.16 0 1 Coded 1 for armed conflict onset 
Civil War (1,000 battle deaths) 0.01 0.12 0 1 Coded 1 for civil war onset 
Recession 0.18 0.38 0 1 Coded 1 for recession 
War Defeat 0.004 0.06 0 1 Coded 1 for defeat in interstate war 
Death in Office 0.013 0.11 0 1 Coded 1 for leader death while in office 
End of Cold War 0.15 0.36 0 1 Coded 1 for years 1985-1995 
Critical Event 0.37 0.58 0 1 Coded 1 for recession, leader death, war 
defeat, and cold war 
Democracy Level 0.24 7.49 -10 +10 Composite autocracy-democracy score 
Democracy squared 56.3 32.4 0 100 Composite autocracy-democracy score, 
squared 
Economic Development 1.5 0.57 0.72 4.23 GDP per capita, logged 
 
Results 
The first model presented here includes four variables measuring the effect of different 
types of shocks on the probability of civil conflict. Results for this model are presented in the 
first column of table 4 and show strong support for the expected relationship between leadership 
weakness and the probability of civil conflict. The variable measuring whether a country 
experienced a recession is positive and significant (z=4.48, p<0.01), indicating that economic 
decline indeed increases the potential for violence. Undergoing a recession results in a 0.02 
increase in the probability of internal armed conflict, which equals a 109% increase (all other 
variables held constant). This result supports the expectation that critical events weakening the 
incumbent government create commitment problems and increase the risk for violence.   
War defeat is the second variable employed to operationalize the concept of a critical 
event. It was argued that defeat in war signals the government’s weakness to opposition groups, 
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which in turn leads to bargaining over power. The coefficient for this variable is significant and 
positive (z=3.43, p<0.01), thus supporting the expectation that war defeat generates credibility 
problems among actors and thus increases the likelihood of civil conflict. The substantive effect 
of war defeat is immense. The probability of civil conflict onset increases by 0.15 when war 
defeat is varied from 0 to 1, representing a 774% increase.  
 
Table 4: Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil conflict (25 battle-deaths) 
Variable Name Model 1 
Estimate 
(Robust 
S.E.) 
Model 2 
Estimate 
(Robust 
S.E.) 
Model 3 
Estimate 
(Robust 
S.E.) 
∆ 
Probability  
Model 1 
∆ 
Probability  
Model 2 
∆ 
Probability  
Model 3 
Recession 
 
0.324***   
(0.07) 
0.238***    
(0.078) 
— +0.021 +0.014 — 
War Defeat 
 
1.12***   
(0.327) 
  1.189***   
(0.33) 
— +0.155 +0.17 — 
Death in Office 
 
-0.302   
(0.383)   
-0.246   
(0.387) 
— — — — 
End of Cold War  
 
0.238***   
(0.076) 
0.272***   
(0.086) 
— +0.015 +0.017 — 
Shock 
 
— — 0.267***   
(0.053) 
— — +0.016 
Democracy Level 
 
— -0.002   
(0.006) 
-0.003  
(0.006)   
— a — a — a 
Democracy Squared 
 
— -0.005***   
(0.001) 
-0.005***  
(0.001) 
— a — a — a 
Economic 
Development 
— -0.289***   
(0.094)   
-0.281***  
(0.094) 
— -0.017 -0.015 
N 6,796 
 
5,217 5,217    
Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Columns 4-6 show the marginal effect of 
the significant variables on the probability of civil conflict. Variables are varied from one standard deviation below 
their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. All 
other variables were held at their mean or modal values. Probabilities were calculated using the mfx command in 
Stata 9.2.  
a Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.  
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
 
The end of Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda provides an illustration of this finding. 
Following Uganda’s defeat in the war against Tanzania in April of 1979, Uganda witnessed a 
“winner-takes-all” struggle between members of the old regime, the Ugandan National 
Liberation Front (UNLF, formed by Ugandans in exile), and followers of former President 
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Obote, Uganda’s leader after independence in 1962. While the UNLF moved quickly in setting 
up the National Consultative Council, it represented only the more radical elements within the 
UNLF and excluded pro-Obote groups from the government (Gertzel, 1980).  In addition, years 
of arbitrary personal rule had left the new government with an institutional and political vacuum 
as well as a crippled economy. Following a string of temporary leaders, former President Obote 
was reinstalled as the country’s leader in late 1980, but this move was vehemently opposed by a 
UNLF faction led by Museveni, which started a six-year guerilla war against the Obote regime.  
The third variable used to measure the occurrence of a shock is the death of a leader. 
When a leader dies during his term in office, one should expect intense bargaining between 
members of the old regime and opposition groups over the future distribution of power. While 
peaceful agreements may be mutually preferable, both groups have incentives to renege on 
agreements, and these incentives can lead to bargaining inefficiencies and fighting. The 
coefficient for this variable, however, is negative and fails to meet conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Therefore, I cannot support the expectation on bargaining inefficiency 
and violence after leader death.  
There are two possible reasons for this finding. First, especially in cases where the death 
of the leader is foreseeable, instability and violence may in fact precede the leader’s death. 
Second, many regimes have pre-arranged succession arrangements that may reduce the potential 
for violence following the death of a leader. However, whether such arrangements will be 
adhered to after a leader’s death will vary across different types of regimes.50 Single-party 
regimes, for example, have the organizational structure of the party to arrange for an orderly 
transfer of power. Four out of seven Soviet Union leaders, for example, died of natural causes 
                                                 
50 To account for this possibility, I create a variable measuring a leader’s death in office in personalist and military 
regimes only. While the coefficient for this variable was positive, it nevertheless failed to reach conventional 
significance levels.  
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while in office, but the party organization swiftly and effectively installed successors. In military 
and personal regimes, on the other hand, the death of a leader should have much greater 
destabilizing effects (Geddes, 1999a). Following the death of dictator, pre-established succession 
mechanisms are often ignored, or successors do not survive long in office. Marcello Caetano, 
chosen by Portuguese dictator Salazar as his successor, was thrown out of office four years after 
Salazar’s death. 
Finally, the comparative politics literature also identifies changes in the international 
balance of power as instances related to leadership weakness and regime change. This concept is 
operationalized with a measure accounting for the destabilizing effects of the end of the Cold 
War. As hypothesized, the coefficient is statistically significant and positive (z=3.13, p<0.01). 
The probability of civil conflict increases from 0.02 to 0.035 when the indicator is varied from 0 
to 1 (and all other variables are held constant), which equals a 73% increase. The collapse of a 
foreign tutorial power evinces the current government’s weakness and thus results in bargaining 
over a new distribution of authority. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the 
subsequent end of the Cold War divide have therefore triggered increased probabilities of civil 
conflict. Violent struggle in the Caucasus, for example, demonstrates how shocks to the balance 
of power can lead to conflictual outcomes.  
The second model presented in table 4 includes control variables similar to those of 
Hegre et al. (2001). Results for the variables testing the first hypothesis are very similar to those 
of the first model. Recession, war defeat, and the end of the Cold War significantly increase the 
probability of civil conflict, thus strongly supporting hypothesis 1. As in the previous model, 
however, a leader’s death in office has no significant effect on the likelihood of armed conflict. 
The control variables included in the second model perform mostly as expected. I find support 
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for the curvilinear relationship between level of democracy and civil conflict, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient for the squared democracy term (z=-3.98, p<0.01). This 
confirms research by Hegre et al. (2001). The variable measuring economic development shows 
a negative and weakly significant relationship between GDP per capita and the risk of civil 
conflict occurrence (z=-3.05, p<0.001). When varied from one standard deviation below its mean 
to one standard deviation above (and all else held constant), the probability of civil conflict 
decreases by 0.016, or 55%. This finding is consistent with expectations by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000).  
The third model in table 4 uses the variable combining all four types of shocks. The 
measure combines economic decline, defeat in war, leader death in office, and the end of the 
Cold War into a single dichotomous variable. While death in office failed to have a significant 
effect on the probability of civil conflict, it is included in the measure for theoretical reasons. 
Consistent with the evidence in the first model, the occurrence of a shock significantly increases 
the probability of civil conflict (z=4.23, p<0.01). The likelihood of civil conflict increases by 
0.02 if the variable is varied from 0 to 1 (with all other variables held constant), which equals an 
86% increase. The first hypothesis, therefore, is supported using individual types of shocks and 
the measure combining all four types of events. Among the control variables, the curvilinear 
relationship between the level of democracy and civil conflict is confirmed in the second model. 
The coefficient for the squared democracy variable is negative and significant at the 99% 
confidence level. A negative and significant relationship between economic development and the 
probability of civil conflict is again confirmed in the second model.  
Finally, I also tested the expectation developed in the first hypothesis using data on civil 
wars with more than 1,000 battle-deaths per year. Results are presented in table 7 in the appendix 
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and are largely consistent with the above results. Economic decline and war defeat significantly 
increase the risk of civil war using a higher battle-death threshold. As in the models discussed 
above, the variable measuring whether a leader died in office is not significantly related to civil 
war onset. The dichotomous variable accounting for the end of the Cold War fails to meet 
conventional levels of statistical significance, contradicting the findings in the models using a 25 
battle-death threshold. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a large 
number of new states with small populations. As mentioned earlier, conflicts with fewer than 
1,000 battle deaths would arguably be major for such states, and the exclusion of such cases may 
drive the non-finding for this variable.  
 
A Selection Model of Critical Events and Civil conflict 
Methodology 
Thus far, this paper has emphasized the commitment problems following shocks to 
government authority, not addressing whether the causes of such critical events could be related 
to the model. Since the absence of domestic authority is not a constant feature of the domestic 
political arena (as in the international system), the reasons leading to regime weakness in the first 
place may well be related to the likelihood of violence following such shocks. It seems 
reasonable to expect that factors related to the collapse of regimes are not independent from 
whether subsequent interactions between relevant actors turn violent.  
The literature on civil conflicts has generally failed to account for such selection effects. 
Sambanis’ (2004b) and Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) investigations of the effects of economic 
inequality on civil conflict are partial exceptions. Both works suggest that the reason for the non- 
relationship between inequality and civil conflict in many studies may in fact be a result of an 
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omitted intervening variable, political stability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that inequality 
in fact is related to political instability, although their research suffers from the use of an 
instability measure that also includes the use of force. Sambanis’ (2004b) measure of instability 
does not include violent incidents, yet while demonstrating that inequality is related to 
instability, he fails to then relate instability to civil conflict, hence omitting the second stage of 
the model.  
A growing body of research on conflict between states, however, emphasizes the 
importance of such selection effects and proposes various solutions to these problems (Reed, 
2000; Lemke and Reed, 2001; Fearon, 2002; Sartori, 2003; Boehmke et al., 2006). Lemke and 
Reed (2001), for example, argue that the causes of war between international rivals (a small 
group of states that fight repeatedly) are related to the formation of such rivalries. The decision 
to enter a rivalry, therefore, is not independent from the decision to fight once a rivalry has 
started. Using a selection estimator, the authors present evidence for a significant relationship 
between the two stages (Lemke and Reed, 2001). 
Nonrandom sample selection - situations in which factors influencing actors’ choices also 
affect whether the outcome in question is observed - is present in many political phenomena, 
such as war onset, revolution, crisis escalation, rivalry termination, and civil conflict settlements. 
When selection effects are present, not accounting for them makes it impossible to know whether 
the results present true relationships, or simply are the result of selection bias.  
To allow for a correlation between factors influencing the occurrence of a shock and the 
subsequent onset of civil conflicts, I specify a set of two equations in which unobserved factors 
are accounted for in the error term. The selection equation considers the causes of shocks to 
government authority such as economic crises, the death of a leader, war defeat, and changes in 
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the international balance of power. The outcome equation analyzes the causes of civil conflict 
following these critical events, thus only including cases that experienced shocks. When 
selection effects are present, the error terms in both equations will be correlated.  
To appropriately model possible selection effects, I employ a Heckman selection model, 
also known as a probit model with sample selection, or censored probit (Heckman, 1979; Dubin 
and Rivers, 1989). This model uses a two-stage estimator to account for non-random sample 
selection. Since the onset of civil conflict after shocks may be systematically related to the cause 
of such shocks itself, the Heckman model is a useful modeling technique. This model estimates 
the effect of independent variables for both the selection and the outcome stage of the model and 
also estimates the correlation of errors between the two stages.  
Hypotheses 2 through 4 investigate solutions to the commitment problem arising during 
political instability. Specifically, I analyze the effects of the institutional structure of government 
and opposition and the distance between actors on the probability of civil conflict occurrence. 
Since the purpose is to evaluate the solutions to the commitment problem outlined in chapter 3, 
only cases that experienced shocks are included in the second stage of the Heckman model, 
which predicts the likelihood of civil conflict onset. I use the variable combining all shock events 
to identify the set of cases for this analysis. This results in approximately 1,800 observations.51 
Dependent Variables 
In the first stage of the Heckman model, the selection equation, the variable indicating 
whether a shock occurred is used as the dependent variable. As outlined earlier, this variable 
codes whether leaders have experienced critical events such as recession, war defeat, death, or 
                                                 
51 As a result of missing cases in some of the independent variables, the number of uncensored observations in table 
4 is slightly lower.  
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changes in the international balance of power while in office.52 The variable is coded 1 if a leader 
experienced a critical event, 0 otherwise. In the second stage of the model, the outcome equation, 
civil conflict onset is the dependent variable. Data for this variable come from the Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Project (Gleditsch et al., 2004). Only cases that experienced shocks, the 
dependent variable in the selection stage, enter the outcome equation. 
Independent Variables 
Selection Equation: The first stage of the Heckman model predicts the probability of a shock.  
While the hypotheses highlighted in the theoretical section focus on the outcome stage, 
predicting the probability of civil conflict, I develop a simple model predicting shocks to avoid 
potential selection bias. Two variables commonly associated with the probability of political 
instability are a country’s level of democracy and economic development (Epstein et al., 2006). 
The polity score is added to the model as a measure of the level of democracy.53 The squared 
term of this variable is also included in order to allow for the curvilinear relationship. To 
measure the effect of economic development, I include a variable measuring GDP per capita per 
country-year.54  
In addition, several variables included in the outcome equation of the model are also 
expected to have an effect on the probability of a shock. These variables are described in more 
detail in the section on independent variables in the outcome equation below. First, Geddes 
(1999a) and Ulfelder (2005) expect that the stability of regimes varies across different types of 
                                                 
52 While it would be preferable to analyze all event types independently, the small number of cases for two types 
(defeat in war and leader death in office) makes it necessary to combine them into a single measure. As a 
consequence, the model includes events that may be poorly predicted by the independent variables included. In 
particular, the model includes no variables (such as age) that would be useful predictors of leader death. To ensure 
that this is not influencing the results, I also specified models that excluded the variables measuring leader death and 
the end of the Cold War, respectively. Results, however, were very similar to the ones presented.   
53 The composite polity score ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Data come from the 
Polity IV project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.    
54 GDP data come from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2, available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ and the World 
Development Indicators 2004.   
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authoritarian regimes. Specifically, personalist and military regimes are expected to be less stable 
than single-party regimes.55 Dummy variables for the different types of authoritarian regime 
types, described in more detail below, are included in the first stage of the model. Second, the 
organizational structure of opposition groups may well have an effect on the probability of 
regime change. If cohesive, organized opposition groups exist in society, we should expect that 
challenges to the regime are more likely. A dummy variable indicating the presence of 
opposition parties is added to the selection equation.  
Outcome Equation: The outcome equation of the Heckman model predicts the probability of 
civil conflict following a shock and is the main focus of this analysis. The second hypothesis 
expects that personalist and military regimes are more conflict prone following a critical event 
because of their heavy reliance on a small support circle and a high probability of post-transition 
punishment.56 To test this hypothesis, I use data on authoritarian regime types by Geddes (1999a, 
b) as well as updates by Ulfelder (2005) to create four separate dummy variables.57 The first 
variable indicates a personalist regime, coded 1 for regimes in which a leader “has consolidated 
control over policy and recruitment in his own hands” (Geddes, 1999a: 20), 0 otherwise. 
Authoritarian regimes are considered military when a group of officers influences decisions of 
policy choice and appointment. The second dummy variable, therefore, is coded 1 for military 
regimes, 0 otherwise. Single-party regimes, characterized by a single party that controls 
                                                 
55 Ulfelder (2005: 320) shows that personal and military regimes face greater insecurity in their leadership tenure, 
having a median duration of 17.3 years (personal) and 11.6 years (military), compared to 32.6 years for single-party 
regimes. 
56 The Goemans et al. (2006) data include a variable indicating leaders’ post-tenure fate, which allowed me to 
investigate whether personalist and military leaders do in fact face more severe consequences after they leave office. 
A frequency table comparing the percentage of leaders that were punished (through exile, prison, or death) to those 
that were not punished showed that 74% and 53% percent, respectively, of all personalist and military leaders 
experienced punishment, compared to 37% of single-party leaders.  
57 Not all regimes are coded as pure types in Geddes’ (1999a) and Ulfelder’s (2005) list of authoritarian regimes. 
Hybrid regimes, which comprise about one-third of the data, were coded according to the first characteristic 
indicated in the data. A single-party/military regime, for example, is thus included as a party regime in this paper.  
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accession, policy choice, and local-level organizations, are the third category included in the 
model. The fourth dichotomous measure comprises democracies (all non-authoritarian regimes), 
and is excluded from the model as the baseline category.  
The third hypothesis focuses on the commitment problem encountered by the opposition. 
Here, opposition movements that are cohesive, are organized hierarchically, and thus have clear 
leadership responsibilities are expected to have improved abilities to commit to a peaceful 
agreement. In addition, I hypothesized that movements with links to existing organizations have 
better commitment abilities. Systematic data on the organization of social movements or 
opposition groups are not readily available, especially for noncompetitive regimes. Many 
noncompetitive regimes, however, allow for the existence of opposition parties, thereby 
approximating the characteristics outlined above. First, the existence of formal party 
organization implies a certain degree of organization as well as the presence of a leadership 
structure. Second, party organizations often venture into many areas of social life, thereby 
forging ties with existing social institutions. Data on opposition parties were collected from 
various editions of the Political Handbook of the World, which provides information on 
governing and opposition parties in all countries for the entire time frame under analysis (Banks 
et al., 2007). A dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of one or more formal 
opposition parties was created. The variable is coded 0 for countries without opposition parties, 1 
for states with one or more parties.58  
 
                                                 
58 While Banks et al. (2007) occasionally provide data on the age or size of parties, which might work better as 
proxies for cohesion, this information is not available systematically.  I also considered counting the number of 
parties rather than creating a simply dichotomous measure, but it is questionable whether the listing of parties is 
exhaustive, especially for earlier editions of the Handbook. To ensure that the data are not biased toward democratic 
regimes, which are arguably more likely to allow for opposition parties, I conducted cross-tabulations comparing the 
existence of opposition parties across different regime types. The results show that 79% of anocratic regimes (polity 
scores between -5 and +5), and 24% of autocratic regimes (polity scores < 5) allow for the presence of opposition 
parties.    
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Heckman Selection Model 
Variable Name Mean SD Min Max Description 
Outcome Equation       
Civil conflict (25 battle-
deaths) 
0.03 0.16 0 1 Coded 1 for civil conflict onset 
Personalist Regime 0.13 0.33 0 1 Coded 1 for personalist regimes 
Military Regime 0.07 0.26 0 1 Coded 1 for military regimes 
Single-Party Regime  0.21 0.4 0 1 Coded 1 for single-party regimes 
Opposition Party 0.65 0.47 0 1 Coded 1 for regimes with opposition party 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.38 0.28 0.001 0.92 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index 
Selection Equation      
Critical Event 0.37 0.58 0 1 Coded 1 for shock 
Democracy Level 0.24 7.49 -10 +10 Composite autocracy-democracy score 
Economic Development 1.5 0.57 0.72 4.23 GDP per capita, logged 
Personalist Regime 0.13 0.33 0 1 Coded 1 for personalist regimes 
Military Regime 0.07 0.26 0 1 Coded 1 for military regimes 
Single-Party Regime  0.21 0.4 0 1 Coded 1 for single-party regimes 
Opposition Party 0.65 0.47 0 1 Coded 1 for regimes with opposition party 
 
In the fourth hypothesis, it was argued that greater ethnic distance negatively impacts the 
credibility of actors. To test this expectation, I use data on ethnic fractionalization provided by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003). While recent research emphasizes the importance of ethnic 
polarization rather than fractionalization, the data collected by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) are available only for 138 countries.  Such a limitation would severely reduce the number 
of cases in the analysis. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index represents the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the 
same ethnolinguistic group, where increases in the ELF indicate greater diversity.  
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I include spline variables to correct for temporal dependence. Spline variables are based 
on a variable measuring the years since the last civil conflict onset for the outcome equation, and 
a variable measuring the number of years since the last shock for the selection equation, 
respectively. Results for cubic splines are not reported. Summary statistics for dependent and 
independent variables included in the Heckman selection model are presented in table 6. 
 
Results 
Table 6 presents the results of the Heckman model of civil conflict occurrence after a 
shock to government authority. The model is useful for studying phenomena that deal with 
interrelated processes. The first stage models the probability of a shock, whereas the second 
stage identifies factors related to the occurrence of civil conflict. In keeping with the main focus 
of the analysis, results of the outcome equation, predicting the likelihood of civil conflict, will be 
discussed first. The results for the outcome stage of the model presented in table 6 show strong 
support for the hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapter. 
The second hypothesis, expecting that countries with personal and military regimes are 
more likely to experience civil conflicts than other regime types, is upheld in the empirical 
analysis. The coefficient for personal regimes is positive and significant, albeit only at the 90% 
confidence level (z=1.70, p<0.1). In substantive terms, varying the personal regime variable from 
0 to 1 results in an increase in the probability of civil conflict from 0.03 to 0.04, equaling a 21% 
increase. Military regimes are also more likely to experience civil conflict than single-party or 
democratic regimes, as hypothesized in the theoretical argument. The coefficient for military 
regimes is positive and significant and the probability of civil conflict increases by 0.02, or 51%, 
when the variable is varied from 0 to 1 (all other variables held constant). This confirms the 
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expectation that regimes in which the survival of elites is threatened by a shock are more likely 
to use force than other types of political regimes.  
The overthrow of the military regime in the Dominican Republic of 1965 provides an 
example of the dangers inherent in such regimes. Having come into power by overthrowing the 
democratically elected government of Juan Bosch a few years earlier, the military junta led by 
Cabral, lacking support of broad segments the population, relied heavily on the consent of a 
small group of high-ranking military officials and oppression of the general population. Amid 
growing unrest and opposition, the junta promised to reestablish the Constitution in 1964, yet 
this promise was not seen as credible by opposition groups given that the Cabral regime had 
come to power by ousting a democratic regime. As a result, mass demonstrations “erupted in 
Santo Domingo as a large number of citizens, especially youths, rallied in majestic outrage to 
support the revolution” (Wedge, 1969: 186). Responding with “unprecedented violence” the 
military regime strafed the National Palace and began a full-scale attack on the National City, 
helped further by U.S. intervention on the side of the military regime (Ferguson, 1973: 522). 
This illustration, while admittedly anecdotal, helps to show how the location of bargaining 
agreements is hindered by the organizational structure of the outgoing regime.  
The logic developed here, furthermore, runs counter to other assessments of military 
regimes. Geddes (1999a: 136) argues that military regimes are “more likely to negotiate orderly 
transitions,” yet this expectation is not supported by the empirical evidence presented here. 
Relaxing the widely accepted assumption that leaders want to remain in power, Geddes argues 
that military officers value internal order and territorial integrity more than staying in office and 
therefore will “step down before conditions in the country have reached crisis” (Geddes, 1999a: 
136). Yet contrary to this assumption, not all military regimes have scheduled their own 
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departures. The Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-1983, for example, was ousted without 
negotiation following severe economic decline and defeat in a war against a much stronger ally. 
Furthermore, while is true that military regimes have lower survival rates, it is not clear that they 
stem from officers’ desire to simply restore order and return to the barracks. The Argentine junta, 
for example, claimed in 1976 that it had “no fixed term, only objectives” (“no tiene plazos sino 
objetivos”), and wanted to stay in power for 10-15 years (Munck, 1985: 85; Pion-Berlin, 1985: 
55). Rather, the shorter life span of military regimes originates from their inability to extend 
authority beyond the inner circle of military officers. As indicated in the theoretical chapter, the 
military as a group is less permeable than elites in other regime types, and thus cannot grant 
authority to outside groups. Dictators in uniform, therefore, cannot grant credible concessions 
when challenged in their power. The theoretical argument combined with empirical evidence 
presented here, therefore, questions Geddes’ evaluation of military leaders’ motives.   
The organizational structure of opposition groups was the focus of the third hypothesis. I 
argued that opposition groups with cohesive organizational structures are more credible in the 
bargaining process, and this credibility reduces the probability of civil conflict.  Empirical results 
confirm this argument. The coefficient for the variable used to operationalize this concept is 
negative and statistically significant (z=-2.12, p<0.05), showing support for hypothesis 3. 
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Table 6: Heckman Selection Model of Critical Events and Civil Conflict (25 battle-deaths) 
Variable  Name Model 4 
Estimate (Robust S.E.) 
∆ Probability  
Model 4 
Outcome Equation 
 
  
Personalist Regime 0.123* 
(0.076) 
+0.007 
Military Regime 0.345*** 
(0.091) 
+0.017 
Single-Party Regime  0.124 
(0.082) 
— 
Opposition Party -0.126** 
(0.059) 
-0.002 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.208** 
(0.105) 
+0.025 
Selection Equation 
 
  
Democracy Level -0.005 
(0.003) 
— a 
Democracy Squared -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
— a 
Economic Development -0.043 
(0.035)   
— 
Personalist Regime -0.106 
(0.064) 
— 
Military Regime -0.316*** 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
Single-Party Regime  -0.211*** 
(0.062) 
-0.08 
Opposition Party 0.135** 
(0.052) 
+0.05 
Rho  
(S.E.) 
N (2
nd
 stage) 
-0.963 *** 
(0.003) 
5,136 (1,762) 
 
Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Column 2 shows the marginal effect of the 
significant variables on the probability of civil conflict and leadership exit. Variables are varied from one standard 
deviation below their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for 
dichotomous variables. All other variables are held at their mean or modal values.  Probabilities were calculated 
using the mfx command in Stata 9.2 for the selection and outcome equation. 
a Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.  
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
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 The diverging experiences of regime breakdown in Chile in the early 1970s and late 
1980s nicely illustrate the effects of opposition cohesion. In the late 1980s, Christian Democrats, 
Socialists, groupings on the Christian left and a new faction within the Socialist party formed a 
united opposition that also planned to form a joint governmental coalition following general 
elections in 1989 (Cavarozzi, 1992: 208-225). Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy in the 
late 1980s thus can be credited to the unified appearance of opposition elites. This peaceful 
outcome of the negotiation process can be contrasted with Chile’s institutional breakdown and 
subsequent civil war in the early 1970s. The violent military takeover in 1973 is widely seen as a 
consequence of the division between the left and Christian Democrats and their failure to reach a 
compromise agreement (Cavarozzi, 1992: 221).  
In substantive terms, the probability of civil conflict decreases by 5% when the 
opposition variable is varied from 0 to 1. While arguably a small substantive effect, it may result 
from a less than perfect operationalization of the concept at hand. The last chapter stressed how 
the cohesiveness of groups and connections to existing social organizations should enhance the 
opposition’s credibility. The measure employed, however, does not provide precise information 
on the number, size, or age of opposition parties, the unity of party leadership, or the degree of 
institutionalization in society. Such information is either not available at all, or only on a case-
by-case basis in Banks et al.’s (2007) Political Handbook of the World, especially for the earlier 
years in the time period analyzed here.  
The next hypothesis anticipated that relations between groups in society would impact the 
probability of civil war after a critical event.59 Here, I argued that greater ethnic distance between 
groups limits the range of negotiable settlements and should therefore increase the risk of 
                                                 
59 I also investigated possible interaction effects between the cohesion of opposition groups and ethnic diversity. In 
particular, I expected that a high degree of ethnic diversity would exacerbate the effect of opposition cohesion. The 
interaction term, however, was not statistically significant.  
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violence. Measured as the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the positive and significant 
coefficient supports this expectation (z=1.97, p<0.05). Apart from statistical significance, the 
substantive effect of ethnic diversity on civil war is large. Varying the fractionalization index 
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above (and all else held 
constant), the probability of civil conflict increases from 0.02 to 0.05, or 110%. This result also 
helps explain some of the inconsistencies in empirical studies of the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and civil war (Sambanis, 2002). While ethnic fractionalization does not exert a 
significant effect on the probability of civil conflict in many studies on ethnicity and conflict, it 
increases the likelihood of violence during government weakness. In this sense, ethnic 
fractionalization is not a constant cause of conflict, but becomes salient once the existing 
equilibrium is challenged and groups bargain over a redistribution of power. The above finding 
is also consistent with recent research that suggests an indirect relationship between ethnic 
diversity and the probability of civil war (Blimes, 2006).  
Ethnic strife in Chechnya and several former Soviet republics following the collapse of 
the USSR is consistent with this explanation. Gorbachev’s resignation signaled the loss of the 
state’s coercive and persuasive ability and opened up space for rebellion in this multi-ethnic 
empire. In 1991, ethnic Chechens declared formal independence from Russia, which responded 
with force in 1994 (Matveeva, 2007).  
Finally, the Heckman model is based on the assumption that the processes determining 
leadership weakness and civil conflict are not independent.60 The rho parameter estimates the 
correlation between the two dependent variables’ disturbance terms. The coefficient for rho is 
                                                 
60 Heckman (1979) and Greene (2000) emphasize the importance of a robust selection equation when using the 
Heckman procedure. The covariates in the selection equation perform reasonably well, correctly predicting 75% of 
the variation in the shock variable.  
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statistically significant, indicating that the factors resulting in violence after critical events are 
related to the causes of such shocks (z=-4.77, p<0.01).  
Results in the first stage of the model, predicting the probability of critical events leading 
to leadership weakness, are largely consistent with expectations in research on regime stability. 
Regimes in the middle of the democracy-autocracy spectrum are more likely to experience 
critical events, as can be seen in the negative and significant coefficient of the squared 
democracy variable (Hegre et al., 2001; Gates et al., 2006). Highly democratic and highly 
authoritarian regimes, therefore, have a lower chance to experience instability, or critical events. 
Secondly, the effect of economic development, measured as GDP per capita, is not significant. 
Changes in the level of economic development have no discernable impact on the probability of 
shocks. Overall, results in table 6 support the modeling technique chosen and also demonstrate 
support for the hypotheses developed in the theoretical section.  
To conclude, results presented in this chapter largely support the theoretical expectations. 
The first set of statistical models shows that shocks to government authority increase the 
probability of civil conflict, thus supporting the argument on commitment problems during 
leadership weakness. Critical events such as economic decline, defeat in war, and/or crises in a 
foreign tutorial power send a sign of weakness to opposition forces and lead to bargaining for 
authority. Yet both actors suffer from credibility problems because of incentives to renege on 
agreements in the future, and these incentives increase the risk of violence.  
The models presented thereafter investigate solutions to this commitment problem. Here, 
I demonstrate that certain types of actors have greater difficulty in making credible 
commitments. Threatened leaders in personalist and military regimes (given their exclusionary 
nature and slim chances of political survival in more broadly based regimes) suffer from greater 
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credibility problems than single-party or democratic regimes. Empirical results confirm this 
hypothesis, indicating that such regimes have higher conflict propensities. In addition, I 
anticipated that opposition groups with cohesive organizational structures can more credibly 
commit to negotiated agreements. Empirical findings show that states with established 
opposition parties are less likely to experience civil conflict. Finally, I show that the distance 
between relevant actors also influences the probability of violent outcomes. When actors have 
divergent preferences (because of ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences), the 
location of peaceful agreements is more difficult. Confirming this argument, results show that 
countries with high ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to see armed internal conflict following 
a critical event. Taken together, the arguments and findings presented in chapters three and four 
offer a comprehensive explanation for the complex causal path between political instability and 
civil conflict. I have shown how the effects of critical events are filtered through existing 
political institutions of the incumbent government, organizational features of opposition groups, 
and the ethnic composition of society.61  
The subsequent chapter presents a second, small-N empirical test for the hypotheses 
outlined in chapter 3. Certain implications of the theoretical argument lend themselves to small-
N comparisons that allow for detailed process-tracing. The analysis of the hypothesized effects 
of organizational features on actors’ ability to make credible commitments, for example, is 
difficult to operationalize in a large-N quantitative analysis. This concept will gain from 
examination in narrative detail. In the next chapter, the argument on opposition groups 
                                                 
61 The findings thus confirm earlier case-study research on the relationship between political instability and civil 
war. A case study of Chechnya and Dagestan by Andrienko and Shelley (2003) demonstrates how regional 
differences in political institutions and ethnic composition resulted in secessionist violence in one case but not the 
other.  
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developed in the theoretical chapter is evaluated by analyzing bargaining after shocks in Chile 
and Algeria.  
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 Chapter 5: Empirical Test II: Critical Events, Opposition Cohesion, and Civil War in 
Algeria and Chile 
The theoretical chapter outlines how critical events alter the domestic balance of power in 
countries, result in commitment problems, and subsequently increase the probability of civil war. 
The chapter then shows how the effect of these critical events is mediated by the type of 
government, the institutional structure of opposition groups, and the level of polarization 
between groups. The statistical analysis conducted in the preceding chapter provides valuable 
support for the arguments developed in the theoretical section. Findings indicate that shocks 
indeed make the onset of civil war more likely. In addition, the institutional structure of 
governments, the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and the distance between groups influence 
actors’ credibility and the likelihood of civil war as hypothesized.  
Quantitative research has the advantage of producing general results with external 
validity, but lacks the descriptive accuracy, internal validity, and ability to disentangle causal 
processes possible in qualitative research (King et al., 1994; Poteete and Ostrom, 2005). 
Qualitative analysis is better suited for process-tracing, for exploring critical junctures that shape 
processes of change, and for providing more nuanced insight in the findings of quantitative 
studies (Tarrow, 2004). As George (1979: 46) points out, only a detailed analysis of a single case 
can “establish whether there exists an intervening process, that is, a causal nexus, between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable.”  
Criticizing the heavy reliance on statistical models in the study of civil war, Sambanis 
(2004a) stresses the need for case studies to address several shortcomings in formal-quantitative 
models of civil war. Case studies, Sambanis (2004a: 260) claims, can help identify causal 
mechanisms, detect measurement problems, discover new variables and highlight interactive 
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effects between variables neglected in statistical models. Furthermore, case studies can alleviate 
the gap between micro-level theories and macro-level empirical tests common in the literature on 
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  
While the trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative approaches are well-established 
in the literature, scholars increasingly perceive these approaches as complementary rather than 
antithetical (George, 1979; King et al., 1994; Tarrow, 2004; Poteete and Ostrom, 2005). 
Increasingly, research combines quantitative and qualitative research to maximize the leverage of 
empirical tests.  
The goal of this chapter, then, is to test the theoretical arguments developed in chapter 
three by conducting an in-depth analysis of actual cases. Since the importance of critical events 
on regime stability is well established in the comparative literature, the case-study analysis 
focuses on solutions to the commitment problem outlined in the theoretical section. Three 
concepts are expected to influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments in the wake of 
political instability. First, regimes with small support networks have greater difficulty credibly 
committing since leaders feel highly threatened by a potential loss of power. Second, opposition 
groups lacking a cohesive and unified organizational structure cannot credibly signal a 
commitment to negotiated agreements. Finally, groups that are polarized across ethnic 
dimensions have difficulty credibly committing since the trust built through shared identity 
within groups is missing among them.  
Testing the implications of all three theoretical concepts in a small-sample setting, 
however, would require a set of six case studies in which all three concepts are varied 
independently from each other. The chapter will focus on the organizational structure of 
opposition groups for three reasons. First, existing research on internal violence often neglects 
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the role of dissident groups. This is largely a function of the difficulty in accounting for these 
actors in a large-N context. Second, the indicator used to operationalize the institutional structure 
of opposition groups in the statistical analysis is far from ideal. The presence of opposition 
parties undoubtedly indicates a certain level of organizational cohesion and thus roughly 
approximates the conditions outlined in the theoretical concept. Yet the measure is unable to 
evaluate precisely how the internal dynamics of opposition groups influence their credibility. In 
addition, it cannot tell us how these internal dynamics impact the relations with other opposition 
groups. Opposition groups marked by internal competition will likely have greater difficulty 
establishing alliances with other parties. Finally, the theoretical arguments also emphasize 
linkages to existing social organizations. Certain parties are more likely to have such ties (such 
as Christian Democrats with the Church, or Social Democrats with unions), yet a dichotomous 
measure indicating the presence or absence of opposition groups cannot tell us much about these 
linkages. Third, the theoretical concept regarding opposition groups extends upon Kalyvas’ 
(1999) research on religious parties in emerging democracies by showing that the organizational 
features of opposition groups matter outside a religious context. Kalyvas (1999) investigates how 
the cohesiveness of religious parties affects their credibility by comparing two cases where such 
parties have received electoral mandates. He argues that religious challengers suffer from greater 
credibility problems since their program includes the rejection of liberal democracy as a 
principle. It is, however, plausible that the cohesion of opposition forces, whether religious or 
not, will influence their credibility when faced with the opportunity of gaining control of the 
state. 
 Following the method of “focused, structured comparison” outlined in George (1979), 
the next sections examine the theoretical argument on opposition groups in detail. I analyze how 
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the institutional features of opposition groups can affect the commitment problem caused by 
critical events. The purpose of the case comparison is to explain the occurrence of civil war as a 
function of opposition groups’ institutional structure. The cases to be studied, therefore, must 
have experienced critical events that triggered a period of liberalization. As King et al. (1994: 
139) point out, nonrandom sample selection is appropriate in small-N analysis since random 
selection can easily fail to capture the full range of variation on the variables of interest. To allow 
for causal inference, I chose cases that exhibit variation on the key independent variable of 
interest while other independent variables of interest are held constant (George, 1979; King et 
al., 1994). This case selection strategy thus corresponds to a “most similar systems” design 
(Prezworski and Teune, 1970). For the purposes of this study, cases should show variation in the 
institutional structure of opposition groups (the key independent variable of interest), but should 
be similar with respect to leadership type and ethnic polarization (the remaining independent 
variables).  
Based on this logic, Algeria and Chile were selected for analysis. Both countries 
experienced critical events that triggered bargaining over power in the late 1980s. As laid out in 
the theoretical argument, the occurrence of a critical event leads to commitment problems 
between government and opposition. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s led to a massive 
increase in Algerian debt and shortages of essential goods. Discontent over growing inequality 
and unemployment culminated in a popular uprising in October 1988 and resulted in 
liberalization measures by the incumbent regime (Lowi, 2005). In Chile, a sharp economic 
downturn in 1982-1983 put the military regime in a vulnerable position for the upcoming 
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plebiscite over General Augusto Pinochet’s continued stay in office (Valenzuela, 1999: 229).62 
The cases are also similar with respect to the other key independent variables of interest. With 
respect to leadership type, both countries were governed by military regimes when political 
liberalization occurred. Since achieving independence in 1962, Algeria was formally governed 
by a single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN, however, was never a party in 
the traditional sense, but “in reality, and in the first place, an army” (Roberts, 2003: 40).63 
Following the collapse of democracy in Chile, the country was abruptly transformed into a 
military regime, and coup leader Pinochet soon made it clear that he did not intend to return 
power to civilian rule (Valenzuela, 1999). In addition, neither country displays significant ethnic 
or religious fractionalization.64 The cases differ significantly, however, in the institutional 
structure of opposition groups. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the dominant 
opposition party, was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate 
elements (Roberts, 1994; Ciment, 1997; Quandt, 1998; Kalyvas, 1999). In addition, the FIS 
failed to establish coalitions with other opposition parties (Roberts, 1994; Martinez, 2000). 
Opposition leaders in Chile, however, united behind a single goal and presented their coalition as 
a clear and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime (Cavarozzi, 1992; Valenzuela, 1999).  
The chapter proceeds as follows. For each of the two cases, I provide a discussion of 
historical events leading up to political liberalization. A subsequent section analyzes how 
                                                 
62 The economic crisis undercut Pinochet’s central claim for his regime’s legitimacy, namely the economic stability 
and growth achieved initially. The crisis, while not immediately resulting in a struggle for power, contributed to the 
reassertion of political parties and the opposition’s success in the 1988 referendum.  
63 Algeria is classified as a military/single-party regime in Geddes (1999b).  
64 Algeria’s ethnic fractionalization index is at 0.43, its religious fractionalization at 0.01. Chile’s index on ethnic 
fractionalization is at 0.14, the religious fractionalization index at 0.19. While Algeria’s degree of ethnic 
fractionalization is slightly higher than Chile’s (with Berbers being the most significant minority), Algeria’s civil 
war was fought between Arabs, thus lacking an ethnic dimension.  
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organizational features of opposition groups influenced the probability of civil war, the 
dependent variable of interest, in each case.  
 
Political Liberalization in Algeria 
To place the economic crisis of the 1980s and Algeria’s subsequent liberalization in 
context, it is necessary to briefly outline the evolution of the political system since independence. 
I will first discuss the war of independence and its immediate aftermath. I will then proceed to an 
analysis of the Houari Boumediénne regime and the consequences of Arab nationalism and 
socialism for Algeria’s economic and political development. After Boumediénne’s death, his 
successor Chadly Benjedid was faced with increasing economic and social problems, caused by 
statist policies of the past and a global decline in oil and gas prices in the 1980s. A popular 
uprising in 1988 convinced him to push forward political liberalization unprecedented in 
Algerian history. However, when the Islamist party scored election victories in municipal and 
parliamentary elections, the military stepped in and cancelled the results. The move was 
followed by violent resistance and gave way to a year-long civil war. 
 Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962 after a six-year war fought by the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), a coalition of a variety of groups with a predominantly secular 
orientation. The FLN, however, was “united only in their common struggle against the French,” 
and violent competition over the future direction of the party emerged immediately after 
independence (Ciment, 1997: 40). Radical Ben Bella emerged as the FLN’s leader and proposed 
Arab nationalism and socialism, but was ousted after a series of erratic policy shifts (Joffe, 
1997).   
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The 1965 takeover by army commander Boumediénne did not produce major ideological 
changes, as both men favored statist economics, one-party politics, and an anti-imperialist 
foreign policy (Ciment 1997). Yet the coup d’état marked the beginning of the military’s 
assertion of control and the decline of the FLN as an independent political force (Ciment, 1997: 
41; Quandt, 1998: 28). From 1965 onwards, the military’s preeminent position as a decision 
maker became increasingly apparent. The military became the chief arbiter of the FLN’s internal 
conflicts and took a decisive role at critical moments such as Boumedienne’s death in 1978. The 
Boumediénne regime, benefiting from high levels of economic growth due to oil and natural gas 
exports, pushed through a rapid industrialization program (Quandt, 1998). Centralized economic 
planning and the importation of sophisticated technology, however, failed to deliver full 
employment and economic equality. Throughout the 1970s, the regime maintained public 
support through the provision of social services and its claim to legitimacy based on the FLN’s 
role in the revolutionary struggle (Ciment, 1997). Boumediénne’s sudden death and increasing 
economic problems, however, eroded these sources of support (Vandewalle, 1992).  
The military quickly installed Chadli Benjedid, a colonel with little role in the Algerian 
revolution, as his successor. Benjedid inherited the economic and social problems of his 
predecessor. Increases in population size coupled with economic stagnation and bureaucratic 
inertia led to severe housing shortages, a lack of consumer goods, and inadequate public services 
(Ciment, 1997: 45). The administration responded with economic liberalization and the 
privatization of economic enterprises, the nationalization of oil and gas corporation, and the 
agricultural sector. These reforms, however, were undertaken arbitrarily, created new 
monopolies, and did nothing to change Algeria’s dependence on oil and gas exports. A series of 
crises turned into an increasingly explosive situation. First, a conflict over the role of the Arab 
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language arose at the University of Algiers (Ciment, 1997). The regime defused the crisis by 
speeding up the process of Arabization of the education system and the state. Second, a 
progressive family code was rejected by conservative elements within the regime in the mid-
1980s and replaced with a code that “revived many of the traditional features of the patrilineal 
family and relegated women to the legal status of minors in society” (Knauss, 1987: 125). Third, 
and most importantly, global oil and natural gas prices collapsed in the mid-1980s. With oil and 
gas exports constituting approximately 60 percent of total revenue in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
effects of the price collapse were devastating for Algeria (Lowi, 2004: 224). The government 
restricted imports, limited capital investment to projects already underway, and cut social 
services such as free health care and subsidies on food. These actions led to an increase in 
unemployment, reaching 26 percent in 1986, created food shortages, and produced conditions 
ripe for social unrest (Ciment, 1997: 50).  
Once the effects of the economic crisis affected large parts of the population, localized 
protests and strikes started to occur sporadically. In October 1988, a large popular uprising 
forced the government to react (Lowi, 2004: 226). The government declared a state of 
emergency, sent in the army, and dissolved the protests with force. Surprisingly, however, the 
crushing of popular opposition was followed by a political opening unprecedented in Algerian 
history. At the FLN congress in November, President Benjedid pushed through a new 
constitution that established a separation of powers, civil liberties, and freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly (Quandt, 1998: 47). In a national referendum in February 1989, the 
constitution was adopted by 73 percent of voters. In July 1989, a new law on political parties was 
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issued, and “by early 1991, over fifty had obtained official recognition” (Ciment, 1997: 51). The 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) soon turned out to be the most popular of all opposition groups.65  
The Benjedid administration proceeded by scheduling municipal elections for June 1990, 
to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. The electoral law adopted by the 
government “seemed designed to favor the largest party, presumably the FLN” (Quandt, 1998: 
51). However, in a stunning defeat, the FIS scored a resounding victory in the local elections.66 
The FIS received 34 percent of all votes cast, giving it a majority in local governments because 
of the skewed electoral rules (Quandt, 1998). The election victory gave the FIS organization a 
boost and threw the governing FLN into turmoil. Sensing its increasing power, the FIS pushed 
for early parliamentary elections and Benjedid eventually agreed to hold elections in June of 
1991. Yet when the FLN passed a new electoral law that again disadvantaged opposition parties, 
the FIS took its grievances to the streets and called for a “general and unlimited strike” (Willis, 
1996). Prime Minister Hamrouche stepped down under increasing pressure, and President 
Benjedid rescheduled elections for December 1991. The results of the first round of 
parliamentary elections, however, mirrored the outcome of municipal elections. The FIS received 
47 percent of the vote, although a large number of spoiled and blank ballots showed that only 25 
percent of all eligible voters had supported the FIS (Quandt, 1998: 60). Nevertheless, the victory 
gave the FIS a clear majority in parliament. Faced with a government takeover by an Islamist 
party, the military stepped in, forced Benjedid to step down, cancelled the election results, and 
banned the FIS (Ciment, 1997: 55-58). The military’s seizure of power was met with violent 
resistance by the Islamists, and Algeria soon descended into an eight-year civil war.   
                                                 
65 Interestingly, the law explicitly prohibited parties based on religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation, and therefore 
should not have permitted the recognition of the FIS and other religious and ethnic parties. It is unclear why the 
administration failed to outlaw them, although Roberts (1994) and Quandt (1998) speculate that the FLN was hoping 
to “play the Islamist card.” 
66 Voter turnout was relatively low with 63% of all eligible voters participating (Quandt, 1998).  
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Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Algeria 
The following sections analyze how the institutional structure of opposition groups helps 
explain the conflictual outcome in the Algerian case. As argued in the theoretical chapter, the 
cohesiveness of opposition groups and their connections to other social institutions are expected 
to impact the opposition’s ability to make credible commitments. Because of the religious nature 
of Algeria’s main opposition party, the FIS, a brief discussion of Islam’s role in Algeria’s recent 
history follows. I then conduct a detailed analysis of the origins of the FIS, its organization and 
internal dynamics, and its ties to other organizations in Algerian society. A subsequent section 
focuses on other relevant opposition groups and investigates the level of cooperation between the 
FIS and other opposition parties. 
Prior to independence, Algeria’s Islam was largely separated into two distinct spheres: 
Maraboutism, the charismatic Islam of the saints, which was practiced mostly in the countryside 
by peasants and country dwellers, and the reformist Islam of the ulemas, which emphasized the 
fundamentals of doctrine as contained in scripture (Roberts, 1994a: 432-433; Ciment, 1997: 81). 
Maraboutic Islam was successfully co-opted by the French colonial regime and therefore became 
a natural target for a nationalist and religiously motivated movement of Islamic reform. Under 
the leadership of Shaykh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, many of the ulemas began to support a 
reformist program and “established the supremacy of a modernist, scripturalist, puritanical, and 
tacitly nationalist Islam at the expense of the old-time religion of the saints” (Roberts, 1994a: 
433). Islamist reformers had a powerful influence on the emerging FLN, which pledged to 
pursue its goals within the framework of Islamic principles. After independence, reformist Islam 
became the official religion of the independent state. The regimes of Ben Bella and 
Boumediénne successfully co-opted the ulemas by providing Islam with state support, such as 
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government-sponsored building of mosques and religious education in schools (Ciment, 1997: 
83). The FLN succeeded in making Algeria Islamic in its basic cultural orientation, but in 
practice the country was governed much more like a secular socialist regime (Quandt, 1998: 27). 
In this sense, the regime nationalized Islam, just as it had nationalized the oil industry and the 
press (Roberts, 1994: 434). Unlike many other Middle Eastern countries, the compromise 
between ulemas and the Algerian state avoided the opposition between Arab nationalism and 
Islamic belief.  
  This subordination of Islam proved quite successful until the 1980s. In the early 1980s, 
a small dissident group of ulemas became increasingly critical of the regime and received 
support from fundamentalist groups in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Roberts, 1994a). Although the 
state had a monopoly on the organization of religion, the dissidents subverted it by establishing 
“free mosques” outside the government’s control. After independence, the state had built a large 
number of mosques, yet lacked imams to properly staff them. Since many of these mosques 
remained unfinished, the state did not claim authority over them, and dissident ulemas took over 
more than 2,000 such mosques by the mid-1980s (Roberts, 1994a; Quandt, 1998; Entelis, 1994).  
Islamic activism, however, engaged in little open opposition or extra-institutional protest 
during this time, and religious activity was largely limited to preaching in the mosques (Hafez, 
2004: 44). Prior to the protests of October 1988, fundamentalist Islam was a “variegated and 
nebulous movement on the fringe of political life” (Roberts, 1994a: 439). Thus, the 1988 protests 
were not the result of an Islamist movement that had long secretly planned a takeover of the 
state. As Quandt (1998: 49) points out, “no one claimed that Islamists were behind these 
demonstrations at the outset.”  Rather, the protests were spontaneous and popular and lacked a 
clear leadership. Yet two Islamic fundamentalists, Hachemi Sahnouni and Ali Belhaj, 
 106 
 
 
immediately recognized the opportunity to take advantage of popular discontent and further their 
message (Ciment, 1997: 92). They recruited a prominent academic, Abassi Madani, who, 
together with Belhaj, would soon emerge as one of the leaders of the Islamist movement. In 
February 1989, they formed the Islamic Salvation Front. While the Benjedid administration had 
initiated political liberalization in late 1988, parties were not yet allowed, and the FIS remained 
small and quasi-clandestine at first. Once the law on the freedom of parties was passed in 
September 1989, the FIS was officially recognized as a party. 
Formally, the FIS was governed by a hierarchical organizational structure. At the national 
level was the Maljis al-Shura (Consultative Council). The Maljis al-Shura had five dependent 
national commissions, and this structure was replicated at the administrative and communal level 
(Roberts, 1994a: 448). Yet information on the institution’s composition or functioning is 
nonexistent, suggesting that it was practically irrelevant. No statutes or regulations for its 
operation were published, and “meetings were held in private at irregular times“ (Takeyh and 
Gvosdev, 2004: 45). The FIS never produced a list of official representatives in the Maljis al-
Shura, nor did it lay out its decision-making procedures (Ciment, 1997: 93). In practice, 
supremacy was enjoyed by Madani and Belhaj, who officially were listed only as “spokesmen,” 
The two leaders represented two very important albeit quite different constituencies of the FIS. 
Madani was a moderate, Western-educated university professor and represented the moderate 
and political wing of the FIS. Born in 1931 and part of an older generation of university 
graduates, he was “willing to compromise with modernism” (Ciment, 1997: 94). Originally a 
member of the FLN, he broke with the party later in his life and established a strong Islamist 
presence at the University of Algiers (Roberts, 1994b: 449). Belhaj, on the other hand, was first 
and foremost a man of religion. Born in 1956, he was a high school teacher of Arabic and a lay 
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preacher who represented impoverished, desperate, and mostly younger voters of the FIS. 
Known for his fiery and militant rhetoric, he offered a radical critique of the Western world and 
pursued a total overhaul of the Algerian state (Entelis, 1994: 67).  
The dual nature of the FIS leadership succeeded in appealing to a large number of 
Algerians. Small merchants, civil servants, and college graduates were the predominantly 
moderate constituency of the party. These groups struggled with the consequences of the 
economic crisis and sought an accountable and representative government. The other wing of the 
FIS was composed of young men suffering from increased unemployment (Takeyh and 
Gvosdev, 2004: 46-47). This duality, however, created serious problems for the party in 
signaling its intentions to the FLN and other groups in society. The contradictions and fissures 
within the FIS can be underlined by evaluating public statements of both leaders. In his speeches, 
Madani repeatedly stressed his party’s commitment to democracy and the willingness to 
cooperate with other parties: 
“Pluralism is guarantee of cultural wealth and diversity needed for development. 
Democracy, as we understand it means pluralism, freedom, and choice.” (Takeyh and 
Gvosdev, 2004: 46) 
 
“We will leave the word to the people. Whether we are in power or not, 
democracy means diversity, choice, and freedom. We have promised this, God 
willing, and keep our promise.” (Reuters, 16 June 1990) 
 
“We are not egoists. We feel no aggressiveness toward the FLN, since in those 
regions where we did not present lists of candidates, we called on people to vote 
for the FLN.” (Libération, 14 June 1990) 
 
Remarks made by Ali Belhaj starkly contrast with Madani’s:  
 
“Yes to pluralism within an Islamic framework. But if today Berbers, communists 
and all others are going to express themselves our country is going to become a 
field of competing ideologies at odds with the belief of our people.” (Reuters, 7 
March 1989) 
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“We will not barter shura [consultation] for democracy. It is Islam which has 
been the victor, as always, not democracy. We did not go to the ballot boxes for 
democracy.” (Le Monde, 17 June 1990) 
 
“As for the secularists, pseudo-democrats, atheists, feminists, francophones, and 
other evil doers, the day we gain power, we’ll put boats at their disposal which 
will take them home to their motherland, France.” (Lloyd, 2006: 186) 
 
“When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be 
ruling.” (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2004: 46) 
 
The ability of the FIS to appeal to diverse constituencies was also reflected in the 
party’s lenient membership criteria. The FIS distinguished between sympathizers, 
supporters, and activists. It did not require sympathizers or supporters to renounce their 
association with other religious or political groups, nor did they have to follow the 
leadership’s commands (Labat, 1995: 187). The FIS, in consequence, represented a 
variety of Islamic tendencies. As Roudjia (1995: 74-75) points out, “the FIS must be 
considered a melting-pot for very diverse factions which have little more in common than 
Islam and the desire to put an end to a political situation in Algeria.” Yet, as with the 
contradictions inherent in the party leadership, this inclusiveness came at a price. The 
unity of the FIS was precarious because it rested on an alliance of a diverse collection of 
forces (Taykeh, 2004: 47).  
Apart from tensions apparent in the party organization and leadership, the party also 
failed to produce a coherent agenda. The party never published a detailed program and publicly 
only made bland assurances of restoring prosperity and order. The closest the party came to an 
official program was the presentation of a 15-point platform in April of 1990. The points were 
rather vague and mostly political in content. Only three points were Islamist in nature, including 
a call for sharia, a moderate proposal regarding the role of women, and a demand for educational 
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reform in line with Islamist thought. Traditional values of Islamist movements were “veiled in 
the blandest possible language and introduced very low down on the list” (Roberts, 1994a: 455). 
Lacking a coherent program and cohesive party organization, contradictions soon appeared in the 
FIS’ policy positions. First, the FIS abandoned its initial opposition against “godless Baathism” 
and embraced a pro-Iraqi position during the First Gulf War. While this decision was supported 
by the moderate wing of the party, it weakened Madani’s position relative to the strictly Islamist 
element on other issues. Second, influenced by its moderate wing, the FIS had endorsed liberal 
economic policy, which was essentially the position of the FLN since Benjedid. This position, 
however, meant that the FIS had little different to offer to the urban poor it claimed to represent. 
In need of a radical political project to divert attention from this issue, the FIS repeatedly stated 
its intent to establish an Islamic republic once elected to power (Roberts, 1994a: 456).  
In addition, the FIS did not develop ties to established social institutions such as unions 
or religious organizations. This failure, however, is most likely the result of circumstances 
outside the FIS’ control. First, the FLN under Boumediénne had successfully co-opted all 
independent social institutions, including unions and student organizations (Ciment, 1997: 40-
41). Tight control by the authoritarian regime made it impossible for the FIS to establish such 
linkages. Second, the absence of ties to religious organizations stems from the nature of Islam 
rather than the FIS’ intent. Sunni Islam lacks a religious hierarchy and is egalitarian in nature 
(Ciment, 1997: 74; Quandt, 1998: 102). The FIS, therefore, could not improve its credibility by 
establishing linkages with existing institutions.     
After the FIS won a majority of seats in municipal elections in June 1990, the tensions 
between radical and moderate elements in the party became increasingly eminent. Councils now 
controlled by the FIS suspended mixed education in schools, prohibited the sale of alcohol, 
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limited the ability of women to work and instructed them to wear the veil, and banned popular 
music festivals. Yet at the same time, the moderate wing restated its commitment to democracy 
and good relations with the West. Madani declared: “Algeria is not Iran, or Saudi Arabia. All we 
want is a return to our traditional values.” (The Economist, August 4, 1990: 31).  
Strengthened by the election results, the FIS demanded early parliamentary elections 
(originally not scheduled until 1992). Benjedid eventually gave in and scheduled the election for 
June 1991. However, the passing of a new electoral law, designed to disadvantage opposition 
parties, mobilized radical elements in the FIS. The FIS responded by calling a general strike and 
engaged in violent confrontations with security forces (Ciment, 1997: 56). The Benjedid 
administration postponed the elections to December and eventually quelled protests by 
establishing a new prime minister. The December election, however, resulted in another FIS 
victory. Algeria was now faced with a government takeover by a group that had failed to clearly 
establish its commitment to democracy. The military intervened, cancelled election results, and 
used force against the Islamists. 
Taken together, the above discussion of the FIS’ organizational structure highlights how 
internal divisions contributed to the occurrence of violence in the Algerian case. The party’s 
leadership and public support was divided into a moderate and a radical wing and lacked an 
organizational entity that could resolve conflicts between the two. As Kalyvas (2000) notes, this 
outcome is in part an unfortunate consequence of Islam’s egalitarian nature. Quandt (1998: 102) 
similarly argues that “there is no single interpretation of what Islam requires of its followers. As 
has been frequently noted, there is no formal hierarchy in Sunni Islam, nothing comparable to the 
papacy as a source of infallible interpretation.” Absent a strong, hierarchical religious authority, 
the FIS represented a mix of divergent interpretations of Islam. Some of its currents were 
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moderate, some radical, but the party lacked an organization that could force it to speak with one 
voice. Finally, the absence of ties to existing institutions further put the FIS’ credentials into 
question, which may have influenced the military’s decision to intervene and cancel election 
results.  
Of over fifty parties that registered after the passage of Algeria’s law on parties in July 
1989, the FIS clearly dominated the opposition during Algeria’s period of political liberalization. 
I will now briefly discuss other relevant opposition parties and then investigate the level of 
cooperation between these parties and the FIS. Among opposition parties, one important 
distinction is between religious and secular parties. There were two religious opposition parties 
of national importance. First, the Hamas party under Mafhoud Nahnah was an Islamist group 
close to the Egyptian-based Muslim brotherhood (Quandt, 1998: 50; Tahi, 1995: 209). Second, 
Abdallah Djaballah, who had organized Islamist student protests in Constantine, founded his 
own party An-Nahda. Both parties were relatively moderate, but with a clearly Islamist message 
and goals similar to those of the FIS. Why did these parties fail to cooperate with the FIS and 
unite against the regime? Roberts (1994a: 450) suggests that the FIS itself brushed such 
competitors aside out of fear of inhibiting “its confrontational posture vis-à-vis the FLN.” 
Incorporating these parties would have weakened Madani’s and Belhaj’s leadership position 
within the FIS and threatened the outlook and posture of the party towards the regime. Another 
explanation is suggested by Tahi (1995: 209), who argues that Hamas and An-Nahda “were 
created by the regime in order to split the Islamist movement.” Similarly, Ciment (1997: 95) 
suggests that the praise Hamas received for its moderate message “led many to assert that Hamas 
is, in fact, a creation of the FLN.” Both parties failed to garner a significant number of seats in 
municipal and parliamentary elections and had little influence thereafter. 
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Two secular parties, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD), played a role nationally. While both parties had clear regional strongholds in 
the Berber-dominated part of Algeria, they competed nationwide in municipal and parliamentary 
elections (Ciment, 1997: 118-122). The FFS was a social democratic party founded under Ben 
Bella’s dictatorial regime, and is probably the only Algerian party that consistently upheld its 
commitment to democracy (Tahi, 1995: 211). This commitment, however, made the FFS an 
unlikely coalition partner for the radical elements in the FIS.  The RCD was a strongly 
nationalist party that promoted cultural nationalism in the Berber region with little appeal for 
Arab Algerians (Ciment, 1997: 122). Tahi (1995: 206) argues that the RCD was in fact a 
construct of the FLN regime, designed to play a clientelist role in the Berber region and to 
destabilize the FFS.67  
Non-fundamentalist voters that did not want to support the FLN thus had few options to 
consider during Algeria’s short experiment with democracy. The FFS represented democratic 
values, but appealed mainly to ethnic Berbers. All other relevant opposition groups were 
suspected of collaborating with the FLN regime, thus leaving people with few electoral choices. 
It is a subject of debate whether these suspicions originated in the FIS in an attempt to weaken its 
competitors, or whether they truly were satellites of the incumbent regime (Roberts, 1994a; Tahi, 
1995). What is evident, however, is that the lack of cooperation between opposition groups was 
clearly detrimental for the opposition’s position relative to the government. The internal 
divisions of the FIS and the lack of cooperation between the FIS and other opposition parties 
seriously weakened the opposition’s credibility as a viable alternative to the FLN regime.  
 
                                                 
67 The RCD’s support for the regime’s decision to cancel election results lends credibility to this argument (Volpi, 
2003: 52).  
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Chile’s Transition to Democracy 
When studying Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989, it is necessary to understand 
what led to its breakdown in the early 1970s. I will first discuss events leading to the election of 
Allende as President in 1970 and the military coup in 1973. A subsequent section summarizes 
key developments during Pinochet’s military rule. It is followed by a description of the 
reemergence of democracy. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chilean party system witnessed increasing polarization. 
Electoral reforms adopted in 1958 greatly limited cross-party bargaining and thereby contributed 
to system polarization (Valenzuela, 1989). The reforms coincided with a decrease of electoral 
support for the right and the emergence of Christian Democrats as an alternative center party 
(Valenzuela, 1999). A decline in peasant living standards combined with increasing Church 
intervention greatly expanded Christian Democrats’ support base. From 1957 to 1965, electoral 
support for the Christian Democratic Party increased from 9.4 to 42.3 percent (Scully, 1995). In 
consequence, party leaders increasingly questioned the logic of coalition governments that had 
dominated Chilean politics and, as Scully (1995: 121) describes, adopted a “camino proprio (go-
it-alone) formula,” The behavior of Christian Democrats alienated the parties on the left and 
right and thus undermined the possibility of electoral coalitions. 
As a result of this polarization, the three major party blocs were unable to strike pre-
electoral coalitions in the run-up to the 1970 presidential election. Socialist candidate Allende, 
supported by a coalition of leftist parties called Popular Unity, won the election by a plurality of 
36.2 percent. His victory only provided him with a narrow margin over the votes received by the 
rightist and the Christian Democratic candidates (Valenzuela, 1999: 218). In need of majority 
support for the accession to the presidency, Christian Democrats supported the left in confirming 
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Allende. However, the lack of majority electoral support and the absence of a majority coalition 
supporting him in Congress seriously weakened Allende’s position (Scully, 1995). In addition, 
his own electoral coalition was divided over the future institutional framework of Chile. As 
Valenzuela (1999: 219) describes, “important elements in the coalition were openly committed 
to a revolutionary transformation of Chilean politics.” 
Fearing the establishment of a Communist system in Chile, sectors on the right organized 
against the leftist coalition, and mobilization quickly spiraled out of the control of party elites 
(Scully, 1995). Allende, believing that his coalition could prevail by using state power, passed a 
series of redistributive economic measures that increased inflation and led to economic 
problems. By 1973, competition had become so intense that conflicts increasingly spilled on the 
streets. When congressional elections held in the same year yet again failed to produce a decisive 
victory for either of the competing blocs, the armed forces stepped in and a military junta took 
power.68  
The military declared a state of emergency and held mass raids. An estimated 1,500 
people died in the months after the coup.69 The military junta prohibited public meetings, 
restricted personal movement, put Congress into recess, and suspended all political and party 
activities (Caviedes, 1991). In 1974, General Augusto Pinochet was selected as president of the 
Junta and named President of the Republic the same year. He quickly consolidated his position 
within the army by retiring officers that were suspicious of him and promoting others loyal to his 
rule (Valenzuela, 1999: 223). A free enterprise economy was the cornerstone of his rule, and the 
privatization of national industries rendered powerful unions ineffective. By 1977, Pinochet had 
                                                 
68 In addition, U.S. efforts to undermine the Allende government contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation 
(Valenzuela, 1999: 220).  
69 The estimates are from the Organization of American States, Commission of Human Rights “Informe Sobre la 
Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Chile,”  Washington, D.C.: 1985.  
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created a tabula rasa in the institutional, economic, and political spheres of the country, and 
wanted to complement it with a new constitution (Scully, 1995). The Constitution included 
provisions for an eight-year transitional period until the return of free elections, prohibited 
parties on the left, and abolished local and provincial governments. As Valenzuela (1999: 226) 
points out, the result was “a hyper-presidential regime with sharply reduced prerogatives for 
Congress.” The military, nevertheless, felt the need to create a semblance of legality and 
subjected the Constitution to a national referendum. The document, however, was negotiated 
behind closed doors, lacked any input from political opposition groups, and was not made public 
until a few weeks before the plebiscite (Caviedes, 1991). 
The referendum revealed almost 70 percent of popular support for accepting the 
Constitution, providing a boost to the military regime. Opposition groups – forced to operate 
clandestinely - had failed to offer workable alternatives and remained beset by the divisions that 
had led to the breakdown of democracy. The collapse of Chile’s economy in the mid-1980s, 
however, triggered a protest movement that led to the reassertion of political parties (Valenzuela, 
1999: 227). In the months prior to the 1988 referendum outlined in the Constitution, thirteen 
opposition parties formed an alliance named Concertación. To the surprise of many, particularly 
within the government, voters rejected Pinochet with a margin of 54.7 percent to 43.0 percent 
(Scully, 1995: 124). This outcome, however, put opposition leaders in a difficult situation. They 
had won the vote by emphasizing the illegitimate and undemocratic nature of the regime. Yet the 
military still controlled the armed forces, and as Valenzuela (1999: 231) describes, the 
opposition “feared that they might renege on the promise of holding free and open presidential 
elections if they felt overly threatened.” To encourage compromise, the opposition accepted the 
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1980 constitution, but negotiated a set of amendments to remove some of its undemocratic 
features.  
In response to this defeat, the Pinochet regime adopted an electoral formula tailored to 
favor its supporters in the upcoming elections. Yet the same coalition of parties united behind a 
single slate of candidates for congressional elections and nominated a single candidate for 
president. The Concertación’s candidate, Patricio Aylwin, won the presidency. In addition, the 
coalition won a majority in the House.70 General Pinochet accepted the outcome of the plebiscite 
and elections, at least in part because he did not have to fear for his immediate survival. The 
1980 Constitution guaranteed him continued powerful influence, as it allowed him to remain 
commandant of the armed forces and head of the army (Oppenheim and Borzutzky, 2006). 
Chile’s first democratic government maintained solid economic growth, confronted human rights 
violations, and undertook further democratic reforms. The Aylwin administration successfully 
reestablished Chile’s democratic traditions, and in 1998, Pinochet finally stepped down as head 
of the army. 
 
Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Chile 
The following sections analyze how the cohesiveness of opposition parties in Chile 
influenced the country’s peaceful transition to democracy. A first section focuses on the internal 
dynamics of Chile’s main opposition parties. It is followed by an analysis of the cooperation 
between these parties during the Pinochet administration. A final section discusses the influence 
of opposition groups’ ties to other social institutions, such as the Catholic Church and trade 
unions.  
                                                 
70 The alliance did not gain control of the Senate because of the presence of designated senators appointed by the 
military regime (Valenzuela, 1999: 232).  
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Prior to the military coup in 1973, the Chilean party system was characterized by a three-
way division among parties on the left, the center, and a conservative but democratic right 
(Navia, 2006). Christian Democrats represented the political center, and Communists and the 
Socialist party were the most important groups among leftist parties. Parties on the right 
identified closely with the coup and reacted favorably to the establishment of military rule. As a 
result, rightist parties ceased to exist as organizations once the military took over power 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986: 207). The imposition of a political recess on parties had 
major consequences for the parties on the left and Christian Democrats.  
Leftist parties, which had constituted Allende’s government coalition, were the ones most 
heavily repressed by Pinochet’s regime. Many leaders of the Communist and Socialist parties 
had fled into exile, and many of its remaining members were jailed, tortured, or killed. Among 
the parties on the left, the Communists were best prepared to deal with the consequences of 
authoritarian rule. Established in 1922, the party was banned for most of the 1950s and thus had 
considerable experience with clandestine operations (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991: 272). The 
party was able to prevent infiltration and maintain their organizational unity despite the threat of 
arrest. Moreover, exiled party leaders in Moscow communicated with the rank and file through 
radio broadcasts (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). Yet a crisis resulted when party leaders 
(probably influenced by Moscow) adopted an insurrectionist strategy aimed at the violent 
overthrow of the Pinochet regime. Some local leaders objected to this strategy, and the violent 
message contributed to the isolation of the party from the anti-regime efforts by more moderate 
groups (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986).  
The Socialist party experienced the most significant leadership and programmatic 
struggles after the coup. The party had suffered from internal divisions since its foundation in 
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1933. As Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 277) write, they “had been rent by disputes between 
members who favored reformist policies and an electoral route to power and those who 
advocated a violent overthrow of the ‘bourgeois’ state.” During Allende’s three-year reign, 
competition between these two forces contributed to his government’s difficulties. The militant 
sector was represented in the appointment of Carlos Altamirano as secretary general of the party, 
whereas party leader Clodomiro Almeyda stood as moderating force. After the coup, this 
division contributed to the emergence of several factions and consumed much of the energy of 
party leaders and followers. Combined with the harsh repression and fear of persecution by the 
Pinochet regime, the void created by dead and exiled leaders lasted for years. However, after a 
Communist assassination attempt against Pinochet failed in 1985, moderates within the Socialist 
party eventually gained the upper hand. Ricardo Núnez, leader of the moderate wing, called for 
the “construction of one great Socialist party” and pressed for a return to democracy (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1991: 294). This shift within the Socialist party was crucial for the 
reestablishment of the party’s internal cohesion and its participation in the coalition of parties 
that eventually succeeded in ousting the military regime.  
The political center in Chile’s political system was represented by the Christian 
Democratic Party. Generally, Christian Democrats enjoyed greater autonomy in their activities 
under authoritarianism than parties on the left. Their unique position was a function of the 
party’s opposition against the Allende government, which they shared with the military regime. 
Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986: 208) write that the Christian Democratic Party’s leadership 
initially supported the coup “as the inevitable outcome of what it saw as the Popular Unity 
government’s errors, ambiguities, and creeping totalitarianism.” Christian Democrats, however, 
never supported the regime’s claim that the Chilean crisis was one of regime and society. By the 
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mid-1970s, it became clear that the military was not willing to transfer authority to a civilian 
government in the foreseeable future, and the party leadership broke with the regime (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1991: 282). The government responded with increased repression against the 
party, and several of its leaders were killed or forced into exile. Nevertheless, oppression against 
the Christian Democrats never rose to the levels experienced by parties on the left. Strong ties 
with the Catholic Church and democratic parties in Europe provided it with a certain level of 
immunity and also contributed positively to the maintenance of the party structure (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1991). This allowed the party to renew its leadership, hold frequent meetings, 
and engage in consultation with party members, thus preserving its internal cohesion (Valenzuela 
and Valenzuela, 1986).  
While the preceding section emphasizes the internal structure of Chile’s key opposition 
parties, relations between them were decisive for the opposition’s ability to present itself as a 
unified, viable, and credible alternative to the Pinochet regime. In the years immediately after the 
coup, opposition parties were marred by the polarization and discord that had led to the 
breakdown of democracy. The first sign of cooperation that crossed party lines was the so-called 
Group of 24, which was founded in 1978 and included members of all parties, including 
Communists and Conservatives (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986: 220). The group’s goal was 
to develop a counterproposal to the Constitution developed by the military regime. The group 
lost its purpose, however, when the Constitution drafted by the government was adopted in the 
1980 referendum. In 1983, a sharp economic downturn triggered a spontaneous protest 
movement that resulted in a rapprochement of opposition parties. A shared history of oppression 
by the military regime combined with the economic downturn reduced the historic divide 
between Socialists and Christian Democrats (Scully, 1995: 123). The two parties formed the 
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Democratic Alliance, which called for an immediate return to democracy. In 1985, the same 
parties joined forces in the National Accord for the Transition to Democracy. While both 
attempts failed to materialize, they nevertheless underlined parties’ newfound capacity to 
cooperate.     
The upcoming plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued stay in office (as mandated by the 1980 
Constitution) put opposition parties in a difficult situation. In particular, Socialists were divided 
on whether the plebiscite presented a valuable tool for popular mobilization, or whether 
participation would simply further legitimize the regime (Valenzuela, 1999: 228). Yet after the 
failed assassination attempt against Pinochet, radical forces calling for a violent overthrow were 
increasingly sidelined. Eventually, all opposition groups except the Communists decided to 
participate in the referendum.71 Some smaller parties registered first, followed by Christian 
Democrats and Socialists. Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 301) write that “by 1988, Socialist 
groups were actively committed to the No campaign – and working together for the first time in 
ten years.”  
In the run-up to the referendum, the key problem for opposition groups was to unify their 
disparate forces and reassure voters of their ability to bring about peaceful, democratic change. 
In early 1988, a coalition of thirteen parties formed the Concertación for the No. Participation in 
the alliance ranged from conservative rightist groups to Christian Democrats in the middle to 
Marxist parties on the far left (Caviedes, 1991: 44). This broad spectrum of parties gave the 
coalition increased coherence and credibility. The coalition for the No vote emerged victorious in 
the plebiscite. Yet its success in the referendum meant that the coalition needed to transform 
                                                 
71 The decision on whether to participate was hotly debated within the Communist Party. When party officials 
reiterated the need to pursue a violent overthrow of the regime in a meeting, Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 302) 
quote a rank and file member’s objection as follows: “An election is a form of a struggle too, and we feel we must 
do everything possible to defeat the dictatorship.”  
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itself into a coalition that could actually govern. The Concertación had to unite behind a 
consensual candidate for president and agree on single slates for congressional seats (Garreton, 
1990: 69; Caviedes, 1991: 56). After lengthy negotiation, parties on the left agreed to nominate 
Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party, as the Concertación’s presidential 
candidate. In exchange, leftist parties were promised ample representation on Senate and 
Chamber tickets. The Communist Party presented an additional obstacle for opposition forces. Its 
refusal to participate in the coalition had the potential to undermine the opposition’s united 
electoral front. Yet in the end, Communists and the Concertación agreed to run a single master 
slate. Communists would compete separately in a number of races in return for supporting the 
coalition’s candidates elsewhere. In his final appearance before the presidential election, 
presidential hopeful Aylwin asserted the Concertación’s message: “Never again will our 
differences convert us into enemies.”72 Aylwin won the election with 55% of the vote, and the 
Concertación dominated Chilean politics over the next 20 years. 
In addition to the internal organization of parties and the cooperation between them, ties 
with existing social institutions also contributed to the credibility of Chile’s opposition coalition. 
Many have emphasized the important role played by the Catholic Church in Chile’s transition to 
democracy (Garreton, 1986; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986; Smith, 1986; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1991; Lies, 2006). Initially, historic ties between the Catholic Church and the 
military resulted in an ambivalent position regarding the military coup. Nevertheless, the Church 
refused to publicly legitimize the regime. Over the years, the Church became increasingly critical 
of Pinochet’s rule, in particular regarding its human rights violations and its economic policies 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). Past proximity, furthermore, allowed the Church to continue 
its operations relatively free from government interference. The Catholic Church thus took over 
                                                 
72 Cited in La Epoca, December 11, 1989, p.12. 
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important functions previously provided by collapsed social institutions (Smith, 1986: 277). It 
also created a host of institutions to support its activities. One such institution was the Vicariate 
for Solidarity, which provided legal defense against human rights violations. Others were soup 
kitchens, neighborhood organizations, mothers’ clubs, and the like (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 
1986: 215).  
Among political parties, Christian Democrats had the closest ties to the Church hierarchy 
and thus benefited the most from the institutional networks provided by the Church. “Help from 
Catholic foundations,” Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 283) describe how the Church allowed 
“party leaders to behave as if they were respected professionals, maintaining a solid party 
structure and creating institutes to keep research and debate alive.” Christian Democratic party 
leaders and the Church’s Cardinal Fresno also became key facilitators of the emerging 
compromise between political parties. In early 1985, Cardinal Fresno arranged a series of private 
meetings with politicians from various parties, which eventually led to the acceptance of the 
National Accord (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991). However, Christian Democrats were not the 
only party that developed close relations with the Church. Its involvement in human rights and 
social issues led to closer identification of the working class with the Church. Members of leftist 
parties were the main victims of persecution by the regime, and the Church’s role in the 
prosecution of human rights violations created important ties with supporters of Communist and 
Socialist parties (Smith, 1986: 285). This collaboration of Christian Democrats and sympathizers 
of leftist parties in Church-sponsored programs made important contributions to reconciliation 
between both groups. As Smith (1986: 293) points out, “such a process of practical cooperation 
is paving the way to greater mutual respect across party lines, respect that was sadly lacking in 
the last months of the Allende regime.” 
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While less influential than the Catholic Church, party ties to labor unions also played an 
important role for Chile’s peaceful transition. The adoption of a free market economy and 
subsequent privatization of state industries weakened the role of unions. In addition, the military 
passed a series of decrees that limited the representation of the rank and file’s interests (Barrera 
and Valenzuela, 1986). Nevertheless, unions provided valuable organizational space for political 
parties restricted by an authoritarian regime. Prior to the military coup of 1973, labor unions very 
strongly reflected the tripartite division of the party system in Chile. Yet after the military 
takeover, developments toward an organized opposition to the regime occurred in unions before 
they did in political parties. In December of 1975, the ten most prominent leaders in the Chilean 
labor movements (thereafter known as the Group of Ten) formed an ongoing group to discuss, 
develop, and coordinate their position towards the junta (Barrera and Valenzuela, 1986: 243). 
The group sent open letters to the military junta, criticizing the government. Over time, a greater 
number of union organizations joined the group, and its importance increased.  
Ties with the Catholic Church and labor unions, therefore, contributed to the peaceful 
outcome of the Chilean transition. The hierarchical structure of these organizations contributed 
to the development of a unified, cohesive, yet moderate opposition against the Pinochet regime.  
 
Conclusions about Algeria and Chile 
Analysis of opposition groups during Algeria’s and Chile’s transition processes reveals 
the influence of group cohesion on the probability of civil war. The theoretical chapter argued 
that cohesive and hierarchical groups are better at making credible commitments. Analyzing this 
concept in narrative detail shows support for the argument and also provides a more nuanced 
picture of the causal nexus.  
 124 
 
 
During Algeria’s experiment with democracy, the main opposition party suffered from 
internal divisions, organizational deficiencies, and the lack of a clear program. The FIS was 
unable to define itself as a unified and credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. Internal 
contradictions, in addition, made it difficult for the party to achieve cooperation with other 
opposition parties, which would have increased its potential to form a coherent and credible 
coalition against the government. Finally, the party did not develop ties to existing social 
institutions. This failure was partly a result of successful cooptation of social organizations by 
the military regime and partly a function of the decentralized nature of Sunni Islam. When the 
FIS scored surprise victories in municipal and parliamentary elections, the government feared 
that radical elements would soon take over and establish an Islamist state. The military thus 
canceled election results and attempted to reestablish control by using force.  
In the Chilean transition to democracy, parties were able to overcome divisions and 
polarization that had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the early 1970s. Socialist 
groups, long beset by internal tensions, united behind a moderate message after a failed coup 
attempt on Pinochet’s life. This development opened up the door for negotiations with Christian 
Democrats. Parties in the center and on the left eventually formed a united, cohesive coalition 
against the military regime.73 Moreover, party ties to the Catholic Church and unions also 
facilitated the emergence of a unified opposition. The Church, while traditionally closer to the 
Christian Democrats, attracted Socialists because of its engagement in human rights issues. The 
hierarchical structure of the church organization also helped moderate the Socialist position. 
Both Christian Democrats and Socialists cooperated with unions, which provided important 
organizational space in an otherwise repressive regime.   
                                                 
73 Communists did not participate in the Coalition for the No, which opposed the Pinochet regime in the referendum. 
Yet members of the coalition were able to negotiate an agreement with the Communists for the subsequent 
presidential and congressional elections.  
 125 
 
 
The case studies also provide a more nuanced understanding of the theoretical concept. In 
particular, the cases show the consequences of internal divisions within parties on the probability 
of cooperation between them. Evidence from both countries suggests that intra-party frictions 
reduce the ability of inter-party cooperation. In Algeria, competition between a moderate and a 
radical wing within the FIS limited the party’s ability to collaborate with other groups. Similarly, 
cross-party bargaining in Chile was difficult until tensions within the Socialist camp were 
resolved. A more comprehensive data collection effort on opposition groups, in particular with 
respect to the number of parties, their key organizational features, and the consequences of these 
features on the interactions between them would be valuable.    
Are there alternative explanations that account for the divergent outcomes in the cases as 
well as or better than the argument put forward here?74 The review chapter outlined two political 
explanations for the relationship between political instability and civil war. First, arguments 
claim that instability provides an opportunity for violent mobilization. Yet this approach cannot 
explain why political instability resulted in violent mobilization in one case but peaceful 
bargaining in the other. A second line of arguments expects that diversionary motives drive the 
use of violence by political leaders. In the Algerian case, little evidence for such strategizing 
exists – why would leaders initiate liberalization and hold elections twice before attempting to 
divert attention from threats to their leadership? In addition, the argument fails to explain why 
the Chilean military regime decided to hand over power without engaging in the use of 
diversionary force.  
More generally, arguments have emphasized the role of economic factors and ethnicity 
on the probability of civil war. One economic explanation sees civil war as the result of utility 
                                                 
74 Two explanations brought forward in this study (the institutional structure of regimes and ethnic polarization) 
were held constant for the analysis and thus cannot account for the variation in the dependent variable. 
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calculations. In poor countries, the opportunity cost of civil war is low, increasing the probability 
of rebellion. Yet Algeria’s GDP per capita in the late 1980s was almost as high as Chile’s.75 A 
second argument expects that grievances caused by economic inequality raise the risk of 
violence. However, Algeria’s level of inequality in the late 1980s was actually lower than 
Chile’s.76 Finally, arguments on ethnicity expect that ethnic fractionalization and/or polarization 
increase the potential for inter-ethnic tensions and thus result in greater probabilities of civil war. 
Yet neither Chile nor Algeria exhibit significant ethnic divisions, and Algeria’s civil war lacked 
an ethnic dimension (Lowi, 2004: 222).  
In addition to the theoretical approaches discussed above, objections might be raised with 
regard to the Islamist nature of Algeria’s opposition. The compatibility of Islam with democracy 
is still the subject of debate. However, there are examples of Islamist parties that have 
participated in elections and even taken on mandates peacefully. One recent case is the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won a majority in the 2002 elections. Related to 
this point, one might argue that Chile’s long experience with democracy and the absence thereof 
in Algeria drive the outcomes in both cases. Yet contradicting this argument is the fact that Chile 
experienced a violent takeover by a military regime not long before its return to democracy. The 
coup resulted in more than 1,000 deaths over a few months in late 1973. While prior experience 
with democracy has long been established as an important variable for democratic success 
(Huntington, 1991), democracy alone seems insufficient to avoid the onset of violence. In 
particular, the absence of precisely the conditions contributing to Chile’s peaceful transition in 
the late 1980s had led to democracy’s violent breakdown 17 years earlier. Polarization between 
                                                 
75 Algeria’s per capita GDP in 1988 is $4,345 compared to Chile’s $4,684. Data come from the Penn World Tables, 
version 6.1. Data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php.  
76 Chile’s GINI index for 1988 is 54.5, compared to Algeria’s at 39. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality. 
Data come from Deininger and Squire (1996).  
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parties on the left, center, and right had resulted in democracy’s collapse. Yet when party leaders 
put past divisions aside and formed a unified and cohesive opposition to the regime, a peaceful 
return to democracy became possible.  
The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the importance of the organizational structure 
of opposition groups on the onset of violence. The analysis of Algeria and Chile lends support to 
the theoretical argument, showing that organized, cohesive groups are better able to make 
credible commitments. Future studies of civil war, therefore, could benefit from greater emphasis 
on the role of opposition groups.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This dissertation has argued that the onset of violence during times of political instability 
is the result of commitment problems incurred by government and opposition groups. Following 
a critical event, incumbents would like to offer concessions to other groups competing for 
authority, yet suffer from credibility problems. The government may expect to regain its strength 
in the future, which renders its offers to opposition groups incredible. Similarly, opposition 
groups may hope to become stronger in the future, making incumbents reluctant to transfer 
power. Incentives to renege in the future, therefore, limit the prospect for cooperation in the 
present. Unable to make credible commitments, actors may choose to use force to establish their 
preferred outcomes.  
The dissertation also developed solutions to the commitment problem. The institutional 
structure of the government, the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and the distance between 
actors were expected to influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments. First, leaders in 
authoritarian regimes that rely on a small group of supporters were argued to face greater 
difficulty in making credible commitments than other authoritarian leaders. Compared to this, 
leaders in single-party regimes or democracies should be more successful at securing a role in 
future governments as they can make use of their party organizations and integrate newly 
mobilized groups. Second, opposition movements with cohesive organizational structures and 
links to existing social organizations were expected to better avoid the onset of violence. 
Cohesive, hierarchical organizations are better at in-group policing and can therefore coerce 
more radical opposition members and enforce compromises. Third, groups with divergent 
preferences were expected have greater difficulty at making credible commitments. Ethnic 
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divisions can result in competing preferences over possible agreements, reducing the possibility 
of credible and peaceful negotiation.  
Four tasks remain. A first section revisits key findings presented in the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. The subsequent section addresses implications of the findings for the 
literature on civil wars. Implications for policymakers engaged in democracy promotion and 
conflict prevention are the subject of the fourth section. The final section of this chapter offers 
recommendations for future research.  
Several key findings emerge from this dissertation. Empirical evidence strongly supports 
the expectation regarding the conflict-exacerbating effects of critical events. The theoretical 
chapter outlined how critical events weaken the government’s power and provide incentives for 
incumbents to make concessions to the opposition. However, both government and opposition 
have incentives to renege on such agreements in the future, which can lead to bargaining failure 
and war. Using data on all countries in the state-system for the 1960-2004 period, findings 
indicate that critical events influence the probability of civil war as hypothesized. Economic 
crisis, defeat in international war, and changes in the international balance of power significantly 
increase the probability of civil war. Commitment problems incurred by both government and 
the opposition, therefore, contribute to violent conflict at the domestic level.  
Expectations on the proposed solutions to the commitment problem are also supported. 
First, empirical findings confirm the theoretical argument with regard to leadership type. It was 
argued here that personalist regimes lack credibility because they are based on the exclusion of 
the vast majority of the population. Furthermore, personalist dictators must continually put 
checks on their most capable supporters to ensure their own survival, making it difficult for them 
to extend their support circle. Similarly, military regimes limit leadership position to members of 
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the armed forces and are therefore unable to provide access to other groups in society. Single-
party regimes and democracies, on the other hand, have mechanisms that allow for the credible 
inclusion of newly mobilized groups. Results in the statistical analysis demonstrate that military 
and personalist regimes are significantly more likely to experience civil war than other types of 
regimes.  
Second, the theoretical section expected that cohesive, organized opposition groups are 
better able to make credible commitments. Groups with developed organizational structures can 
punish extremists, reducing fears of reneging among government actors. In addition, ties to 
existing institutions in society were argued to have a moderating influence on opposition groups. 
Both expectations are confirmed in a statistical and a small-N analysis. Using a simple indicator 
on the presence of opposition parties, the statistical analysis shows that groups organized as 
political parties are less likely to experience civil war. The existence of a party organization 
contributes to group cohesion and provides members with a hierarchical organization. In 
addition, political parties often have ties to other institutions in society, such as the Church or 
unions. To improve on the rough operationalization of the theoretical concept used in the 
statistical chapter, a detailed analysis of historical cases was conducted as a second empirical 
test. Algeria and Chile were selected as cases since the two countries exhibit significant variation 
in the institutional structure of opposition groups. Findings again confirm the theoretical 
argument. In Algeria, the dominant opposition party was marred by internal divisions, which 
undercut the group’s credibility and contributed to the country’s descent into violence. Chile’s 
key opposition parties, however, formed a unified, cohesive, and clearly identifiable alternative 
to the Pinochet regime, which was crucial for the country’s peaceful transition to democracy. 
 131 
 
 
Finally, results confirm the anticipated effect of preference divergence. Groups with 
competing preferences were expected to suffer from greater credibility problems. Ethnic 
diversity is a possible cause for such preference divergence, as mechanisms for trust and 
cooperation are absent between different ethnic groups. Statistical results demonstrate that 
greater ethnic diversity significantly increases the probability of civil war, thus providing 
empirical support for the argument. 
The findings emerging from this dissertation suggest four important contributions to the 
literature on civil wars. First, empirical findings constitute an important improvement over 
existing research on the relationship between political instability and civil war. The 
operationalization of political instability used here avoids the endogeneity problems present in 
other research. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al. (2001) measure 
instability as fluctuation in polity scores, yet these scores may already include the occurrence of 
violence. Critical events occur prior to actual regime changes, thus steering clear of the inclusion 
of potentially violent events.  
Second, the findings of this dissertation highlight the dynamic element of civil war. 
Currently, much research on civil wars emphasizes factors that exhibit little or no variation over 
time. Evidence on the relationship between poverty, income, or ethnic fractionalization and civil 
war are undoubtedly useful in helping us understand why some countries are more likely to 
experience civil war than others. Yet such arguments have difficulty explaining what triggers a 
shift from a stable political system to war. In demonstrating the conflict-exacerbating effects of 
critical events, this dissertation specifically addresses the dynamic element of civil war. The 
empirical section shows how economic crisis, defeat in international war, and changes in the 
international balance of power can produce such shifts from peace to war.  
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Third, the evidence presented in the dissertation provides empirical referents for the 
power shifts highlighted in the literature on commitment problems (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2004, 
2006). The dissertation shows that economic decline, war defeat, and changes in the international 
balance of power constitute such power shifts, thus supplying the micro-foundations for the 
causes of commitment problems in the domestic arena.  
Finally, the dissertation provides empirical evidence for solutions to the commitment 
problem incurred in times of political instability. While power shifts can contribute to the onset 
of violence, it is shown here that actors vary in their ability to make credible commitments. The 
dissertation shows empirically how different types of regimes, the cohesiveness of opposition 
groups, and preference divergence between actors affect their credibility and thus the probability 
of civil war.   
In addition to the dissertation’s contributions to the academic literature on civil war, the 
findings have important implications for policymakers and international organizations active in 
the areas of democracy promotion, failed states, and/or conflict prevention. First, results suggest 
the need for greater collaboration between groups engaged in the aforementioned areas. 
Specifically, efforts on democracy promotion should be connected to work in conflict 
prevention. While the dissertation does not focus on democratization per se, democratic 
transitions are often triggered by the critical events emphasized here, thus making this study  
important for the field of democracy promotion. The findings of this research confirm earlier 
evidence suggesting a link between democratization and violent domestic conflict (Hegre et al., 
2001; Snyder, 2000). The adoption of democracy is a key foreign policy goal of many Western 
policymakers and international organizations alike, yet the conflict-exacerbating effects of 
democratization are often neglected. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
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(OSCE), for example, is a large regional organization with a prominent role in democracy-
related activities. In 2005, hostilities led to 300-500 deaths in Uzbekistan despite the OSCE’s 
presence and activism in the country. The organization’s inability to react to the violence has 
divided its members on the OSCE’s future, particularly in the area of democracy promotion 
(Boonstra, 2007). It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the international community 
should limit or end its efforts in democracy promotion.77 Rather, actors should be prepared for 
the potentially conflictual outcomes. Collaboration with groups active in early warning analysis 
for conflict prevention could be particularly useful.  
Second, the findings presented here also imply that the international community should 
put greater focus on the period preceding actual regime change. Many organizations active in 
democracy promotion are most attentive to the monitoring of elections and the development of 
democratic intuitions for the post-transition period. However, the dissertation shows that the 
period preceding a handover of power is the most conflict prone. Violence can break out without 
an actual transfer of power or transition to democracy, as illustrated in the Algerian case. The 
critical events identified as causes of conflict could be useful additions to the list of proximate 
causes assembled by conflict prevention specialists (Clarke, 2005). Moreover, since most 
regimes today – even authoritarian ones - hold some form of elections, greater emphasis on the 
pre-election period would be useful. The pre-election violence recently experienced in Pakistan 
seemingly supports this notion.  
Finally, the findings on possible solutions to the commitment problems can help identify 
the cases with greatest potential for violence. Results show that leadership type matters, and this 
                                                 
77 Mansfield and Snyder (2005), for example, imply that democracy in weakly institutionalized regimes would better 
be held off until more favorable conditions allow for peaceful democratization. Yet it is questionable how this could 
be achieved in practice, as long as the quest for democracy emerges endogenously.  In addition, as Carothers (2007) 
points out, such recommendations can be used by authoritarian leaders as a convenient justification for staying in 
power.  
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knowledge should be helpful for the international community. In addition, the findings provide 
strong evidence for the positive effect of foreign governments’ and international organizations’ 
support for civil society and opposition parties in authoritarian regimes. Results show that the 
presence of organized, cohesive opposition parties makes a difference and can reduce the 
potential for violence. 
This research, however, is not without limitations. Three aspects could particularly gain 
from additional research. First, a more unified approach with regard to the types of actors most 
likely to commit violence would be desirable. The dissertation focuses on leadership type for the 
government and the organizational strength for opposition groups. Yet it may be possible to 
combine these arguments into a single expectation on institutional strength or breadth, 
respectively. It is likely that moderates will gain the upper hand in groups governed by cohesive 
leadership and supported by broad social coalitions, regardless of whether they represent the 
government or the opposition. However, under what circumstances do groups decide to pursue 
broad coalitions and hierarchical leadership? Second, a more detailed understanding of shock 
events would be valuable. Different events may impact the probability of violence in diverse 
ways. For example, shocks such as the death of a leader or defeat in war will likely have 
immediate consequences for all actors, whereas the consequences of economic shocks may take 
longer to materialize. The 1982-1983 economic crisis in Chile, for example, undermined the 
legitimacy of the Pinochet regime and was crucial for the reemergence of opposition parties and 
thus the transition to democracy, yet its importance did not manifest itself until the plebiscite in 
1989. Finally, the dissertation neglects the role of international actors. Governments may have 
friendly or belligerent relations with other actors, and the state of external affairs may have 
important consequences on the effect of political instability. For example, one may expect that 
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embattled leaders of states in rivalry are more likely to experience foreign intervention by 
opponents. Rival states may see domestic leadership weakness as an opportunity to support 
opposition groups more sympathetic to their own goals, and therefore intervene on the side of 
opposition groups. 
Over the course of the past several months, competition over government authority has 
led to significant violence in the Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Nepal and, most recently, 
Zimbabwe. In all instances, government and opposition groups bargained over the future 
distribution of power, and violent fighting occurred despite its humanitarian, economic, and 
political costs. It was the goal of this dissertation to develop a general explanation of the 
relationship between political instability and civil war and help identify the cases most likely to 
experience violent conflict. It is my hope that this research will be informative for policymakers 
analyzing the violent turn of events in these recent cases.  
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Appendix 
 
 Table 7: Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil War (1,000 battle-deaths) 
Variable Name Model 5 
Estimate (Robust 
S.E.) 
Model 6 
Estimate (Robust 
S.E.) 
∆ Probability  
Model 5 
∆ Probability  
Model 6 
Recession 
 
0.545*** 
(0.102) 
— +0.016 — 
War Defeat 
 
0.91*** 
(0.3) 
— +0.042 — 
Death in Office 
 
-0.033    
(0.156) 
— — — 
End of Cold War 
 
-0.001 
(0.131) 
— — — 
Critical Event 
 
— 0.311*** 
(0.068) 
— -0.007 
Democracy Level 
 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.02** 
(0.01)   
— a — a 
Democracy Squared 
 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
— a — a 
Economic 
Development 
-0.378*** 
(0.126)   
-0.368*** 
(0.124) 
-0.007 -0.007 
N 5,217 
 
5,217   
Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Columns 3 and 4 show the marginal effect 
of the significant variables on the probability of civil war. Variables are varied from one standard deviation below 
their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. All 
other variables were held at their mean or modal values. Probabilities were calculated using the mfx command in 
Stata 9.2.  
a Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.  
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 
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